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PRIVITY OF WARRANTY: HAS THE TOCSIN SOUNDED?
Walter H. E. Jaeger*
I. INTRODUCTION
Declaring their independence of an anachronism, sown in dictum and
grown in error, more and more jurisdictions are participating in the
movement to expunge the requirement of privity from the law of
warranty. A veritable revolution against the artificial strictures of
privity of warranty and its unwarranted, and all too often unjust,
results has occurred in recent years.' The number of jurisdictions
*Professor of Law and formerly Director of Graduate Research, George-
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1. Mannaz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946); Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958); Alexander
v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1958); Gladiola Biscuit Co. v.
Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1959) reversing 163 F. Supp. 570 (E.D.
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engaged in repudiating their allegiance to this unfortunate anach-
ronism is steadily mounting. Pennsylvania seemed to be as active
in this revolution as it had been in an earlier Revolution which is
regularly celebrated by appropriate ceremonies throughout the Na-
tion, especially as it was the first jurisdiction to adopt the Uniform
Tex. 1958); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961);
Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Magee v. General Motors
Corp., 117 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1953); 213 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1954); 124 F.
Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1954); aff'd per curiam, 220 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1955); McAfee
v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp.
78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Thompson v. Reedman,
199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 CaL.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Burr v.
Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); Rubino v. Utah Can-
ning Co., 123 Cal. App.2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954); Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,
135 Cal. App.2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182
Cal. App.2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960); Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39
So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949); Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So.2d 910
(Fla. 1953); Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956); Hector Supply
Co. v. Carter, 122 So.2d 22 (Fla. App. 1960).
Tiffin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 18 Ill.2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959);
Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943); Patargias
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947);
Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App.2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442
(1956); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R.
649 (1920); Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930
(1938); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317, 38 A.L.R.2d 887 (1953);
Cernes v. Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan. 758, 332 P.2d 258 (1958);
Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So.2d 873 (1952);
Miller v. Louisana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So.2d 409 (La. App. 1954); Sams
v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 157 Me. 10, 170 A.2d 160 (1961); Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Rain-
water v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444 (1923);
Bledenharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1939); Midwest
Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959); Worley v. Procter
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Seaton Ranch
Co. v. Montana Vegetable Oil & Feed Co., 123 Mont. 396, 217 P.2d 549 (1950).
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961); Parish v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc.2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958);
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 4 Ohio Ops. 2d 291, 147
N.E.2d 612, 75 A.L.R.2d 103 (1958); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
106 Ohio App. 265, 7 Ohio Ops.2d 10, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 111, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958);
Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 330 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1958); Nock v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931); General Motors Corp. v.
Dodson 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v.
Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328
S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135
Pac. 633 (1913); Martin v. J. C. Penney Co., 50 Wash.2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957);
LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash.2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
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Commercial Code just a decade ago.2 However, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has just spoken definitively, albeit disappointingly
(and regrettably), in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corporation,3
wherein the majority has seen fit to adhere to this archaic and
senseless doctrine. Lower court decisions reveal a similar dis-
inclination to break with this judge-made dictum and declare their
independence of an outmoded and harsh "requirement." 4 In sharp
contrast are several federal court decisions purporting to apply
Pennsylvania law which reveal an increasingly hostile attitude to-
ward this baseless concept. 5 Thus, even before the adoption of the
Code, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had
hopefully declared, basing its opinion on the evidence of Pennsyl-
vania law then available in the pertinent cases:
We think it is clear that whether the approach to the
problem be by way of warranty or under the doctrine of negli-
gence, the requirement of privity between the injured party
and the manufacturer of the article which has injured him
has been obliterated from the Pennsylvania law.
6
While emphasizing Pennsylvania law, this article will also deal
with privity of warranty generally. Major subdivisions include the
nature of warranty, its origin and early development, statutory
2. Enacted in 1953 to become effective July 1, 1954, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A.
The pertinent provisions are quoted in the text at notes 163, 172, 177 and in note
98, infra.
3 ......... Pa ........ 187 A.2d 575, No. 53, March Term, 1962, aff'g s.c. 110 Pitts-
burgh L.J. 82 (1962); for a statement of the case, see infra notes 80a to 80k
inclusive in text. Cf. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d
568 (1959).
4. As, for example, Kaczmarkiewicz v. J. A. Williams Co., 13 Pa. D. &
C.2d 14 (1957); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 110 Pittsburgh L.J. 82 (1962).
Through the cooperation of the editors of the Duquesne University Law Review,
the writer's attention has been called to the unreported case of Ford v. Owens-
Illinois Glass Co., #1345, October Term 1960 (1961), where the defense of lack
of privity was successfully maintained. Plaintiff wife had purchased a vaporizer
which broke and cut her thumb. The action for damages was based on breach
of an implied warranty of fitness for use. Citing Kaczmarkiewicz v. J. A. Williams
Co., supra and Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl.
537 (1931), the court found that an exception had been made in food cases and
then distinguished Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568
(1959), on the basis of the extensive national advertising which defendant Ford
Motor Company had carried on and which the plaintiff had relied on in purchasing
the defective truck. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Professor Donald T. Kiley.
5. Mannsz v. Macwhyte, supra note 1; McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co.,
190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960); Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120
(E.D. Pa 1961).
6. Mannsz v. Macwhyte, supra note 1, at page 449; italics supplied.
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changes, products liability insurance, and a treatment of warranty
as applied to various categories of products, notably:
(1) Foodstuffs, beverages and their containers;
(2) Drugs and pharmaceuticals;
(3) Cigarettes and other tobacco products;
(4) Cosmetics, detergents and related chemical preparations;
(5) Wearing apparel;
(6) Automotive vehicles, aircraft and their accessories; and
(7) Miscellaneous products.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW
How did the United States Court of Appeals come to state that the
requirement of privity has been "obliterated" from Pennsylvania law
as a bar to recovery for breach of warranty? And does this represent
the present judicial approach? A review of the cases demonstrates
that this optimistic declaration does not represent the present judi-
cial approach, more's the pity!
As in other jurisdictions, the courts in Pennsylvania quite early
decided that where food is sold, even though in the original package,
there is an implied warranty that the goods are of merchantable
quality and fit for human consumption. To trace the development of
warranty, a number of the earlier cases will now be examined.
Although the core of this discussion is centered on privity, it is
nevertheless instructive to include some cases dealing with the gen-
eral concept of warranty in this preliminary review of Pennsylvania
jurisprudence. Almost a half-century ago, in one of the earliest food
cases, Catani v. Swift &C Co., 7 where trichinosis caused illness-an
example of a rather frequent cause of action-the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reversed a judgment in favor of the defendant com-
pany. The court held that the meat packer had not sustained its
burden of due care by showing the pork to have been properly
inspected. 8
Some twenty years later, the presence of part of a mouse in a jar
of raspberry preserves was held to be a breach of warranty in Young
7. 251 Pa. 52, 95 Ati. 931 (1915) error dis. 241 U.S. 690; see next note.
Cited with apparent approval in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corporation, supra
note 3.
8. Three years later in Tavani v. Swift & Co., 262 Pa. 184, 105 At. 55
(1918) evidence was introduced to show that no method of examination would
insure the discovery of trichinae in pork and hence, it was not the custom of
meat packers to inspect for trichinae; judgment was rendered for defendant.
[Vol. i : p. I
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v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.9 In Murphy v. Yuengling Dairy
Products Corp.,10 decided just two years later, the plaintiff's minor
son had allegedly sustained injuries because of the presence of a
foreign substance in ice cream in a "Dixie" cup produced by defend-
ant dairy. The court held that although the foreign substance was
not specifically identified, this was not essential to recovery. In a
more recent case, Miller v. Meadville Food Service," decided some
ten years ago, the action was brought against a cafeteria for injuries
sustained when the plaintiff, while eating some pineapple pie, bit into a
foreign substance. The lower court held for defendant; on appeal,
this was reversed, the appellate court rejecting defendant's conten-
tion that plaintiff was barred from recovery by her failure to identify
the foreign substance in the pie. 12
In Newcomb v. Armour & Co., 1 3 pieces of wire were found in
sausages manufactured by the defendant and eaten by the plaintiff.
Holding for the latter, the court found that the presence of the wire
in the food product was sufficiently demonstrated. Damages were
sought against the manufacturer of a certain kind of oil which the
plaintiff had purchased from an intermediary in Mattiucci v. C. F.
Simonin's Sons, Inc.;' 4 when used for the manufacture of mayon-
naise, the presence of certain foreign substances ruined the mayon-
naise and made it unfit for sale. The court held that there could be
recovery in spite of the absence of privity and in spite of the fact
that only property damage, not personal injury, was alleged.' 5
Where the plaintiff brought a breach of warranty action for in-
juries resulting from an oyster shell in oysters purchased in a sealed
9. 15 F. Supp. 1018 (D.C. Pa. 1936).
10. 34 Pa. D.&C. 355 (1938); in light of the Hochgertel decision, supra
note 3, the query arises: Was the minor son in the Murphy case in the "dis-
tributive chain"?
11. 173 Pa. Super. 357, 98 A.2d 452 (1953).
12. An opposite result was reached in Horn & Hardart Baking Co. v.
Lieber, 25 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1928) where the plaintiff while eating strawberries
served by the defendant sustained injury from biting into tack or nail of the
type used in making berry baskets. The court held that this did not evidence
lack of due care by defendant since it was shown that the latter had used proper
care in preparing the strawberries for its patrons. It may be doubted whether
after some 35 years, the same result would obtain, especially if the action were
brought for breach of warranty.
13. 39 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Pa. 1941).
14. 40 Pa. D. & C. 535 (1941).
15. Where glass was found in liverwurst which caused injury to a patron
eating the liverwurst in a sandwich, the court held that the evidence did not
exclude the possibility that the glass might have been in the liverwurst before
it came into possession by the meat company or after it had been sold to the
restaurant in question, Werner v. Armour & Co., 320 Pa. 440, 138 Atl. 48 (1936).
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can, the court held an implied warranty of fitness applicable and that
the warranty was not eliminated by the fact that the can was not
open to immediate inspection by defendant retailer. Since the latter
is in a better position, said the court in Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh
Mercantile Co.,1 6 to know or ascertain the reliability and responsi-
bility of the packer or processor than is the purchaser, the retailer
can recoup his losses from the packer. This is a recognition of the
fact that as the purchaser generally selects the retailer he does busi-
ness with, it is only fair to make the retailer answerable to his pur-
chaser.
As'will be seen subsequently, 1 7 there has been considerable con-
troversy as to whether tobacco products may be properly assimilated
to foodstuffs when considering the consequences of breach of war-
ranty. More than three score and ten years ago, a Pennsylvania
court held the "guarantor" liable in damages when certain tobacco
he had warranted was found to have deteriorated in the case of
Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke.' 8  After the better part of a cen-
tury has passed, it seems entirely fitting that another court
applying Pennsylvania law in a diversity of citizenship case, 1 9
should reach a similar conclusion when confronted with a similar
question: Is there a breach of warranty when injurious effects are
experienced by a person using cigarettes advertised to be harmless?
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.2 0 is of outstanding im-
portance, not only from the point of view of Pennsylvania jurispru-
dence, but also because of its national significance. 2 1 As there has
been a tendency to absolve manufacturers of tobacco products, es-
pecially where the smoke is inhaled rather than when tobacco is
masticated, 2 2 the Pritchard case may have far-reaching conse-
quences. The plaintiff had been smoking Chesterfield cigarettes from
1921 until 1953 when a medical examination indicated cancer of the
right lung requiring its excision. After his lung had been removed,
Pritchard brought this action against the manufacturer alleging
negligence and breach of warranty. 2 3
16. 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942); the Bonenberger case is cited with
apparent approval in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3.
17. Text at notes 20-28 infra.
18. 144 Pa. 159, 22 Ati. 868 (1891).
19. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 1.
20. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
21. Infra note 23.
22. Text at notes 468-489, infra.
23. There had been an extensive advertising campaign conducted by Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., to overcome the suggestions that there might be a con-
nection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. This led to representations
that Chesterfield cigarettes were not injurious to the respiratory organs and
could be used without ill effects.
[Vol. 1 : p. 1
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The trial court granted defendant company's motion to dismiss the
warranty count at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. When all of
the evidence on the negligence count was in, the court directed a
verdict for the defendant company. Pritchard appealed; the appellate
court concluded that these motions had been improperly granted, and
that there was sufficient evidence on both counts to require submis-
sion to the jury. Consequently, a new trial was ordered. Especially
impressive was the testimony of the five medical expert witnesses
proffered by the plaintiff in response to the trial court's requirement
that proof first be tendered to show the causal connection between
inhaling cigarette smoke and lung cancer.2 4 That physicians as a
whole had not subscribed to this opinion was deemed unimportant.
The court's ruling on the warranty aspect of the case is of particu-
lar significance. It was held that the evidence supported the existence
of both warranties: The warranty of merchantability, namely, that
the cigarettes were reasonably suitable for the general purposes for
which they were sold, and the warranty of fitness for use or con-
sumption, namely, that they were reasonably fit for smoking and
generally so intended without causing physical injury. The court
adverted to the extensive advertising campaign regarding the quality
and purity of Chesterfield cigarettes and especially to one claim
made during the campaign to the effect that "the nose, throat and
accessory organs" are not "adversely affected by smoking Chester-
fields."' 2 5 From this, the jury could well conclude that there were
24. Dr. Kremer [Pritchard, supra note 1, at 299, 300] testified that knowl-
edge of the connection between smoking and epidermoid cancer was being dis-
seminated many years prior to 1953. Dr. Kaunitz testified that he noted a
relationship between heavy smoking and lung cancer as early as 1946, while Dr.
Cameron said that literature on the relationship between smoking and lung
cancer was available half a century ago. He himself became interested in the
relationship in the mid 1930's.
Dr. Overholt testified that he became suspicious that a connection existed
between heavy smoking and lung cancer in the early 1940's, and that he himself
stopped smoking. Dr. Levin started research on the relationship between smok-
ing and lung cancer in 1939 after reading a German article dealing with the
subject.
25. In a concurring opinion, some of these statements were quoted: "There
is language in some of the advertisments for Chesterfield cigarettes shown in
the evidence which could be understood to assert a claim on the defendant's part
that these cigarettes are harmless. In newspaper and magazine advertisements
the public was told that 'Nose, throat, and accessory organs [are] not adversely
affected by smoking Chesterfields,' and that 'A good cigarette can cause no ills
and cure no ailments.' Arthur Godfrey, on a program sponsored by defendant,
broadcast that be 'never did believe they [Chesterfields] did any harm and now
we, we've got the proof.' If a manufacturer assures his potential public that his
product is harmless, and it is proved that it is not harmless, he can be held, no
doubt, for breach of warranty. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 2-313 (Supp. 1960);
Uniform Commercial Code § 2--313; Uniform Sales Act § 12.", at 301.
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express statements that the lungs would not be harmfully affected.
As to the timeliness of the notice of breach, the court held that the ten
months which elapsed between the removal of the lung and the notice
of breach of warranty given was not too long a period to be unreason-
able under the Pennsylvania statutes. 2 6 In any case, the question
was for the jury. 2 7
With respect to the negligence count, the appellate court ruled that
the evidence adduced might bring the defendant company within the
Pennsylvania rule that where one supplies a product to another and
knows or should know that the foreseeable use is dangerous to human
life unless certain precautions are taken, and who realizes or should
realize that the user will not, in the exercise of reasonable vigilance,
recognize the danger is under a duty to warn the consumer. Since it
26. Uniform Sales Act § 49, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607(3); 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 714, 715, 887B (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
27. On this point, the court said:
Section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act, 69 PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. § 259, con-
tains the notice requirement and provides:
"... But if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to
the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty, within a reasonable time
after the buyer knows or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be
liable therefor."
Plaintiff's notice, which was received by defendant's agent on October 21,
1954, read:
"This is to inform you that our client, Otto E. Pritchard, has elected to treat
an injury he received as a result of smoking Chesterfield Cigarettes as a breach
of warranty on the part of Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co."
Where more than one inference may be drawn from undisputed facts, or the
facts are disputed, the timeliness and sufficiency of a notice of breach of warranty
are questions for the jury to resolve. The question of reasonableness must be
determined from the circumstances in the individual case. Columbia Axle Co. v.
American Automobile Ins. Co., 63 F.2d 206, 208 (6th Cir. 1933).
There is authority to support the proposition that the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the buyer after he knew or should have known of the breach may
be considered. That was true in Pennsylvania even before passage of the Uni-
form Sales Act.
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 1, at 298.
In support of sending question of reasonableness to the jury, see Bonker v.
Ingersoll Prod. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D.Mass. 1955) which is cited and discussed
in Burket v. Westmoreland Supply Co., 41 Westmoreland L.J. 35 (Pa. Com. P1.
1958). The Uniform Commercial Code (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-607(3)
(1954)), carried forward the requirements on notice of breach under § 49 of the
Uniform Sales Act. Draftsmen's comments to that subsection read as follows:
The time of notification Is to be determined by applying commercial
standards to a merchant buyer. 'A reasonable time' for notification from
a retail consumer is to be judged by different standards so that in his case
it will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is designed to
defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of
his remedy. (Emphasis supplied.)
[Vol. I : p. I
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could be established that a great deal had been written about the
possible connection between cigarette smoking and certain types of
cancer, and that there is a considerable body of scientific opinion
which appears to hold the connection between the two established
as a scientific fact based on research and experimentation, the court
concluded that the jury should have been permitted to pass on the
question of whether or not defendant company should have conducted
additional tests to determine if the cigarettes in question were
actually harmless. In any event, the assertion that the respiratory
organs would not be "adversely affected by smoking" the said
cigarettes could certainly be regarded as a warranty which would be
deemed breached the moment the consumer could show that the use
of these cigarettes had caused his cancerous condition. 28 *
An examination of some of the other cases in which the courts
have been faced with the question of privity and its status in Penn-
sylvania law reveals several significant opinions dealing with the
liability of manufacturers to third parties which deserve analysis.
Basing its rank on the frequency of citation, Jarnot v. Ford Motor
Co. 2 9 is among the foremost of these. Here, a tractor had been pur-
28. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 1.
*Editor's Note: On the remand, after six weeks of trial, Pritchard was sub-
mitted to the jury on interrogatories. Answering the inter-
rogatories, the jury found that smoking Chesterfield ciga-
rettes caused the plaintiff's cancer; that the defendant was
not negligent; that the plaintiff had given timely notice
that he intended to treat his injury as caused by the de-
fendant's alleged breach of warranty; that no express
warranty had been made by the defendant; that there was
no breach of any implied warranty; and that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of injury by smoking. The jury did not
answer a question about the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence. Under the instructions, the jury was not required to
consider the amount of monetary damage if it did not find
liability.
Presently pending before the district court are a
motion to amend the judgment and a motion for a partial
new trial. The basis for these motions is that the court
should not have permitted the jury to consider assumption
of risk in connection with the warranty counts nor in con-
nection with the evidence of negligent misrepresentation
and failure to warn. It is also contended that the law and
the evidence require a finding of the existence of an express
warranty and a finding of a breach of an implied warranty.
The question may well be raised, in light of the jury's find-,
ing that there was no express warranty and no breach of
an implied warranty, why was the jury asked to pass on
the matter of timely notice of "breach of warranty"?
29. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 3.
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chased from an authorized Ford dealer by the plaintiffs. While being
driven by an experienced operator and hauling a trailer containing a
cargo weighing fifteen and a half tons, the tractor incurred an acci-
dent which resulted in the complete destruction of the trailer and
substantial property damage to the truck. While the tractor was pro-
ceeding on a down grade near Washington, Pennsylvania, there was a
sudden sharp report or "bang" which came from the front of the
truck; the kingpin had broken.3 0 This prevented the driver from
steering the tractor, and when the brake mechanism no longer func-
tioned, both tractor and trailer rolled into the ditch. True to tradition,
the Ford Motor Company defended on the grounds of lack of privity
and an express disclaimer in its limited warranty, a standardized
one used in the automotive trade.3 1
Basing their action on the alleged breach of implied warranty by
the Ford Motor Co. as to the fitness of the tractor for the uses for
which it was designed, manufactured and sold, plaintiffs recovered
judgment in the trial court for the value of the trailer and the cost
of repairing the tractor. When the usual motions by defendant were
denied and judgment entered, defendant appealed. After reviewing
the evidence and finding that the operator had exercised due care,
the appellate court held that the expert testimony introduced by
plaintiffs disclosed a weakness in the kingpin which constituted a
breach of warranty when the ensuing damage occurred. 3 2 The court
reviewed a number of other cases including Frigidinners v. Branch-
town Gun Club,3 3 The White Company v. Francis,3 4 Loch v. Con-
fair,3 5 Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co.,3 6 Mannsz v. Macwhyte
30. It was pointed out that in the evidence submitted, the kingpin, an essen-
tial part of the steering mechanism, was shown to have been defective.
31. The "warranty," or disclaimer, limited the liability of the manufacturer
to "making good at its factory any part or parts [of the tractor] which shall,
within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser
or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall first
occur." This, however, did not preclude the co-existence of an implied warranty
of fitness for intended use. A similar disclaimer was held contrary to public policy
in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1.
32. The trial court had given judgment for plaintiff on the ground that the
national advertising campaign of the manufacturer had represented the tractor
as being safe and dependable and this constituted a direct assurance to the pur-
chaser or driver that the product was not defective and could be used without Ill
effect.
33. 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954).
34. 95 Pa. Super. 315, (1928).
35. 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949), discussed in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry
Corp., supra note 3.
36. 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953), cited in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry
Corp., supra note 3.
[Vol. I : p. I
PRIVITY OF WARRANTY
Co., 37 Conestoga Cigar Co. v Finke,38 and finally, Knapp v. Willys-
Ardmore, Inc.,3 9 which the court described as "perhaps most nearly
analogous, to the instant action, of the cases in our reports."
40
Earlier, the court had said: "Even though a sales contract may
negative a warranty because not contained in the writing, this does
not preclude evidence of an implied warranty."' 41 Citing Mannsz, the
court observed, "it was held that under Pennsylvania Law privity be-
tween the injured party and the manufacturer is not required to
impose liability on the manufacturer, either on grounds of negligence
or on grounds of breach of warranty." 4 2
The court then affirmed the decision against the Ford Motor
Company, but amended the judgment by striking the name of the
authorized dealer from whom the tractor had been purchased because
the jury had found only against the Ford Motor Company.
Some doubts remained as to the validity of the statement in Mannsz
v. Macwhyte Co.4 3 with respect to the obliteration of the privity re-
quirement because of a later decision by the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania in Loch v. Confair.4 4 There, a bottle of ginger ale had ex-
ploded in a self-service food store before it was taken to the check-out
counter and paid for, and the court held that there was no breach of
warranty. However, another automobile case, Thompson v. Reed-
man,4 5 suggested that the Loch case could be differentiated or dis-
tinguished since there had been no sale of the ginger ale, and there-
fore, no warranty. 4 6
37. Supra note 1.
38. Supra note 18.
39. 174 Pa. Super. 90, 100 A.2d 105 (1953).
40. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 3 at 431.
41. Id. at 429.
42. Id. at 430.
43. Supra note 1.
44. Supra note 35.
45. Supra note 1.
46. Sed quae re: Is a sale necessary for warranty? Not according to the
separate opinion by Chief Justice Gibson in Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal.2d
217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958): "With respect to Arden, however, I am of the view
that the judgment of nonsuit should be reversed, because the evidence is not in-
sufficient as a matter of law to sustain plaintiff's cause of action for breach of
warranty. As shown by the discussion in the concurring and dissenting opinions
of Justices Carter and Traynor, there is testimony from which the jury could
reasonably infer that the bottle was not improperly handled in plaintiff's home and
that when the bottle was delivered by Arden it contained a defect which caused
it to break. If an inference to that effect were drawn by the jury, the defect
in the bottle would constitute a breach of warranty by Arden under section 1735
of the Civil Code (Uniform Sales Act, §15), which reads in part: 'Subject to the
provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied war-
ranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods
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In Thompson v. Reedman,4 7 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated that when the Third
Circuit Court remarked that the requirement of privity had been
obliterated from Pennsylvania law, it meant exactly that and no case
decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania up to that time (the
lower courts felt themselves bound by the privity requirement in
non-food cases) had derogated from its authority. Reinforcing its
views, the court quoted extensively from Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.,4 8
Magee v. General Motor Corp., 49 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers To-
bacco Co.,5 0 and Mannsz v. Macwhyte. 51 The facts in the Thompson
case 5 2 are simple enough:
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows: (1) Where the buyer,
expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for
which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is
an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. (2)
Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of
that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.' (Italics added.)
Section 1735 does not refer merely to goods sold but to all 'goods supplied
under a contract to sell or a sale.' It has been held that when bottled beverages
are sold, the bottles in which they necessarily must be delivered are supplied under
the contract of sale within the meaning of the statute although the bottles are
bailed rather than sold. Geddling v. Marsh (1920), 1 KB 668; see 1 Williston on
Sales (rev ed 1948), 582, n 1. The Gedding case related to a sale of 'lime juice
and soda' in bailed bottles and was decided under section 14 of the English Sale
of Goods Act, 1893, which contains provisions nearly identical with those quoted
above from section 1735. The findings in that case showed that the sale came
within the first subdivision of the section, but the reasoning of the court is equally
applicable to a sale coming within the second subdivision. Accordingly, even if
we assume that the bottle involved here was bailed, it would be subject to any
warranty which would be applicable under either of the quoted subdivisions if the
bottle had been sold.
The sale of a bottle of milk by a dairy under the circumstances appearing
here clearly comes within the language of the second subdivision of the statute,
and the seller's implied warranty of merchantable quality under this provision
includes a warranty that his product is reasonably fit for the general purpose for
which goods of that kind are sold. See Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46
Cal.2d 190, 194, 293 P.2d 26; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 694, 268
P.2d 1041. It is obvious that a milk bottle which is so defective that It will break
under normal handling is not fit for the ordinary use for which it was intended
and that the delivery of such a defective bottle constitutes a breach of warranty.
The buyer may recover for breach of the statutory warranty without proving
negligence on the part of the seller."
47. Thompson v. Reedman, supra note 1.
48. 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
49. 117 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
50. Supra note 1.
51. 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
52. 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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Plaintiff was injured during a collision between the automobile in
which he was riding as a guest and another private car. The accident
was caused by the accelerator pedal becoming stuck; this released an
excessive flow of gasoline and the automobile, contrary to expecta-
tion, suddenly lunged forward. The automobile, a Chevrolet, was
purchased new; the injured passenger claimed that he was entitled
to recover regardless of lack of privity of warranty. Plaintiff's at-
torney argued ingeniously that according to the Uniform Commercial
Code, a guest in an automobile should be assimilated to the statutory
words "a guest in his [the buyer's] home." 5 3 However, the court,
quoting the comment to this section, rejected this argument stating
"it is too much of a leap, it seems, to classify a guest passenger in an
automobile as a guest in the home."5 4 Nevertheless, based on its
analysis of the cases it cited and quoted as shown above, the court
concluded that privity was not necessary and that defendant's motion
to dismiss would be denied. 5 5 Since the decision in Hochgertel v.
53. Uniform Commercial Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 2-318: "A seller's
warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section. (1953, April 6, P.L. 3, § 2-318.)"
54. The court added: "Plaintiff argues that since 'a guest in his home'
is covered, then a guest in an automobile should similarly be covered. The Uni-
form Commercial Code Comment, however, says:
'This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the sec-
tion is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing
case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who re-
sells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.'
To this Court, it seems more consistent with the plain meaning of words to
understand the comment as leaving this present situation at large. It is too
much of a leap, it seems, to classify a guest passenger in an automobile as a
guest in the home. In that light, the question remains one of gleaning the rule
from 'the developing case law.'"
55. The court disposed of the privity argument: "The question was presented
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1946 in Mannsz v.
Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3rd Cir. 1946), Marls, Goodrich and Biggs, Circuit
Judges; opinion by Biggs, J. In that diversity action, plaintiffs' injuries were
claimed as having resulted from failure of wire rope sold by Bradford and manu-
factured by defendant Macwhyte. The complaints alleged breach of warranty
and negligence by Macwhyte in connection with manufacture and inspection of
the rope, and in misrepresentations of its fitness for the purpose (suspending
scaffolds). At page 449, the Court said:
* ** We think it is clear that whether the approach to the problem
be by way of warranty or under the doctrine of negligence, the require-
ment of privity between the injured party and the manufacturer of the
article which has injured him has been obliterated from the Pennsylvania
law. * * *
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Canada Dry Corporation,55a this would no longer seem to be the law
as the plaintiff passenger was neither a subpurchaser nor within
"the distributive chain."
In another diversity of citizenship case,5 6 McQuaide v. Bridgeport
The opinion continues with a discussion of the manner in which the require-
ment of privity was eliminated, case by case, collecting over a dozen authorities
at page 450. Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 450 (3rd Cir. 1946)."
The court then discusses the facts in a "later Pennsylvania warranty case
[which] rather pointedly cites and follows the Mannsz case," referring to Jarnot
v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 3, from which the court quoted in its opinion:
"A person, who after the purchase of a thing, has been damaged because of its
unfitness for the intended purpose may bring an action in assumpsit against the
manufacturer based on a breach of implied warranty of fitness; and proof of a
contractual relationship or privity between the manufacturer and the purchaser
is not necessary to impose liability for the damage. Cf. Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa.
158, 63 A.2d 24; Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715.
There is some analogy in the principle referred to . . . in Conestoga Cigar Co. v.
Finke, [supra note 18] long before The Sales Act, supra [of May 19, 1915, P.L.
543, §§ 15 & 69, 69 P.S. §§ 124, 314]. In Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445,
it was held that under Pennsylvania Law privity'between the injured party and
the manufacturer is not required, to impose liability on the manufacturer either
on grounds of negligence or on grounds of breach of warranty. That case was
cited in Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., [375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953)],
supra, in support of the principle. * * *" [156 A.2d 572]
The court notes that the Pennsylvania cases have not been too clear on the
subject of privity, observing: "In his discussion of 'Products Liability-Privity'
in 75 A.L.R.2d 39, 53-54, n. 18, the annotation writer ventures that 'this refer--
ence to the Silverman Case is perplexing' and takes the position that the refer-
ence to Mannsz in Silverman in truth exemplifies an exception to the general
requirement of privity."
Be that as it may, however, there are later cases, apart from that already
mentioned, which seem to reinforce plaintiff's position. An example is one which
came before the courts four times under the captlion of Magee v. General Motors
Corp., 117 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1953); 213 F.2d 899 (3rd Cir. 1954); 124 F.
Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1954); aff'd per cur. 220 F.2d 270 (3rd Cir. 1955)."
This entire discussion must be reexamined and evaluated in light of the
latest decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry
Corp., supra note 3. The case is stated in detail in text, infra notes 80a to 80k
inclusive.
55a., Supra note 3.
56. On this point, the court remarked: "Breach of Warranty Construed As
A- Contract Or Tort Action For Purposes Of Conflict of Laws: This -being a
diversity case, under the rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58
S. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), this Court must follow the conflict of laws
rules prevailing in the State of Connecticut. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manu-
facturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941).
The first Inquiry is how do the Connecticut courts construe a cause of action
for breach of warranty-as a contract action or a tort action-for purposes of
conflict of laws? The answer is that the Connecticut courts have not declared
what conflict of laws rule is applicable to a breach of warranty action."
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Brass Co., 5 7 a woman bought an insecticide at a supermarket in
Pittsburgh; the manufacturer was located in Connecticut. When plain-
tiff sustained certain injuries from using the insecticide, she brought
this action. The defendant company moved to dismiss on the ground
of lack of privity. Holding Pennsylvania law to be applicable under
either the theory of warranty or the theory of negligence, the federal
court concluded that lack of privity could not be a bar since privity
has been "obliterated," quoting Jarnot and Mannsz, supra. 5 7a So
therefore, whether tort or contract was involved, the applicable law
would still not preclude a recovery. If based on tort, Connecticut,
where the action is being brought, would follow the law of Pennsyl-
vania where the injury occurred. And if the action is regarded as
sounding in contract, the result would not be different since the sale
was made in Pittsburgh and the court would apply the lex loci con-
tractus.58 Although the court quoted the opinion in Mannsz v. Mac-
whyte5 9 with approval on this point, the authority of this statement
must be doubted in view of the limitations which appear in Hochgertel
v. Canada Dry Corporation: 59a
We think it is clear that whether the approach to the prob-
lem be by way of warranty or under the doctrine of negli-
gence, the requirement of privity between the injured party
and the manufacturer of the article which has injured him
has been obliterated from the Pennsylvania law. The aboli-
tion of the doctrine occurred first in the food cases, next in
the beverages decisions and now has been extended to those
cases in which the article manufactured, not dangerous or
even beneficial if properly made, injured a person because it
was manufactured improperly.6 0
57. 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960).
57a. That privity has not been obliterated, see Hochgertel v. Canada Dry
Corp., supra note 3.
58. "If the breach of warranty alleged in the second count is construed as
a contract action, the Connecticut courts, in determining the existence of the
warranty and the persons to whom it extended, would apply the law of the place
where the contract was to have its beneficial operation. Craig & Co. v. Uncas
Paperboard Co., 104 Conn. 559, 133 A. 673 (1926); McLoughlin v. Shaw, 95 Conn.
102, 111 A. 62 (1920).
"If the breach of warranty, however, is regarded as a tort action, then under
Connecticut conflict of laws rules the law of the place where the tort occurred
governs. Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 142 A.2d 527 (1958)."
McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., supra note 57.
59. Supra note 1.
59a. Supra note 3; however, In the McQuaide case, the result would have
been the same, since the plaintiff was a subpurchaser.
60. The court points out that the opinion in the Mannsz case was written
by Judge Biggs, and concurred in by Judges Maria and Goodrich, McQuaide v.
Bridgeport Brass Co., supra note 57, at 254.
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And from Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 6 1 the following was deemed per-
tinent:
A person, who after the purchase of a thing, has been dam-
aged because of its unfitness for the intended purpose may
bring an action in assumpsit against the manufacturer based
on a breach of implied warranty of fitness; and proof of a
contractual relationship or privity between the manufac-
turer and the purchaser is not necessary to impose liability
for the damage.6 2
The court also reviewed a number of cases from other jurisdic-
tions 6 3 and articles by various legal scholars. 6 4
61. Supra note 3.
62. Quoted in McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co. supra note 57, at 254; the
court notes: "Pennsylvania, unlike other states including Connecticut (see e. g.
Hermanson v. Town Motors, D.C. Conn. 1953 126 F.Supp. 519,) seems not to re-
quire privity of contract where breach of warranty, express or implied, is alleged."
In light of the decision in Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961),
there may be some doubt as to whether Connecticut still adheres to the privity
requirement. Of course, since the Hermanson case, Connecticut has adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code, see infra note 196.
63. Gosling v. Nichols, 59 Cal. App.2d 442, 139 P.2d 86 (1943); Medeiros v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App.2d 707, 135 P.2d 676 (1943); Greco v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Lindsey, 262
Fed. 331 (5th Cir. 1919); Sterling Aluminum Products v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d
801 (8th Cir. 1944) cert. den. 322 U.S. 761 (1944).
64. Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1888); Ehrenzweig,
Products Liability In The Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 794 (1960); Prosser,
The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer) 69 YALE L.J.
1099 (1960). Products liability has stimulated a prolific flow of periodical litera-
ture as the following articles will attest:
Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immedi-
ate Vendees, 45 L.Q. REV. 343 (1929); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Condon,
Progress of Products Liability Law, 31 N.Y.S. B. BULL. 119 (1959);
Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1925); Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 MINN. L. REV. 752
(1935); Fricke, Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability, 6 VILLA-
NOVA L. REV. 1 (1960); Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE.
L. REV. 119 (1958); Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products
Be Liable Without Negligence? 24 TENN. L. REV. 928 (1957); Hotes,
Advertised-Product Liability, 8 CLEVELAND-MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1959);
Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent
Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 493; James, General Products-Should
Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence? 24 TENN. L. REV. 923
(1957); James, The Liability of Manufacturers for Faulty Goods, THE
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 287 (1960); Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liabil-
ity to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134
(1937); Lucey, Liability Without Fault and the Natural Law, 24 TENN.
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Among the cases frequently cited and relied on by the courts as
stated above is Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club,6 5 where
the vendor appealed from an order of the lower court opening a judg-
ment which had been confessed in the amount of the price of a food
freezer sold to the Gun Club. Judgment had been entered against the
Club in the amount of $730.00, based on a note executed by the Gun
Club as collateral security for the payment of the purchase price of
the freezer. 6 6 The basis for opening the judgment was the allegation
that the freezer was not performing satisfactorily and that the food
served from it was not merchantable, or in short, not edible. In con-
L. REV. 952 (1957); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Proc-
ess-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961); Noel,
Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN.
L. REV. 963 (1957); Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries
Caused by Defects in Products, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957); Russell,
Manufacturers' Liability to the Ultimate Consumer, 21 KY. L.J. 388
(1933); Ruud, Manufacturers' Liability for Representations Made by
Their Sales Engineers to Subpurchasers, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 251 (1961);
Skeel, Advertised-Product Liability, 8 CLEVELAND-MARSHALL L. REV. 2
(1959); Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on War-
ranty, 19 N.C.L. REV. 551 (1941); Willis, Product Liability Without Fault,
15 FooD, DRUG, COSMETIC L. J. 648 (1960); Wilson, Products Liability, 43
CALIF. L. REV. 614 (1955).
A comprehensive bibliography on products liability has been published in 7-
No. 5 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 70 (1961).
See also Noel, Manufacturers' Negligence of Design or Directions for Use
of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962) discussed in Keeffe, Practicing Lawyer's
Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 49 A.B.A.J. 109 (1963).
65. 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954).
66. In the petition to open judgment the appellee averred inter alia: (1)
that the parties had agreed that Frigidinners were to be placed upon the premises
of appellee for thirty days but if not satisfactory they were to be removed and
all the papers executed, including the conditional sales contract and the judgment
note, were to be null and void; (2) that the Frigidinners had not performed
properly and were not satisfactory; (3) that the food served with the Frigidinners
was not merchantable. The appellant denied the allegations in the petition and
in its answer averred, inter alia, that the conditional sales agreement constituted
the entire contract between the parties, and that the contract in no way provided
for food to be served with the Frigidinner appliance. Regarding the application of
the appellee Club, the court remarked: "It is well established that an application
to open a confessed judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
which, in the exercise thereof, is governed by equitable principles; and on appeal
the court's dispositive order will not be reversed except for a clear abuse of
discretion. Baron v. Bernstein, 175 Pa. Super. 608, 106 A.2d 668. In passing upon
a rule to open a judgment both the pleadings and the testimony may be taken
into consideration in determining whether or not a meritorious defense has been
indicated by one who seeks to open judgment confessed against him. Lloyd v.
Jacoby, 156 Pa. Super. 105, 39 A.2d 525."
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sequence, the Gun Club was anxious to rescind the contract.6 7 One
of the reasons the vendor contended that the lower court had abused
its discretion in opening the judgment was the presence of an express
disclaimer in the contract of sale which stated: "This Contract con-
tains the entire agreement between Seller and Buyer; there are no
other representations, warranties or covenants by either party. This
Contract may not be modified except in writing."
This argument, however, did not seem to impress the Superior
Court which found that as there was no express disclaimer of implied
warranties, the implied warranty of merchantability would survive
the disclaimer provision. The court quoted the Uniform Sales Act
§ § 15 and 71,68 to the effect that "there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be of merchantable quality,"6 9 unless the parties
have expressly agreed otherwise, citing Hobart Manufacturing Co. v.
Rodziewicz,7 0 where the court had said:
The' doctrine is well established that when a buyer relies on
the judgment of a seller who knows the purpose for which
the property is to be used, there is an implied warranty that
the property is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it
was bought, and it is not excluded by a written contract
eliminating any warranty that may have been made by the
seller. The implied sales warranty arises independently and
outside of the contract and is imposed by operation of law. 7 1
Signalizing the difference between express warranties where the
parol evidence rule precludes the admission of any extrinsic evidence
to vary or contradict the terms of the contract,7 2 and implied or
constructive warranties, 7 3 the court remarked, "parol evidence may
67. Appellant argued that the judgment note and the conditional sales agree-
ment for which it was collateral security constitute the entire contract between
the parties and their respective rights and obligations are fully contained therein
in clear and unambiguous terms.
68. Uniform Sales Act, P.L. 543, (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 124) (1915) pro-
vides in § 15: "Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who
deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or
not), there Is an implied warranty that the goods shaU be of merchantable quality."
Section 71 reads: "Where any right, duty, or liability would arise under a
contract to sell or a sale, by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied
by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by
custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 332.
69. Uniform Sales Act § 15, supra note 68.
70. 125 Pa. Super. 240, 189 Atl. 580 (1937).
71. Citing Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
72. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3d ed. Jaeger, 1961) § 643.
73. Text at note 136, infra.
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be received to show circumstances tending to establish an implied
warranty."'7 4 It was held that the evidence relating to the warranty
had been properly admitted, and that as it also tended to show a
breach thereof, the court concluded that a prima facie instance of a
breach of an implied warranty had been established. 7 5
A similar case7 6 decided under the Uniform Commercial Code in-
volved the sale of certain bottle "pourers". These were devices to be
attached to beverage bottles to measure and insure uniformity in the
amount of each drink dispensed. When the 123 pourers were found
deficient in various respects, especially as to uniformity of measure-
ment, the purchaser defaulted on his note. From a refusal by the lower
court to open a judgment entered by confession upon purchaser's
note, the maker appealed. Reversing the lower court and holding that
in spite of an express warranty, there was also an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose because these warranties are not
inconsistent, the appellate court quoted the Uniform Commercial
Code: "Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties
other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,"7 7
and held that the vendee had a right to rescind when the warranty
was breached. 7 8
74. Frigidinners v. Branchtown Gun Club, supra note 33 at 648, citing Hobart
Manufacturing Company v. Rodziewicz, supra note 70, where the court's entire
statement is: "The weight of authority, and we think the sounder reasoning,
supports the view that while parol evidence Is not admissible to prove an ex-
press warranty, it is admissible to show circumstances tending to establish an
implied warranty." The court also noted that: "In White Co. v. Francis, 95 Pa.
Super. 315, as in the case at bar, judgment had been entered by confession under
a warrant in a bailment lease. We held that a contract providing that the written
agreement constituted the entire contract did not preclude the defendant from
relying upon an implied warranty that the truck in question was reasonably fit
for the purpose for which it was manufactured and leased." Hobart Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Rodziewicz, supra.
75. In this connection, the court stated: "For the purpose of the rule to
open judgment the appellee was only required to show that it had a good defense
in whole or in part of the claim on which the judgment was founded. Once this
requirement was met it became the duty of the court below to open the judgment
and allow the appellee to definitely prove its case by proper evidence before a jury.
Plympton Cabinet Co. v. Rosenberg, 96 Pa. Super. 330. Moreover, where, on the
pleadings and proof, doubts exist as to what is the real justice and equity of the
case, the court below, ordinarily, will not be reversed for opening or refusing to
open a judgment since its order, when Interlocutory, as is the present one, is within
its sound discretion." Frigidinners v. Branchtown Gun Club, supra note 33.
76. L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
77. Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-317(c). Cumulation and Conflict of
Warranties Express or Implied.
78. The court cited Frantz Equipment Co. v. The Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa.
459, 88 A.2d 702 (1952).
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Pennsylvania has had its fair share of soft drink cases, Caskie V.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., lnc. 9 being somewhat typical. Plaintiff pur-
chased a bottle of Coca-Cola from a vending machine; upon drinking
a part of it, he noticed that its odor was like that of "brake fluid."
Actually, it turned out to be hydrochloric acid and was the cause of
his subsequent illness. When the trial court gave judgment for plain-
tiff in the amount of $6,500, the defendant company appealed. Citing
Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,8 0 the appellate
court affirmed, holding that "a breach of the implied warranty of fit-
ness" had been proved by establishing the presence of the acid in the
beverage.
However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has made it quite
clear that if recovery is to be had for breach of warranty in a bot-
tled beverage case, the plaintiff must be a purchaser or subpurchaser
"in the distributive chain," Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corporation.SOa
Here, the plaintiff, a bartender in a clubhouse, was injured by flying
fragments of glass from an unopened soda water bottle which ex-
ploded while standing on a counter behind the bar. The trial court
sustained preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer,80b
and an appeal was taken. Said the Supreme Court:
There is no doubt that when the defendant manufac-
turer sold the bottle of soda water to the fraternal lodge
involved, it impliedly warranted to the purchaser that the
contents of the bottle were fit for the purposes intended.89c
Two interesting questions are posed by this appeal:
(1) Did this implied warranty extend to the plaintiff, an
employee of the purchaser? (2) Did the warranty cover
the container as well as the contents of the bottle? Our
answer to the first question is determinative of the case.
The court then quotes Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the Official Comments 2 and 3 thereto, and continues:
It is clear from the language used [in § 2-318 and the
quoted Comments thereto] that in order to qualify as a
person (not a buyer), who is within the protection of the
warranty, one must be a member of the buyer's family, his
79. 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953); cf. Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works,
supra note 1.
80. 296 Pa. 114, 145 Atl. 700 (1929).
80a. Supra note 3.
80b. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 4, for lower court citations.
80c. Citing Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., supra note 16, and
Loch v. Confair, supra note 35.
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household or a guest in his home. An employee is definitely
in none of these categories.80d
The Supreme Court suggests that as the Uniform Commercial Code
was not intended by its framers to restrict the case law in this field,
a study of the pertinent Pennsylvania authorities becomes necessary:
The general rule in the United States is that the mere re-
sale of a warranted article does not give the subpurchaser
the right to sue the manufacturer in assumpsit, on the basis
of breach of warranty, for damages incurred by him due to
a defect in the quality of the goods. Pennsylvania decisions
are in accord with this general proposition. The warranty
is personal to the immediate or original buyer, and he alone
may avail himself of the benefit thereof. This limitation
is based on the rule of privity of contract.oe
However, nearly a third of the American jurisdictions, in-
cluding Pennsylvania, have broken away from the rule of
"privity of contract" in cases involving food, beverages and
like goods for human consumption, and have for various
reasons permitted a subpurchaser to sue the manufacturer
directly in assumpsit for breach of an implied warranty
that the food was wholesome and fit to eat.8 0f
After citing certain Pennsylvania cases discussed heretofore,8 0g
the Court declares that a close study thereof will show that the
courts therein did not "outrightly reject the 'privity of contract'
rule, but extended the obligation of the manufacturer to the sub-
purchaser in such instances upon the basis of the demands of 'so-
80d. The Court adds: "For the meaning of the words, 'Family' and 'house-
hold' see, Way Estate, 379 Pa. 421, 109 A.2d 164 (1954) and Shank Estate, 399
Pa. 656, 161 A.2d 47 (1960)."
UCC § 2-318 is quoted supra note 53; Comment 3 to this section appears in
footnote 54, supra.
In a footnote at this point in the opinion, the Court cites Duart v. Axton
Cross Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 188, 110 A.2d 647 (1954) to the effect that a statute
"exactly similar" to § 2-318 of the UCC adopted in Connecticut to be effective
October 1, 1961, was interpreted to the effect "that a maid was not a member
of the buyer's household" (emphasis supplied). Actually, it was a cook em-
ployed by a college who was held not to be a member of the household, which
may, perhaps, be somewhat more justifiable than so holding with respect to a
maid living with the family by whom she is employed. The cook in question
neither lived at the college nor took her meals there, but came in by the day.
80e. Citing Williston on Sales, § 244 (3d ed., 1948) and C.J.S., Sales, § 305.
80f. Citing Prosser on Torts, Ch. 17, § 84 (2d. 1955); Nock v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, supra note 1; Catani v. Swift & Co., supra note 7.
80g. Nock and Catani, supra preceding note.
1963]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cial justice.' Regardless of the rationale employed in these decisions,
it is now established beyond argument in Pennsylvania that a sub-
purchaser may sue the manufacturer directly in food cases for
breach of an implied warranty of fitness regardless of the lack of
privity....
The Court then concludes:
In no case in Pennsylvania has recovery against the manu-
facturer for breach of an implied warranty been extended
beyond a purchaser in the distributive chain. In fact the
inescapable conclusion from Loch v. Confair8Oh is that no
warranty will be implied in favor of one who is not in the
category of a purchaser.
Finding that there is no "impelling meritorious reason" why the
implied warranty should be extended to the bartender, an employee
of the purchaser, since he is a complete stranger "to any contractual
transaction involved," the court concludes in a somewhat incompre-
hensible manner by not distinguishing between implied in fact war-
ranties and constructive (implied in law) warranties:
Further, in express warranties the purchaser or subpur-
chaser can rely thereon, for they are considered part of the
consideration for the purchase and are meant to be relied
upon by the purchaser. 8 0 i So also, the basis for recovery
upon an implied warranty ... must be that the implied war-
ranty forms a part of the consideration for the contract[?],
and flows from the manufacturer to subpurchaser through
the conduit of a contractual chain.80J
This leaves the plaintiff bartender to his remedy in tort since the
Court suggests that he "has an adequate remedy in trespass." On
this point, opinions may well differ since if the defendant company
can show due care, the plaintiff may still be left without any real
remedy although he was truly "an innocent bystander."
Analysis of the opinion in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry CorporationOk
leaves some perplexing questions: Why should a privity requirement
be interposed when the warranty is constructive, that is, originally
and basically sounding in tort rather than contract? What type
of "implied warranty" did the Court have in mind in its opinion?
Who may properly be considered within the distributive chain?
80h. Supra note 35.
80i. Citing Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., supra note 36.
80j. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3. There was a vigorous
dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Musmanno.
80k. Supra note 3.
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Does this decision point the way to recovery by subpurchasers
of products in addition to foodstuffs if they are within the distribu-
tive chain? It would seem that it does if the fair implications of the
opinion are followed through to a logical conclusion.
In still another connection, the courts of Pennsylvania have had
occasion to consider the question of warranty in the sale of articles
of apparel. In a case of novel impression, Barrett v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 8 1 the plaintiff purchased a dress from the defendant company
for one dollar. Upon wearing it, she suffered an attack of acute der-
matitis, a serious skin irritation. Thereupon the plaintiff brought
this action. When the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff, defendant moved far judgment n.o.v., based on the lack of reli-
ance upon the vendor's skill or judgment and alleging that there was
insufficient evidence of any deleterious substance in the dress to
take the case to the jury.8 2 Although the trial court noted a similar-
ity between articles of clothing designed and sold for human wear
"and the foodstuff cases" defendant company's motion was neverthe-
less granted because of an apparent allergy plaintiff had which pre-
cluded recovery against the vendor.8 3
One of the unfortunate limitations circumscribing the action for
breach of warranty is well illustrated by Frankel v. Styer,8 4 a recent
federal district court case tried in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania. Here, an action was brought by the guardian of certain minor
children alleging that the wrongful death of their father was caused
by a breach of warranty. In another count, negligence was alleged
but the allegation of breach of warranty was also incorporated in this
count. The court held that under Pennsylvania law, the guardian of
minor children was without a right to bring this action saying, "there
is no such thing in the law of Pennsylvania as an action for wrongful
death based on breach of warranty," quoting "the leading case" of
Birch v. Pittsburgh C. C. c St. L. Railway.8 5 As the theory of recov-
81. 31 Pa. D. & C. 379 (C.P. 1938); 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941).
82. The court referred to an English case, Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills,
Ltd. (Privy Council 1935), L.R.A.C. 85 (1936) in which the "privity requirement"
alleged to exist by the obiter dicta in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. & W. 109,
11 L.J. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) was flatly rejected.
83. Where allergies exist, it is the general rule that recovery will be denied
unless the allergy is so prevalent that the manufacturer or retailer is under a
duty to warn prospective customers of the possibility of injury from the use of
the product, cf. Scientific Supply Co. v. Zelinger, 139 Colo. 568, 341 P.2d 897 (1959);
Crotty v. Shartenberg's New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960);
Jacquot v. Win. Filene's Sons, 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958); Zampino v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., "10 Misc.2d 686, 173 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
84. 201 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
85. 165 Pa. 339, 30 Atl. 826 (1895).
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ery was "unclear," according to the court, it was necessary to grant
defendant's motion to dismiss-with leave, however, to the plaintiff
to amend his complaint.8 6 This emphasis on the use of the tort
action is further highlighted in Hochgerte v. Canada Dry Corpora-
tion,8 6a where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania observes in re-
gard to a plaintiff not in privity: "His cause of action is basically
one of tort . . .Plaintiff has an adequate remedy in trespass, and
with the judicious regulations as to proof, enunciated in Loch v.
Confair,8 6b supra, both parties will enjoy a fair day in court."8 6c With
these rather cryptic statements regarding "judicious regulations as
to proof," and "a fair day in court," the Supreme Court sustained
the lower court's order of dismissal.
Another limitation which has been recognized by the Pennsylvania
courts and represents a general rule is that imposed by the dis-
claimer of liability.8 7 In Eimco Corp. v. Joseph Lombardi & Sons, 88
a typical provision was made a part of the written contract of sale
of certain rockershovel machines; it read:
All equipment offered herein is fully guaranteed for a period
of one (1) year from the date of initial operation and any
parts which prove defective through improper workmanship
or material will be replaced, without charge f.o.b. Salt Lake
City, Utah. (4) (a) The Company agrees to have repaired
at its factory, or to replace without cost F.O.B. its factory,
any defective parts of its manufacture which within one
year from date of shipment and following examination by
the Company's inspectors shall prove to have been defective
in either workmanship or material when shipped. The Com-
pany's liability for damages or losses incurred or caused by
such defectives shall be limited to the foregoing.8 9
86. On this point, the court observed: "While the second count of the
amended complaint does charge defendant with negligence, it also incorporates
by reference every allegation of the first count respecting breach of warranty,
and plaintiff's theory of recovery under the second count is unclear.
"We think both the interests of justice and of clarity require that plaintiff
be afforded an opportunity to file a more definite statement in the particulars
indicated, and to amend the caption to accord with Pa.R.C.P. 2202(b)." Frankel
v. Styer, supra note 84.
86a. Supra note 3. Case is stated supra notes 80(a) to 80(k).
86b. Supra note 35.
86c. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3.
87. Text at note 174, et seq. infra.
88. 193 Pa. Super. 1, 162 A.2d 263 (1960).
89. Other provisions of the contract considered pertinent were quoted by
the court: "(6) The Company shall not be held liable under this contract for any
special, indirect or consequential damages whatsoever."
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The court concluded that the sale of these shovels was clearly
intended "to be one of a specified article under its patent and trade
name," and therefore there was no implied warranty as to its fitness
for any particular purpose. 90 Citing Frantz Equipment Co. v. Leo
Butler Co., 9 1 the court remarked: "The only question remaining is
whether there was a breach of any implied warranty of merchant-
ability. This is a warranty implied by law that the goods are reason-
ably fit for the general purpose for which they are sold.
' 9 2
The court found that the written contract definitely limited the
liability of the manufacturer of the shovels by the provisions quoted
above, namely, to replacement of defective parts (reminiscent of a
similar disclaimer clause used in the standard automotive sales con-
tract).93 The court also found that there was a custom in the min-
ing industry which limited liability to this extent. 9 4 After quoting
the Uniform Sales Act,9 5 it was found that the manufacturer had
"fulfilled its agreement by replacing the damaged parts and restoring
the machine to operation without charge, which was their only obli-
gation under the contract." 96
Under the statutes,9 7 there is a further requirement which must be
fulfilled by the party claiming damages for breach of warranty. The
condition precedent to recovery by the buyer is the giving of notice to
"(10) (a) This contract expresses the entire agreement between the parties
hereto and all previous negotiations, conversations and understandings are merged
herein; and this contract cannot hereafter be modified except by writing signed
by the Customer and approved by an officer of this Company. All proposals are
subject to price changes, without notice, fifteen days after date issued."
90. The court quotes the Uniform Sales Act § 15. Implied warranties of
quailty (4), referring to sales of articles under "patent or other trade name."
91. Supra note 77.
92. Citing Uniform Sales Act § 15(2).
93. This disclaimer clause is referred to by the court in Jarnot v. Ford
Motor Co., supra note 3, but not deemed applicable and is set forth in Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1, but held unenforceable as contrary to
public policy.
94. As to custom and usage generally, see 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3d ed.
Jaeger 1961) Chapter 23.
95. Section 71: "Where any right, duty or liability which would arise under
a contract to sell or a sale, by Implication of law, it may be negatived or varied
by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by
custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale
..... PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 332 (1915).
96. Eimco Corp. v. Joseph Lombardi & Sons, supra note 88.
97. Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-607; Uniform Sales Act § 49.
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the seller "within a reasonable time" under both the Uniform Com-
mercial Code 98 and the Uniform Sales Act.9 9
In a recent case, Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,' 0 0 the
court reviewed the Pennsylvania cases and observed: "Defendant
correctly contends that the requirement of notice within a reasonable
time is a condition precedent to plaintiff's right of recovery, as to
which plaintiff has the burden of proof." The court held that the plain-
tiff had given notice within a reasonable time. This requirement is
embodied in the statutes of the great majority of jurisdictions; how-
ever, as might be expected, there is no uniformity to be found in the
decisions as to what constitutes a "reasonable time."
MIl. WHAT ARE THE WARRANTIES INVOLVED?
From this panoramic review of the history of warranty in Pennsyl-
vania, it may readily be inferred that the concept of warranty with-
out privity even when limited to food did not, like Venus, spring
"full-panoplied" from the brow of its progenitor. In fact, the law
affords few better illustrations of the slow, agonized, faltering de-
velopment of a rule of public policy than the gradual obliteration of
the requirement of privity from the doctrine of warranty in certain
specified cases.
Any discussion of privity of warranty necessarily requires an exam-
ination of the nature of warranty. Almost six centuries ago, when
98. Section 2-607(3) (a) reads in pertinent part: " Where a tender has
been accepted the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or
should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from
any remedy . . ." (Italics supplied).
99. Section 49 reads in pertinent part, "if, after acceptance of the goods,
the buyer fail to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or war-
ranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such
breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor." (Italics supplied).
100. 134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955), afl'd 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961),
holding that although the plaintiff was required under Pennsylvania law to prove
that notice of breach of warranty had been given within a reasonable time, an
allegation to that effect in the complaint was unnecessary. As to reasonable time,
the court noted the following authorities: "See Pa. Uniform Sales Act § 49, 69
P. S. § 259; Texas Motorcoaches, Inc. v. A. C. F. Motors Co., 154 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1946); Kull v. General Motors Truck Co., 311 Pa. 580, 166 A. 562 (1933); Wright
v. General Carbonic Co., 271 Pa. 332, 114 A. 517 (1921); Hazelton v. First Nat.
Stores, Inc., 88 N.H. 409, 190 A. 280 (1937). The foregoing decisions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also indicate that in the state courts, the buyer has
the further burden of pleading with a fair degree of specificity that notice was
given within a reasonable time." Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
supra at 832; as to the present posture of this case, see supra note 28.
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the earliest reported case on warranty arose, 10 1 it was conceived as
essentially sounding in tort, and it was not until another century had
passed that special assumpsit found its place among the recognized
forms of action.' 0 2 In its early form, assumpsit was deemed a tres-
pass upon the case as demonstrated by Slade's Case.10 3 However,
this tort action soon evolved as a contract action to be classified with
covenant rather than tort. There is no longer any question that this
is the view taken of assumpsit today. 1 4
Although this is true, and warranty is regarded as a promise or
special form of contract, this loses sight of the original character of
the action and confusion is caused by the failure to realize that a
vendor's liability for breach of warranty may sound in tort as well
as in contract.' 0 5 Apparently, the first reported case in which an
action for breach of warranty was brought in assumpsit was Stuart v.
Wilkins,10 6 decided less than two hundred years ago. Thus, for some
four centuries, the action rested on a wrong or tort, not on the breach
of an enforceable promise. 10 7
In the early cases, it was held that the word "warrant" would have
to be used if an actual warranty were to be found. This emphasis
on the use of the word as being essential continued until the close of
the eighteenth century when a mere affirmation of fact that certain
paintings were the authentic works of a specified painter was found
to be a warranty in Power v. Barham. 10 9 And in Jendwine v. Slade, 110
a somewhat similar case, a statement as to the identity of the
painter of certain pictures was deemed a matter of opinion. " 1 1
101. Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REV. 1, refers to Fitz Ab
Monst de Faits, pl 160 (1383) as "perhaps, the earliest reported case upon a
warranty."
102. WILLISTON, SALES (3d ed. 1948) §§ 195 et seq.
103. 4 Coke 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1602).
104. WILLISTON, op. cit. note 102 § 196.
105. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 970.
106. 1 Dougl. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
107. WILLISTON, SALES (3d ed. 1948) §§ 196-257.
108. Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1625); Stuart v.
Wilkins, supra note 106.
109. 4 Ad. & El. 473, (K.B. 1836).
110. 2 Esp. 572 (N.P. 1797).
111. This was based on the view of Lord Kenyon that it was not possible
to consider this a case of warranty since the artists who were supposed to have
painted the pictures in question had died almost a century ago and thus, it
could only be a matter of opinion by whom they were painted. In Power v.
Barham, supra note 109, by contrast, the representation that the pictures were
painted by Canaletti stated in the bill of sale was found to be a warranty by the
jury and this was held to be correct.
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Aside from this necessity of proving the use of the word "war-
rant,"1 1 2 there was yet another obstacle introduced to defeat the
plaintiff seeking recovery for breach of warranty. An intent to war-
rant was held essential in Pasley v. Freeman,1 1 3 where it was said,
"an affirmation at the time of a sale is a warranty provided it appears
on evidence to have been so intended." 1 1 4 There seems to be no
earlier precedent for this statement and as might be expected, leading
authorities have criticized it as not representative of the actual
law.115
Curiously enough, Pennsylvania retained this concept for almost
three hundred years; indeed, the Chief Justice expressed regret that
the rule of Chandelor v. Lopus 1 1 6 should have "been swept away by
a flood of innovation in England and some of our sister States.
'117
This rigid adherence to form makes the recent decision in Hoch-
gertel v. Canada Dry Corporationll8 all the more understandable,
even if not acceptable. Until the very end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was still insisting on
112. The phrases generally required were "warrantizando vendidit" or
"warrantizando barganizasset"; the word "guaranty" originally attributed to
Norman-French would readily become "warranty" by a change of the initial
letter comparable to the anglicized form of "Guillaume," or William. Until the
18th century, the use of these technical expressions was still prevalent, Butter-
field v. Burroughs, 1 Salk. 211 (Q.B. 1706).
This insistence on form is reminiscent of the early development in other
fields of common law such as instruments under seal. In alluding to this, a
court has said: "Words in early times, like form in a document or pleading, were
all important." Commenting on the difference in approach between the ancient
and modern law, the court said: "'The ancient land law imputed a thaumaturgic
quality to language. If the judicial eye in scanning the instrument chanced upon
a pet phrase the inquiry was ended without resorting to the arduous effort of
reconciling evident inconsistencies therein. The universal touchstone today is
the intention of the parties to the instrument.... .. Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes,
Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958), quoted in 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 600A,
at 291 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
Somewhat reminiscent of this ancient era is the adherence of the court to
the archaic dictum in Winterbottom v. Wright, infra note 208, in the recently
decided case of Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3. Case is more
fully stated supra notes 80a to 80k.
113. 3 T.R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 198
(3d ed. 1948).
114. Pasley v. Freeman, supra preceding note.
115. Williston, op. cit. supra note 113 § § 198 et seq.
116. Supra note 108.
117. Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle (Pa.) 23 (1831); McFarland v. Newman,
9 Watts (Pa.) 55 (1839).
118. Supra note 3. WILLISTON, SALES § 199. American law-Pennsylvania
(3d ed. 1948).
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something more than "a naked averment of a fact" to find a war-
ranty. The Court concluded that, although statements had been
made by the vendor that a horse being sold "was kind, sound
and gentle," these were mere assertions of fact "which the cases
cited 1 1 9 show was not a warranty, nor the evidence of one."' 1 20
Modern decisions have consistently rejected the view that any
special words are necessary, or that an intent to warrant is essential,
in order to create a warranty. 121 In fact, the tendency has been to en-
large the scope of the warranty so that express words are certainly
not necessary, but it has even been suggested that in appropriate
instances, a statement of opinion may be sufficient to bind the vendor,
as where the latter is in the position of a fiduciary or expert, as illus-
trated by the opinions in Aultman v. Weber,' 2 2 and Gouchman v.
Hill.12 3
That intent to warrant is not a prerequisite is exemplified by Kid-
dell v. Burnard. 124 Here the court was confronted with a warranty of
soundness of a horse. It was held that if there was any disease from
which the horse was suffering or had suffered which would "diminish
the natural usefulness of the horse, such horse is unsound."'1 2 5 War-
ranties of soundness play a most important role in the rural sections
of this country where animal husbandry is an important means of
earning a livelihood. In a recent case, Mitchell v. Rudasill,12 6 the
court made this statement:
A warranty is a statement or representation made by the
seller of goods contemporaneously with, and as a part of,
the contract of sale, although collateral to the express object
of it, having reference to the character, quality, or title of
the goods, and by which he promises or undertakes to insure
that certain facts are or shall be as he then represents them.
A warranty is express when the seller makes an affirmation
with respect to the article to be sold, pending the treaty of
sale, on which it is intended that the buyer shall rely in
119. McFarland v. Newman, supra note 117; Jackson v. Wetherill, 7 S. & R.
(Pa.) 480 (1822).
120. Holmes v. Tyson, 147 Pa. 305, 23 Atl. 564 (1892).
121. Ford Motor Co., v. Cullum, 96 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1938) cert. den. 305 U.S.
627 (1938); Becker v. Sprowles, 310 Ky. 636, 220 S.W.2d 564 (1949); Adams v.
Peter Tramontin Motors Sales, Inc., 42 N.J. Super. 313, 126 A.2d 358 (1956);
Jackson v. Gifford, 264 P.2d 313 (Okla. 1953).
122. 28 Ill. App. 91 (1888).
123. [1947] 1 K.B. 554 (C.A.) (1946).
124. 152 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ex. 1842).
125. Id. at 283.
126. Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App. 1960).
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making the purchase; and there is authority for the proposi-
tion that any warranty derived from express language
should be considered an express warranty. A warranty is
implied when the law derives it by implication or inference
from the nature of the transaction, or the relative situation
or circumstances of the parties. Stated otherwise, an ex-
press warranty is one imposed by the parties to the contract,
while an implied warranty is not one of the contractual ele-
ments of an agreement but is, instead, imposed by law.
1 27
The court found that the cows which were the subject matter of the
sale had mastitis of the udder which prevented them from giving a
suitable amount of milk; this was held to be a breach of the warranty
of soundness. 12 8
In a truly representative case, Miller v. Penney,1 2 9 the court had
occasion to consider a similar warranty with respect to the soundness
of a bull of pedigreed ancestry.13 0 This prize animal had been ac-
127. Id. at 94-95.
128. It appeared that the plaintiff had submitted his case on the theory of
an implied warranty rather than that of an express warranty; however, he
actually proved an express affirmation that the cows had sound udders and
would give "a decent flow of milk." Nevertheless, the court affirmed, stating:
"But it does not necessarily follow in this case that the judgment must be re-
versed because the plaintiff submitted his case on the theory of an implied
warranty rather than that of an express warranty. While it has been stated, as
defendant urges, that an express warranty excludes an implied warranty, this
has been criticized as too broad a statement of the rule. Williston on Sales, Rev.
Ed. Vol. 1, p. 625, Sec. 239a. A more accurate statement of the correct rule Is
that an express warranty excludes an implied warranty of fitness (1) if the
express warranty is inconsistent with the warranty which would have been
implied had none been expressed; or (2) if the express warranty relates to the
same or a similar subject matter as one which would have been implied. 164
A.L.R., p. 1328; Williston on Sales, supra; 2 Mechem on Sales, p. 1095, Sec.
1295. In the principal case cited by defendant Hunt v. Sanders 313 Mo. 169,
281 S.W. 422, 425, after stating the general rule, the court went on to say:
'Where the warranty expressly agreed upon is precisely the same as the
one the law would imply from the mere fact of sale, in case of breach it can be
of no consequence whether the warranty be regarded as express or as implied
In such case the distinction is without importance except as to the matter of
proof.'"
129. 77 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
130. Introducing the issues, the court remarked: "This is a bull case, and I
sincerely regret that I agreed to decide it rather than to have it tried before a
jury composed of stockmen and farmers who through experience would have
been more familiar with the commercial 'love life' of a 'blooded' bull than I.
"While my youth was spent in rather close association with bulls, they were
not the kind involved here. They were common, plebian bulls which at this time
of the year roamed the woods and fields and walked the fence rows, challenging
with low growling moans or shrill bellows every animate or inanimate object.
[Vol. 1 : p. I
PRIVITY OP WARRANTY
claimed as "Grand Champion" on eleven occasions and was considered
an outstanding specimen. Although sold for breeding purposes for
the sum of $10,600, he completely disappointed the cows and his new
owner who brought this action to recover the price, as well as
the cost of care and maintenance to which this champion of the "bull
ring" had become accustomed.
In highly humorous vein, 1 3 1 the federal district court rendered an
opinion in favor of the plaintiff and held that the bull was not as
warranted since he was totally unfit for breeding purposes.' 
3 2
They were bulls which pawed the dirt and rolled their heads in impassioned,
frenzied wrath that knew no bounds and respected no normal enclosure. But
Eileenmere 627th, No. 735647, is an aristocrat of the kine world, a product of
this age of high prices.
"Eileenmere 627th was born in the stable of luxury and raised in the field of
plenty. With a long line of champions as his ancestors, he was destined from the
day he was calved to follow in the hoofsteps of his illustrious progenitors. In
this respect, at least, he did not disappoint his 'fitters' (a term applied to those
who prepare bulls for the show ring). Before he was two years old he had
traversed the 'circuit,' appearing in twelve shows. Eleven times he was ac-
claimed as Grand Champion and the twelfth time as champion of his class. This
is no mean record where competition in glamour and other bullish qualities,
obscure to the uninitiated, is so pronounced as it is in the world of show bulls.
Finally having won his laurels as a great star in the show ring, he attracted by
his reputation the 'big money' buyers. After this was accomplished, he, like
most others of his kind, was removed from the tinselled surroundings of the
show world and returned to his home that he might bring to the enjoyment of his
owners the fruits of his success. . . . Miller v. Penney, supra note 129.
131. This is adequately demonstrated by the following excerpt from the
court's opinion: "He was touted as the great son of a noble sire and heralded
far and wife [wide ?] as the outstanding 'Star of the Year' and the new Junior
Sire of an equally aristocratic herd of Aberdeen-Angus cows and heifers. But,
alas, while his meretricious charms made him a champion in the show ring, they
were unavailing in the mating pen. The cruel hand of fate had destined the great
Eileenmere 627th, 735647, to be a celibate. Never could he become the proud
Junior Sire of so noble a herd, with ambitious visions no doubt of becoming, in
time a prouder Senior Sire; never would he know the proud, chest-expanding
pride of seeing his own flesh and blood walk the green pastures among a herd
over which he would majestically preside. There would be no Eileenmere 628th.
Because of defective hind quarters and genital defects he was physically unable
to perform the mating act, which nature intended should result in reproduction.
He was worthless for the purpose for which he was purchased."
132. In addition to Miller v. Penney, aupra note 129, there have been any
number of similar cases involving warranties of animals; among these may be
cited: Ver Steegh v. Flaugh, 251 Ia. 1011, 103 N.W.2d 718 (1960), boar for breed-
ing; Lyle v. W.H. Hodges & Co., 82 So.2d 457 (La. App. 1955), bull calf died some
three days after purchase, warranty held breached; Grovedale Feed Co. v. Corron,
155 N.E.2d 291 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1957), chickens were sick, held that warranty was
breached; Vander Eyk v. Bones, 77 S.D. 345, 91 N.W.2d 897 (1958), Battle
Pioneer, a bull, failed to breed; however, as notice of breach was not given within
a reasonable time, the buyer could not rescind.
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A. Express Warranty
The distinction between express and implied warranties which the
court makes in Mitchell v. Rudasill, 3 3 is to be emphasized since it is
one that is sometimes not observed or noted by the courts and by
attorneys generally. As indicated, the warranty is express when the
seller makes an affirmation on which it is intended that the buyer
shall rely in making the purchase; similarly, a warranty in fact would
be implied from the conduct of the parties including their prior deal-
ings. As used by the court in the above quotation, the implied war-
ranty is one imposed upon the parties by law, and should more prop-
erly be described as a constructive warranty.
Another source of confusion which often plagues litigants and
may sometimes bemuse courts is the failure to observe that scienter,
so fundamental a requisite in fraud, is not an essential ingredient in
warranty. Although the basic elements of warranty and of fraud
are readily recognized in theory, the cases often fail to apply the
well-established distinction between the two in practice; and it may,
therefore, not be amiss to draw attention to court decisions which
state with clarity the fact that guilty knowledge is a sine qua non
in fraud, but not in breach of warranty. " 'The representation of fact
which induces a bargain,' " said the court, " 'is a warranty. In truth,
the obligation imposed upon the seller in such a case is imposed upon
him not by virtue of his agreement to assume it, but because of a
rule of law applied irrespective of agreement. . . " The obligation of
a warranty is absolute, and is imposed as a matter of law irrespective
of whether the seller knew or should have known of the falsity of
his representations. Fraud, on the other hand, involves the additional
requirement that the seller knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, that his representations were false."' 3 4
The principal development in the law of express warranty is to be
found in the cases holding manufacturers liable on advertisements,
tags, or labels containing factual representations as to the products
being offered for sale. With the tremendously increased coverage of
the media for the dissemination of advertising, more especially radio
and television, such a development is both logical and necessary, and
133. Supra note 126.
134. Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., 12 Cal.2d 501, 86 P.2d 102 (1939),
quoting WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1505 (Rev. ed. 1937). Cf. Green v. Caribou Oil
Mining Co., 179 Cal. 787, 178 Pac. 950 (1919); Young v. Three For One Oil
Royalties, 1 Cal.2d 639, 36 P.2d 1065 (1934); Gillis v. Pan American Western
Pet. Co., 3 Cal.2d 249, 44 P.2d 311 (1935); Boss v. Silent Drama Syndicate, 82
Cal. App. 109, 255 Pac. 225 (1927); Belden v. California Fireproof Storage Co.,
140 Cal. App. 706, 35 P.2d 1034 (1934). WILLISTON, op. Cit. §§ 673, 970, 974, 1487,
1505.
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Pennsylvania seems to apply it when the subpurchaser is within
"the distributive chain."1 3 5
B. Implied or Constructive Warranty
While there may be some justification for requiring privity in con-
nection with actions for breach of express warranties, this seems
totally missing when the warranty is imposed by law and should run
to anyone injured by the harmful or defective nature of the product.
Any number of cases have recognized the existence of this "implied"
or constructive warranty in connection with foodstuffs and bever-
ages. 13 6
1. In any case where a dealer sells articles of food for im-
mediate human consumption, the purchaser may rely upon
an implied warranty that such articles are wholesome and
not deleterious, and in the event he sustains injuries from
consumption thereof, he may waive any tort there may have
been and maintain his cause of action upon such implied
warranty.
2. Where articles of food for human consumption are
manufactured or packed by a manufacturer or packer and
by a series of transactions reach a retail dealer who sells to
the consumer, the manufacturer or packer, each intermedi-
ate dealer, and the retail seller impliedly warrant that such
articles of food are wholesome and fit for immediate human
consumption.' 37
135. According to the decision in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra
note 3; cf. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 3.
136. Thus, it has been said, in Stanfield v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan.
117, 53 P.2d 878 (1936):
"2. One who, for compensation, sells or provides food for immediate con-
sumption to another impliedly warrants the food to be wholesome. This is true
whether the transaction is in all of its aspects properly classified as a sale.
"3. One to whom, for a compensation, food is sold or provided for immediate
consumption, and who suffers food poisoning as a result of consuming the food,
may maintain an action upon the implied warranty of its wholesomeness without
alleging or proving negligence in the selection or preparation of the food by the
one who sold or provided it."
137. Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930
(1938), quoted with approval in Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953),
where the court cites and discusses many of these cases arising in Kansas, as
well as those from other jurisdictions including, inter alia, Davis v. Van Camp
Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, to this effect:
"1. A manufacturer who prepares and puts upon the market in sealed
packages an article of food for human consumption, is held not only to the
highest degree of care in preparing such article, but is also held to impliedly
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A lesser, though growing number of jurisdictions recognize the
existence of a constructive warranty in cases which do not involve
articles of human consumption. Principal among these are decisions
relating to products of mechanical construction, any of which may
have hidden defects threatening life or limb.
This implied warranty is fully recognized in Jarnot v. Ford Motor
Co. 13 8 Here, even in the presence of an express disclaimer, the court
held that the constructive warranty would not be affected thereby,
quoting Frigidinners v. Branchtown Gun Club. 13 9 But the case which
has left the most widespread impact on the concept of construc-
tive warranty is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Co., Inc.1 40 Dis-
regarding privity, the court not only held the maufacturer liable to
the purchaser for breach of the implied warranty, but both the manu-
facturer and the vendor were found liable to the injured wife of
the purchaser. 141
warrant to the ultimate consumer that the article is fit for human consumption.
It follows that the consumer, in purchasing such an article, is not shackled by
any rule of caveat emptor, and, if injured, without want of care on his part, by
eating such article, he may maintain an action for damages against the manu-
facturer, both (1) for negligence and (2) for breach of implied warranty, even
though there is no privity of contract between the parties."
The court also cites numerous authorities and quotes 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1505 (Rev. ed. 1937):
"Warranty may, but need not, be based on contract.
"There can be no doubt now, of course, that a seller may promise, in consid-
eration of the purchase of goods from him, that he will be answerable for their
present, or, indeed, for their future condition. Nor is it open to doubt that a
seller who in terms warrants the goods which he sells thereby enters into such a
contract. But when a seller is held liable on a warranty for making an affirma-
tion of fact in regard to goods in order to induce their purchase, to hold that such
an affirmation is a contract is to speak the language of pure fiction. It should not
be the law and it is not the law that a seller who by positive affirmation induces
a buyer to enter into a bargain can escape from liability by denying that his
affirmation was an offer to contract. A positive representation of fact is enough
to render him liable. The representation of fact which induces a bargain is a
warranty. (Citing Foote v. Wilson [Mercantile Co.], 104 Kan. 191, 195, 178 P. 430.)
In truth, the obligation imposed upon the seller in such a case is imposed upon
him not by virtue of his agreement to assume it, but because of a rule of law
applied irrespective of agreement. The obligation in such a case is quasi con-
tractual, and at least if the seller knows the falsity of his representation there
is also a tort. [The court quotes the next two paragraphs of the same section as
well]." Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., supra.
138. Supra note 3.
139. Supra note 33.
140. Supra note 1.
141. After a comprehensive discussion of the impact of the uniform sales
act on the common law, the court summarized its effect by declaring: "The
uniform act codified, extended and liberalized the common law of sales. The
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An important consequence of the recognition of the distinction
between the express warranty and the constructive warranty is in
the admissibility of evidence. 1 4 2 According to the usual interpreta-
tion of the parol evidence rule, evidence extrinsic to the written con-
tract of sale and the warranties therein contained would not be
admitted to vary or contradict these warranties. 1 4 3 However, where
the warranty is imposed by law, the parol evidence rule is held in-
applicable as in Huddleston v. Lee.' 4 4 The court discussed the dis-
tinction between warranties and pointed out that the early common
law regarded the warranty as an obligation imposed by the law of
torts, citing the case of Kohn v. Ball. 145 In this case it was held that
the sale of an automobile under an express warranty did not exclude
a warranty of merchantability imposed by law.14 6
Although the courts have seen fit to extend the "implied" or con-
structive warranty to foodstuffs, beverages and similar articles, 1 4 7
it is inconceivable that there has been any extension of this protective
device comparable to the development of the warranty of seaworthi-
ness. 148 From a rather humble beginning in The Osceola, 149 down
motivation in part was to ameliorate the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor, and
in some measure to impose a reciprocal obligation on the seller to beware. The
transcendent value of the legislation, particularly with respect to implied war-
ranties, rests in the fact that obligations on the part of the seller were imposed
by operation of law, and did not depend for their existence upon express agree-
ment of the parties. And of tremendous significance in a rapidly expanding com-
mercial society was the recognition of the right to recover damages on account
of personal injuries arising from a breach of warranty ....
"The general observations that have been made are important largely for
purposes of perspective. They are helpful in achieving a point from which to
evaluate the situation now presented for solution. Primarily, they reveal a trend
and a design In legislative and judicial thinking toward providing protection for
the buyer. It must be noted, however, that the sections of the Sales Act, to which
reference has been made, do not impose warranties in terms of unalterable
absolutes. [The Act] provides in general terms that an applicable warranty
may be negatived or varied by express agreement. As to disclaimers or limitations
of the obligations that normally attend a sale, it seems sufficient at this juncture
to say they are not favored, and that they are strictly construed against the
seller." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)
noted 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 829 (1960).
142. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 643 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
143. Op. cit., §§ 631 et. seq.
144. 39 Tenn. App. 465, 284 S.W.2d 705, cert. den. (1955).
145. 36 Tenn. App. 281, 254 S.W.2d 755 (1953).
146. This is in accord with the majority rule.
147. Text at note 313, 4nfra.
148. For a discussion of the development of this warranty, see 4 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 643 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961), especially pp. 1101-1109.
149. 189 U.S. 158 (1902).
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to and through Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,150 the courts by
judicial construction have steadily enlarged the protection afforded
to seamen and longshoremen, when engaged in the ship's service,
until finally it has been said that the obligation to furnish a sea-
worthy vessel, even as to stevedores, "is a form of absolute duty." 1
51
This warranty has been likened to the "implied warranty the manu-
facturer assumes as to the soundness of his product or its suitability
for a particular use. 15 2 Nor is privity of contract a requirement,
for the Supreme Court of the United States has said that third
parties not in privity may recover as third party beneficiaries."'
153
C. Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
Where the purchaser made known to the vendor the purpose or use
for which he was buying the chattel and relied on the seller's superior
judgment, skill and experience, the common law considered that a
warranty that the goods in question would be "reasonably fit for
that purpose, accompanied the sale. ' 154 By a process of gradual
development, the courts now imply this warranty from the mere fact
that the goods have been sold by the vendor after the buyer has
stated his needs and the purpose for which he proposes to use the
150. 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
151. Grzybowski v. Arrow Barge Co., 283 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1960); Williston,
op. cit. § 643, note 20 at pp. 1103-1104.
152. Citing Booth Steamship Co., v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d
Cir. 1958).
153. 4 WILLISTON, op. cit. § 643, at 1106, quoting Waterman Steamship
Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960); and citing Crumady v.
The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959), noted 34 NOTRE DAME LAW.
576.
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., and Crumady v.
The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, supra, as well as the other leading cases in this
field are discussed in Italia Societa Per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Steve-
doring Co., 310 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1962) where the court observed: "In recent
history liability for breach of warranty has been associated with contract more
than anything else .... Concepts of privity of contract are ever more gradually
giving way to sweeping coverage of warranty .... In Waterman and Crumady
the shipowner was allowed to recover for breach of warranty even though there
was no direct contract relationship between him and the stevedoring company.
However, the contract idea was adhered to since the ship or shipowner were con-
sidered to be that third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the steve-
doring company and the one who contracted for its services." See also
Nordeutscher Lloyd, Brennan v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 195 F. Supp. 680
(D. Ore. 1961) where the court discusses the Waterman, Crumady and other
leading cases dealing with the warranty of seaworthiness.
154. Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630 (1886) at 636.
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goods.15 5 Even where the chattel comes within the general descrip-
tion of articles of its kind, if it is not fit for the particular purpose
so stated, the vendor is nevertheless liable on this warranty.' 5 6 It
is most frequently encountered in sales of food products, drugs,
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and more recently, detergents.157 And
it has found its way into other fields as well. In the case of foodstuffs
and the like, there is little room for differentiation between this
warranty and that of merchantable quality which will be discussed
later. 15 8
The distinction has been succinctly stated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a case applying Pennsyl-
vania law: 1 5 9 "Under a warranty of fitness for a particular use, the
seller warrants that the goods sold are suitable for the special pur-
pose of the buyer, while a warranty of merchantability is that the
goods are reasonably fit for the general purposes for which they are
sold."' 60
And this concept has been incorporated in the statutes:' 61
UNIFORM SALES ACT
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in
that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to
the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows:
155. The S.S. Angelo Toso, 271 Fed. 245 (3d Cir. 1921); Fruehauf Trailer
Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1948); Burge Ice Machine Co. v. Weiss,
219 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1955); Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 659 (W.D.Pa.
1952), afj'd, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953); Buchanan v. Dugan, 82 A.2d 911 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. App. 1951); Fraley v. Ford, 81 Ariz. 268, 304 P.2d 1068 (1957); Wal-
lower v. Elder, 126 Colo. 109, 247 P.2d 682 (1952); Kaufman v. Katz, 356 Mich.
354, 97 N.W.2d 56 (1959) (barrels held unfit for special purpose); Knapp v.
Willys-Ardmore, Inc., 174 Pa. Super. 90, 100 A.2d 105 (1953) (goods must be
suitable for special purpose of the buyer, not merely fit for general purposes of
goods of that classification); Croton Chemical Corp. v. Birkenwald, 50 Wash.2d
684, 314 P.2d 622 (1957); Roddis Plywood Corp. v. Dorchester Furniture Co.,
268 Wis. 17, 66 N.W.2d 702 (1954).
156. White v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367, 34 Atl. 175 (1896); Beggs v. James Hanley
Brewing Co., 27 R.I. 385, 62 Atl. 373 (1905); Preist v. Last, [1903] 2 K.B. 148
(C.A.); Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co., Ltd., [1905] 1 K.B. 608 (C.A.).
157. Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961) "Lestoil"; Worley
v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) "Tide";
cf. Cumberland v. Household Research Corp., 145 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass. 1956).
158. See text at note 164, infra.
159. For a discussion of Pennsylvania law, see Section II (text at notes
7-100, supra).
160. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 1.
161. Uniform Sales Act and Uniform Commercial Code.
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(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods are required, and it appear that the buyer relies on
the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. 1 62
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 1 6 3
D. Warranty of Merchantable Quality
Of real assistance to the injured consumer is the warranty of mer-
chantability.1 6 4 At common law, this requires that the goods shall
be salable as goods of the general kind which they were described
or supposed to be when purchased, or reasonably suitable for the
ordinary uses for which they were manufactured or produced.' 65
When applied to the sale of foods or drugs, and more recently to
cosmetics and even detergents, this warranty requires that the
product be fit for human consumption, if so intended, or suitable for
use without injurious after-effects. In these situations, the warranty
has received its broadest application; in the more outspoken juris-
dictions, this breadth of interpretation has quite candidly been
attributed to public policy which entitles the consumer to protection
whether he be in privity or not. 1 6 6 In these changing times, the
warranty of merchantable quality has been held to cover the sale
of mechanical instrumentalities such as automobiles, aircraft, and
their accessories, even where an express disclaimer purports to limit
or negative liability. 1 67 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Co.,
Inc.,16 8 the court did not hesitate to ground its decision on the firm
162. USA § 15.
163. UCC § 2-315.
164. 1 WILLISTON, SALES, §§ 243 et seq. (3d ed. 1948).
165. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 378A (3d ed. Jaeger 1959).
166. See cases discussed in Section VII (text at note 310 et seq., infra).
167. For a discussion of the effect of a disclaimer provision, see Section IV
(text at note 174, et seq., infra).
168. Supra note 1.
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base of public policy. 16 9 The necessity of protecting the general
public, where such a large segment uses the automobile, even in the
absence of privity, would outweigh considerations of freedom of
contract, particularly where the contract of sale is standardized, i.e.,
where it is a contract of adhesion. 17 0 And the statutes embody these
considerations:
UNIFORM SALES ACT
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in
that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to
the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as
follows: ...
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a
seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he
be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality. 1" 1
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316172), a
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving
for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale. 1 7 3
IV. NOTICE AND DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY
A. Notice
In addition to the privity "requirement" so-called, a condition prece-
dent of notice to the vendor by the buyer is imposed where recovery
in damages is sought for breach of warranty.
At common law, there was considerable confusion among the deci-
sions as to the effect of acceptance and retention of goods which had
been sold on the right of action for breach of warranty.' 7 4 Prior to
169. For a discussion of the effect of public policy on contracts, see WIL-
LISTON, op. cit. §§ 615A and 626 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
170. Such as automotive contracts or insurance policies.
171. USA § 15.
172. UCC which reads: "Exclusion or Modification of Warranties."
173. UCC 2-314.
174. WILLISTON, SALES § § 488, 489, for an elaborate citation of the authorities.
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the adoption of the uniform statutes, it was essentially a question
of fact as to whether acceptance of defective goods constituted a
waiver of the rights of the buyer, particularly with respect to breach
of warranty. 1 7 5 Both the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code require that the buyer must notify the vendor of breach
of warranty within "a reasonable time" after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach; the pertinent provisions of these stat-
utes read:
UNIFORM SALES ACT
In the absence of express or implied agreement of the par-
ties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not dis-
charge the seller from liability in damages or other legal
remedy for breach of any promise or warranty in the con-
tract to sell or the sale. But if, after acceptance of the goods,
the buyer fail to give notice to the seller of the breach of
any promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the
buyer knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller
shall not be liable therefor.17 6
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered any breach notify
the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy; ... 177
Of the Uniform Sales Act provision, Professor Williston says:
This section of the Statute treats the seller's tender of the
goods as an offer of them in full satisfaction, but the buyer
175. North Alaska Co. v. Hobbs, Wall & Co., 159 Cal. 380, 120 Pac. 27 (1911);
in Reininger v. Eldon Mfg. Co., 114 Cal. App.2d 240, 250 P.2d 4 (1952), the court
said: "Prior to the Uniform Sales Act it was a pure question of fact whether
the receipt and retention by the buyer was made in such a way as to indicate
he was assenting to the tender of nonconforming goods. It has never been the
law in California that mere acceptance of defective goods with knowledge of their
defects cuts off a buyer's right of action for breach of an express warranty as a
matter of law. . . " 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 714 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
176. USA § 49. Acceptance Does Not Bar Action For Damages. THE RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 412 reads: "Under a contract for the sale of goods,
the failure of the buyer, after acceptance of goods tendered as performance of
the contract, to give notice to the seller of the latter's breach of any promise or
warranty, within a reasonable time after the buyer knows or has reason to
know of such breach, discharges the seller's duty to make compensation."
177. UCC § 2-607(3) (a).
[Vol. I : p. I
PRIVITY OF WARRANTY
is allowed a reasonable time for accepting the offer. More-
over, if he declines to take the goods in full satisfaction
he need not return them. The practical advantages of the
statutory rule and its ease and certainty of application
commend it.17 8
The purpose of the notice requirement, as the courts have signal-
ized, "is to advise the seller that he must meet a claim for damages,
as to which, rightly or wrongly, the law requires that he shall have
an early warning." 17 9
While, as has been pointed out, both of the uniform laws require
the buyer to give reasonable notice, the rather strict interpretation
given the Uniform Sales Act in some jurisdictions'80 to the effect
that the nature of the defect and of the damage caused thereby must
be disclosed has led to the change in terminology of the Uniform
Commercial Code provision. The comments thereto and the sec-
tion181 dealing with definitions under the Code leave no doubt that
178. WILLISTON, op. Cit. § 714, at 399.
179. Judge Learned Hand in American Manufacturing Co. v. United States
Shipping Board, 7 F.2d 565 (2d. Cir. 1925), quoted with approval in Columbia
Axle Co. v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 63 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1933),
in Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal.2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948), and in Reininger v. Eldon
Manufacturing Co., supra note 175.
180. Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. Midland Grocery Co., 23 F.2d 167 (2d
Cir. 1927); Truslow v. Diamond Bottling Corp., 112 Conn. 181, 151 Atl. 492 (1930);
Simonz v. Brockman, 249 Wis. 50, 23 N.W.2d 464 (1946) rehearing den. 249 Wis.
50, 24 N.W.2d 409; cf. Texas Motorcoaches v. A.C.F. Motors Co., 154 F.2d 91
(3d Cir. 1946).
Texas Motorcoaches v. A.C.F. Motors Co., supra is cited with approval in
Clarizo v. Spada Distributing Co., 373 P.2d 689 (Ore. 1962), where the court re-
marked, "the requirement of notice, to be given by the vendee charging breach
of warranty, is imposed as a condition precedent to the right to recover, and
the giving of notice must be pleaded and proved by the party seeking to recover
for such breach....
"This court has construed ORS 75.490 to require that the buyer must notify
the seller not only of the breach of warranty but also that he intends to claim
damages for such breach. [Citations omitted] Other courts have adopted a
similar construction. [Citing Whitfield v. Jessup, supra preceding note]." ORS
75.490 is U.S.A. § 49 quoted in text.
181. The official comment to this section (2-607, UCC) reads: Purpose of
Changes: To continue the prior basic policies with respect to acceptance of goods
while making a number of minor though material changes in the interest of
simplicity and commercial convenience ...
The time of notification is to be determined by applying commercial standards
to a merchant buyer. "A reasonable time" for notification from a retail consumer
is to be judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended, for
the rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith,
not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy.
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there was every intent on the part of the draftsmen to liberalize the
notice requirement so that the rights of non-commercial buyers would
not be jeopardized by this requirement.
However, under either statute, the question of what is "a reason-
able time" still continues to plague the courts, leaving them hope-
lessly at odds. And while the statutes are "uniform," the interpre-
tation the courts give them (or may give them), remains far from
uniform, as the cases amply demonstrate. 18 2
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know
that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched ...
Indicative of the greater liberality with respect to notice which the Uniform
Commercial Code imports into the law is § 1-201. General Definitions. . . (25)
which reads: "A person has 'notice' of a fact when:
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in ques-
tion he has reason to know that it exists."
For a general discussion of notice in its many implications, see WILLISTON, op. cit.
§ 887B.
182. United States v. Dewart Milk Prod. Co., 300 F. 448, construing Pa. Act
10 month's delay discoverable by inspection is unreasonable; Ruggles v. Buffalo
Foundry Co., 27 F.2d 234 (CCA 6), applying Mich. Act 1 year's delay in giving
notice in a contract for sale of a brine evaporator is unreasonable; Owen v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 273 F.2d 140 (C.A. 9), delay of two years in giving notice that
shirt was defective held unreasonable.
Elkus Co. v. Voeckel, 27 Ariz. 332, 233 P. 57 (1925), where goods to retailer
contained a defect not readily discoverable, notice given as soon as retailer
received complaints from customers was reasonable; Mutual Electric Co. v. Turner
Eng. Co., 230 Mich. 63, 202 N.W. 964 (1925), delay of several years held not ex-
cessive, as a matter of law, in view of constant efforts to obviate cause of com-
plaint; Stewart v. Menzel, 181 Minn. 347, 232 N.W. 522 (1930), delay of 6 months
in giving notice of defects in fur coat unreasonable; Laundry Service Co. v.
Fidelity Laund. Mach. Co., 187 Minn. 180, 245 N.W. 36 (1932), delay of 5 months
in discovery and claiming defects in laundry machine held unreasonable.
Mastin v. Boland, 178 A.D. 421, 165 N.Y.S. 468 (1917), 3 weeks held reasonable
when the buyer did not know the seller's name and address; Ficklen Tobacco Co.
v. Friedberg, 196 A.D. 409, 187 N.Y.S. 561 (1925), a year is an unreasonable time;
Stone v. Bleim, 176 N.Y.S. 25 (App. Term) (1919), 10 days not unreasonable as
matter of law; Pierce Foundation Corp. Co. v. Eagle Supply Co., 180 N.Y.S. 88
(App. Term) (1920), 4 months held unreasonable; Kaufman v. Levy, 102 Misc.
689, 169 N.Y.S. 454 (1918), notice given immediately after examination of the
goods held unreasonable when examination was deferred for 23 days, where It
was customary to examine goods within 10 days; Gleason v. Lebolt, 126 Misc. 216,
212 N.Y.S. 227 (1925), 5 months' delay in discovering defect in diamond and
giving notice is reasonable as matter of law.
Walsterholme v. Randall, 295 Pa. 131, 144 Atl. 909 (1929), notice after 11
days reasonable even though material had to be manufactured into cloth within
that period; Bodek v. Avrack, 297 Pa. 225, 146 Atl. 546 (1929), 3 months, as
matter of law, unreasonable in sale of blankets; Kull v. General Motors Truck Co.,
311 Pa. 580, 155 Atl. 562 (1933), notice of breach of warranty as to age of trucks
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It has also been held that a remote buyer must give notice to his
immediate vendor as a condition precedent to recovery of damages
for breach of warranty.'18 3 This may be true where there is a con-
tractual warranty and privity is deemed necessary, but it should
certainly not obtain where the warranty is imposed by law for the
protection of the consumer and the manufacturer or other vendor
has not been too greatly prejudiced by the delay.1 83 a
B. Disclaimer
Aside from the so-called privity "requirement" and the condition
precedent of notice discussed above,' 8 4 there is another sig-
nificant limitation on the possibility of recovery for breach of war-
ranty: Rejection of liability by the use of a disclaimer provision.
Here too, however, the courts have shown an inclination to protect
the consumer, either by a strict construction of the limitation of
liability clause, 18 5 or by categorically refusing to enforce the dis-
claimer. 18 6
The unfortunate consequences of the rigid enforcement of a dis-
claimer provision are well illustrated by the decision in Gagnon v.
given 2 years after sale held barred by laches; Patterson Foundry Co. v. Williams
Lacquer Co., 52 R.I. 149, 158 Atl. 721 (1932), delay of 6 months in giving notice
of defects in lacquer grinding mill held unreasonable.
Suryan v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 153 Wash. 164, 300 Pac. 941 (1931),
1 month delay of notice reasonable in sale of fishing boat; Chess & Wymond Co.
v. LaCrosse Box Co., 173 Wis. 382, 181 N.W. 313 (1921), several months unreason-
able; Knobel v. J. Bartel Co., 176 Wis. 393, 187 N.W. 188 (1922), expert testimony
not admissible to prove 25 days a reasonable time; Buck v. Racine Boat Co., 180
Wis. 245, 192 N.W. 998 (1923), three or four days held reasonable as matter of
law; Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W.
392 (1932), months' delay in giving notice of defects in boiler tubes precluded
recovery, annotation, 72 A.L.R. 726; Schroeder v. Drees, 1 Wis. 2d 106, 83 N.W.2d
707 (1957), citing Marsh Wood Products v. Babcock & Wilcox, supra.
Cf. Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., (Cal.) 360 P.2d 897 (1961), dealing
with warranty of merchantability.
183. Columbia Axle Co. v. American Auto Insurance Co., supra note 179.
183a. It was so held in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 23 Cal.
Rptr. 282 (Cal. App. 1962), where the court after citing the leading cases in-
cluding Spence, Henningsen, Worley, Decker & Sons, all to be found, supra note
1, declared: "No sound reason exists for requiring the consumer to give notice
of his intention to hold the manufacturer liable for a claimed breach of the
latter's representations .. " As there is no relationship of buyer and seller be-
tween these parties, § 49 of the U.S.A. as adopted by California, Civ. Code, § 1769,
would not apply, citing La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, supra note 1.
184. Section IV, Part A (text at note 174 supra).
185. WILLISTON, op cit. §§ 602A, 626.
186. As, for example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1.
19631.
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Speback.l s 7 There, the contract called for the sale of a specified lot
of potatoes, one-half of the purchase being covered by a note given by
one of the partners who bought the potatoes. He was given a bill of
sale stating, "this sale is made with the express understanding that
there is no warranty of quality or quantity whatsoever."' 8  When
many of the potatoes turned out to be far from merchantable,18 9 the
partnership did not honor its note, and judgment was entered thereon
pro confesso. Relying on a classic precedent, International Milling Co.
v. Hachmeister,1 9 0 the majority of the court held that parol evidence
was inadmissible to show that 75% of the potatoes were unmerchant-
able. Thus, the partnership acquired title to certain potatoes which
were "in a frozen, decayed and grossly unfit and unmerchantable
state."'1 9 The decision seems subject to some criticism because if
187. 383 Pa. 359, 118 A.2d 744 (1955).
188. This is a typical disclaimer provision; emphasis supplied by the
court. But as pointed out in the dissent, infra note 191, this should have no
effect on Constructive warranties.
189. In the testimony, they were described graphically by various eye-
witnesses as being "a mess," looking like "mud balls," "a sticky mess," and the
frozen potatoes were described as "soft" and they were rotten.
190. 380 Pa. 407, 110 A.2d 186 (1955).
191. So described in the dissenting opinion by Musmanno, J. 383 Pa. 359, at
367, 118 A.2d 744, at 747-48; criticizing the majority opinion, the dissent con-
tinues: "The Majority Opinion states that the 'defendants could have examined
and determined for themselves the merchantibility of the potatoes.' It was a ques-
tion of fact for a jury to decide whether the defendants could have examined, or
were required to Inspect, each individual potato to ascertain its condition. In this
connection, it is also noteworthy that when Kuzneski was specifically asked: 'Was
it practical for you to dig down and check and examine these potatoes thoroughly,'
he replied: It was impossible.'
"It Is true that upon receiving the $15,000 cash from the defendants, the
plaintiff made up a receipt in which appeared the statement that 'there is no
warranty of quality or quantity whatsoever.' But even this apparently iron-
sheeted barricade erected by the plaintiff may not shut off justice from one who
has been palpably and grossly victimized. Whatever aggrieves fundamental fair-
ness between man and man aggrieves the law.
"Regardless of what may have happened in the past when form frequently
dominated over substance, and the letter of the law often ignored factual reality,
it is the established jurisprudence of today that 'when a buyer relies on the
judgment of a seller who knows the purpose for which the property is to be used,
there is an implied warranty that the property is reasonably fit for the purpose
for which it was bought, and it is not excluded by a written contract eliminating
any warranty that may have been made by the seller. The implied sales warranty
arises independently and outside of the contract and is imposed by operation of
law.' Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Rodziewicz, 125 Pa. Super. 240, 244, 189 A. 580, 582
(1937).
"It does not comport with fair dealing that a seller may disobligate him-
self from plainspoken requirements of the law by inserting into a bill of sale a
statement that he will not abide by the law. A potato merchant may refuse to
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the potatoes were actually no longer potatoes, but merely a putrefied
mass, then it would appear that there was either a lack, or a failure,
of consideration.' 9 2 This would justify rescission of the contract.
Of course, it is understood that as a general rule, disclaimer is
merely an example of freedom of contract. However, where the con-
tract in question is one of adhesion, the courts are quite uniform in
interpreting it strictly against the vendor. In appropriate instances,
as in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 19 3 courts have refused
to give any effect to disclaimer provisions on grounds of public policy.
The desirability of limiting freedom of contract where its use would
lead to abuse has been recognized in a statement by Chief Justice
Hughes in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo: 19 4
accept responsibility for the quality of his potatoes, but the article he sells must
actually be potatoes. No disavowal of warranty can protect a businessman who
sells oleomargarine for butter, or may it immunize from liability a wine dealer
who markets cider as champagne. No amount of disclaimer of quality could save
the trader who sells infected milk. It is, in fact, an affront to human intelligence
and to every concept of responsibility which goes to make up civilized society
for any vendor of food to proclaim that he will not be held to an accounting for
taking money for bad food.
"The evidence reveals that the goods Gagnon sold to the defendants were
not merchantable. He knew that the potatoes had been subjected to a severe
frost as well as to the rigors of a snow storm and unusual rains. It was within
his knowledge that potatoes hammered at by such severe climatic elements would
quickly rot and become unfit for human consumption. Gagnon did not sell what
he promised to sell, that is, potatoes.
"Despite the most valiant effort at self-preservation, a potato may deteriorate
to the point where It is no longer a potato. Most of the tubers in this case had
reached a stage of almost complete self-effacement. Bruised and debilitated from
the attack of the frost, snow, and rain in the fields, they could offer no resistance
to the forces of disintegration in the warehouse which levelled them into a com-
mon denominator and compounded them into an inedible mass.
"Although a potato seems to be more firmly constructed than an egg, its
outer covering is no less susceptible to the elements of deterioration than those
which attack an egg. A dealer in potatoes is charged with that particular knowl-
edge. Thus, he may no more escape responsibility for selling rotten potatoes
than the egg merchant who purveys rotten eggs. It needs no argument to prove
that in the market of fair dealing, a rotten egg has lost all standing as an egg.
"What Gagnon sold to the defendants had lost all standing as potatoes .. "
Gagnon v. Speback, supra note 187, dissenting opinion, where, quoting Hobart
Manufacturing Co. v. Rodziewicz, supra note 70, at 244, the following appears:
"The implied sales warranty arises independently and outside of the contract and
is imposed by operation of law." Since it is dehors the contract, it is constructive.
192. WILLISTON, op. cit. § 119A. Lack of and Failure of Consideration Dis-
tinguished.
193. Supra note 1; of., however Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 108 F. Supp.
659 (W. D. Pa. 1952).
194. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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We have had frequent occasion to consider the limitations
on liberty of contract. While it is highly important to pre-
serve that liberty from arbitrary and capricious interfer-
ence, it is also necessary to prevent its abuse, as otherwise
it could be used to override all public interests and thus in
the end destroy the very freedom of opportunity which it is
designed to safeguard.1 9 5
Clearly, the Henningsen decision points the way to greater con-
sumer protection by the simple expedient of refusing to enforce dis-
claimer provisions when these would tend to limit the protection to
which the consumer is justifiably entitled. Since New Jersey (and
Pennsylvania) are among the states which have adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code' 9 6 and since the Code specifically declares that the
courts may decline to enforce unconscionable agreements,' 9 7 it would
appear that their courts may continue to refuse to enforce disclaim-
ers embodied in standardized contracts wherein the consumer has no
opportunity to bargain but must accept the agreement as written.' 9 8
It has also been held that disclaimers refer only to express war-
ranties and do not affect warranties imposed by law as, for example,
the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or use, as in Bekke-
vold v. Potts' 99 and Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 2 0 0 oft-
quoted and cited to this effect. And even where meat was delivered
pursuant to a contract clause reading "with all faults and defects,"
it was held not to negate liability under a warranty of description
when it was proved that the meat was adulterated and not equivalent
to the description. 2 0 1
195. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, supra note 194, Chief Justice
Hughes dissenting, at 627.
196. Jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code,
together with effective dates, include:
Alaska, January 1, 1963; Arkansas, January 1, 1962; Connecticut, October 1, 1961;
Georgia, April 1, 1963; Illinois, July 1, 1962; Kentucky, July 1, 1960; Massachu-
setts, October 1, 1958; Michigan, January 1, 1964; New Hampshire, July 1, 1961;
New Jersey, January 1, 1963; New Mexico, January 1, 1962; New York, Septem-
ber 27, 1964; Ohio, July 1, 1962; Oklahoma, January 1, 1963; Oregon, September
1, 1963; Pennsylvania, July 1, 1954; Rhode Island, January 2, 1962; Wyoming,
January 2, 1962.
197. UCC § 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
198. As, for example, in automotive sales contracts, insurance policies, and
similar agreements; some of these are discussed in WILLISTON, Op. cit. §§ 626,
643.
199. 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
200. 106 Oh. St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922).
201. Robert A. Munroe & Co. v. Meyer, [1930] 2 K.B. 312.
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It is clear that the Uniform Commercial Code 2 0 2 recognizes the
right of a vendor to make a limited warranty or none at all. And
where the disclaimer does not offend against public policy, it will be
enforced as made. 2 0 3
This, however, still leaves the question of the effect of a disclaimer
upon a third party not in privity of warranty. Here, there is no ques-
tion of contract unless the third party is a beneficiary. 2 0 4 In that case
his recovery must be based on the contract and its limitations. But
where the third party seeks recovery under a warranty imposed by
law, he is not affected by a disclaimer from the manufacturer to the
retailer from whom he has purchased the defective product. 2 0 5 Ac-
tually, it should make no difference whether the case involves an ex-
press or constructive warranty, the result should be the same-the
disclaimer should be ineffectual as to third parties. It was so held in
Henningsen:
It is important to express the right of Mrs. Henningsen to
maintain her action in terms of a general principle. To what
extent may lack of privity be disregarded in suits on such
warranties? 2 0 6 . . . it is our opinion that an implied war-
ranty of merchantability chargeable to either an automobile
manufacturer or a dealer extends to the purchaser of the
car, members of his family, and to other persons occupying
or using it with his consent. It would be wholly opposed to
reality to say that use by such persons is not within the
anticipation of parties to such a warranty of reasonable
suitability of an automobile for ordinary highway operation.
Those persons must be considered within the distributive
chain. 2 0 7
202. UCC § 2--316; Comment, Effect of Disclaimer Clause on Implied War-
ranty of Merchantability, 7 S. D. L. REv. 133 (1962).
203. WILISTON, op. cit. §§ 615A, 626, 643.
204. Id. § 378A.
205. Marino v. Maytag Atlantic Co., 141 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1955)
where the court said that "such express waiver should apply only in express con-
tracts between and executed by the parties to such express contract."; Sokoloski
v. Splann, 311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E.2d 874 (1942), cf. Taylor v. Jacobson, 336
Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1958); Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620,
211 Pac. 748 (1922).
206. Citing and following Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252
(1959).
207. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1, at 414-15, 161 A.2d
at 100. It is important to note that the court does not confine the right of action
in the absence of privity to the members of the purchaser's family, but extends.
it "to other persons occupying or using it [the automobile] with his consent."
This goes beyond the scope of § 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
became effective in New Jersey on January 1 of this year.
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V. HOW DID THE REQUIREMENT ORIGINATE
AND DEVELOP?
By a bizarre quirk of circumstance, the judicial precedent which
gave vendors the most effective defense against their victims was
a dictum in an English case, Winterbottom v. Wright.2 0 8 And to add
to the quizzical perversity at times characteristic of legal dogmas
molded by the rigidity of stare decisis, the Winterbottom case in-
volved neither a manufacturer nor a retailer. Comments in the
various opinions 209 clearly stated that absent privity, there would
be no recovery. 2 1 0 Quite suddenly, judicial inventiveness reached a
new peak, possibly unequalled until the labor relations cases in this
half of the twentieth century.2 1 1 It all arose because an unfortunate
coachman had the ill-luck to be injured while driving a defective
208. 10 Mees. & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); the
essential facts are quite simple: The defendant was a contractor who supplied
mail coaches to the Postmaster General for the carriage of mail bags from one
locality to another and also undertook to keep the mail coaches in a fit, proper,
safe and secure condition for this purpose. Plaintiff Winterbottom was a coach-
man whose services were engaged by a third party who had a contract with the
Postmaster General to carry the mail. While Winterbottom was driving the mail
coach, the coach broke down throwing him from his seat and causing him to be
injured for life. The plaintiff declared that he had relied on the contract between
the Postmaster General and defendant whereby the latter had undertaken to keep
the mail coaches in a proper state of repair. This duty having been violated by
the defendant Wright, plaintiff Winterbottom sought judgment in the amount of
his damages. The court sustained the defendant's demurrer since plaintiff could
establish no privity.
209. Abinger, C.B. declared that if Winterbottom was found to have a right
of action, then "every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who
is injured by the upsetting of the coach" could sue; by way of dictum, he observed
that there was "no privity of contract between these parties," and therefore de-
fendant should have judgment.
210. Sharing this view, Alderson, B., in Winterbottom v. Wright, supra
note 208, was of the opinion that if the plaintiff could sue, "there is no point
at which such actions would stop." He concluded that "the only safe rule is to
confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract."
211. Especially, Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), where the Supreme Court of the United States
calls upon the inferior federal tribunals to fashion a remedy by having recourse
to "judicial inventiveness":
"We conclude," said the Court, "that the substantive law to apply in suits
under Section 301 (a) is federal law which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws . . . The Labor Management Relations Act ex-
pressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may
not do in certain situations. Other problems will be in the penumbra of express
statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved
by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will
effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by
the nature of the problem." at 457.
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coach on a mail run! How could this coachman, this hapless wight,
have guessed that his sad plight-no recovery for lack of privity-
would be shared by so many countless thousands in the years to
come?
Right after the middle of the nineteenth century, any number
of cases 2 12 may be found wherein the courts have declared that no
one not in privity of warranty with the vendor of an article could re-
cover for breach of said warranty against the vendor. In Pennsyl-
vania, the early cases not only held that privity was essential, but
the courts declared that a mere statement of fact without intent to
warrant could not be considered a warranty. 2 1 3 This further limited
the possibilities of recovery. But other jurisdictions were just as
dedicated to this erroneous concept and adhered to it with a dogged
tenacity worthy of a better cause.2 1 4
However, the harsh and unfortunate consequences of this rigid
adherence to the requirement of privity in tort actions soon per-
suaded many courts to discard it where certain categories of prod-
ucts were concerned. Thus, a decade after the decision in Winterbot-
tom v. Wright,2 1 5 the New York courts in Thomas v. Winchester2 16
Earlier, the Court had said: "Section 301 [of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act, 61 Stat. 154, 29 U.S.C. § 173] Is more than jurisdictional ... it authorizes
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these
collective labor agreements" at 451. Setting an example for the lower courts,
the Supreme Court's liberal construction of federal labor law reached its apogee
in a trilogy of cases: United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra, discussed in Jaeger, Collective
Labor Agreements and the Third Party Beneficiary, 1 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REv.
125 (1960); see also JAEGER, LABOR LAW chs. 1, 2 (1939), and (Supp. 1959);
JAEGER, COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS (1962).
212. Collected in FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1961) and
HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1961).
213. Text at note 118, supra.
214. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948); Oklahoma Tire & Supply Co. v. Williams, 181
F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1950); Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.
1956); International Derrick & Equipment Co. v. Croix, 241 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957).
Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921);
Miles v. Chrysler Corp., 238 Ala. 359, 191 So. 245 (1939); Hale v. Depaoli, 33
Cal.2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); White v. Rose, 241 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1957);
Hunter v. Quality Homes, Inc., 45 Del. 100, 68 A.2d 620 (1949); Thrash v, U-Drive-
It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953); Smith v. Atco Co., 6 Wis.2d 371,
94 N.W.2d 697 (1959).
215. Supra note 208.
216. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
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held a manufacturer liable to a consumer where a bottle of bella-
donna had been mislabelled "dandelion," and caused injury to the
plaintiff. Lack of privity, said the court, is no defense. About a
half a century after that decision, a federal court declared that a
party who makes or sells "an article of merchandise designed and
fitted for a specific use is liable to the person who, in the natural
course of events, uses it for the purpose for which it was made or
sold, for an injury which is the natural and probable consequence of
the negligence of the manufacturer or vendor in its construction or
sale., 2 17
Then came the era of great expansion of consumer protection ini-
tiated by the historic pronouncement in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. 2 18 "The question to be determined is whether the defendant
owed a duty of care and vigilance to any one but the immediate pur-
chaser.,, 2 19 And later, the court continued: "We have put aside the
notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences
of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing
else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be.
We have put its source in the law." 22 0
This was followed by a virtually universal elimination of the
privity requirement in at least three categories of negligence cases:
(1) Inherently dangerous or harmful character; (2) Defective prod-
uct that is imminently dangerous; and (3) Fraud or deceit. 2 2 1
Today, there is hardly a jurisdiction which would even suggest the
necessity of this requirement where a tort action against the manu-
facturer or intermediary concerns a product within one of these
classes.2 2 2 However, since the essence of this action is negligence,
the question immediately presents itself: What is negligence? Here,
the courts are hopelessly at odds. While many of the cases hold
that the mere presence of a noxious substance in food or drink will
establish a prima facie case of negligence, 2 23 a number of jurisdic-
217. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
218. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
219. Id. at 385.
220. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra, note 218, at 390.
221. Discussed in FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, Op. cit. supra note 212, and in
HURSH, op. cit. supra note 212.
222. Try-Me Beverage Co. v. Harris, 217 Ala. 302, 116 So. 147 (1928), foreign
substance in beverage; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dean, 43 Ga. App. 682,
160 S.E. 105 (1931); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., supra note 1; Nehi Bottling
Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1930), arsenic in soft drink; Hertzler
v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924), poison in flour; Minutilla v.
Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R.I. 43, 144 Atl. 884 (1929), glass in ice cream.
223. Dr. Pepper Co. v. Brittain, 234 Ala. 548, 176 So. 286 (1937), "a black
substance," possibly a fly, which was unwholesome; Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling
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tions permit the manufacturer to overcome this by a showing of due
care and the possibility of the intermediate introduction of the foreign
substance. 22 4 Here the manufacturers or bottlers of certain types of
beverages seem to have the greatest advantage. However, the ten-
dency toward the adoption of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
increasing. In a growing number of jurisdictions, the courts hold
that the presumption of negligence becomes conclusive where the
consumer purchases the product in its original sealed package or
container. 2 2 5
Res ipsa loquitur has become a real boon to the consumer in negli-
gence cases. There has been a gradual extension of this doctrine so
that in many instances, the mere presence of an unwholesome or
deleterious substance in an article or product intended for human use
or consumption speaks for itself.2 2 6 But even here, there has been
wide divergence of view as to the manner of its application. A number
of jurisdictions fall far short of imposing strict liability since the
Co. v. Smith, 29 Ala. App. 324, 195 So. 560 (1940), beverage containing spider;
Gardner v. Sumner, 40 Ala. App. 340, 113 So.2d 523 (1959), root beer contained
piece of cigar; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cromwell, 203 Ark. 933, 159 S.W.2d
744 (1942), insect legs resembling those of a spider, judgment for plaintiff
affirmed; Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958),
foreign substance; Cordell v. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 56 Ga. App. 117, 192
S.E. 228 (1937), beverage contained flies; Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
supra note 1, containing mouse; Migliozzi v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 51 N.J. Super.
313, 144 A.2d 1 (1958), foreign substance; Smith v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 152
Pa. Super. 445, 33 A.2d 488 (1943), spider; Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Tyler, 288 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), mouse in Coca-Cola.
224. Nickols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1929), dead
cockroach in loaf of bread, but defendant showed due care in making loaf;
Sanders v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 F. Supp. 332 (D. Tex. 1939), ginger ale bottle;
Stewart v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 68 P.2d 952 (1937),
Coca-Cola bottle exploded; Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal.2d 217, 324 P.2d
583 (1958); Coca-Cola Bottling Co., v. Rowland, 16 Tenn. App. 184, 66 S.W.2d
272 (1932).
225. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sinyard, 45 Ga. App. 272, 164 S.E.
231 (1932); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Creech, 245 Ky. 414, 53 S.W.2d 745
(1932); Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., supra note 1, glass in sealed package
of sausages; Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. 1, 158 A.2d 631 (1960);
Keffer v. Logan Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 141 W. Va. 839, 93 S.E.2d 225
(1956), bottle exploded.
226. Canada Dry Ginger Ale Co. v. Jochum, 43 A.2d 42 (Mun. Ct. App.
D.C. 1945); Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.2d 162 (1933), doctrine applied
where putrefied mouse was found in beverage; Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); McClelland v. Acme Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App.
2d 698, 207 P.2d 591 (1949); Nichols v. Nold, supra note 1; Redmond v. Ouachita
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 76 So.2d 553 (La. App. 1954) ; Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg
Co. 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954), bursting bottle; Zarling v. La Salle Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 2 Wis.2d 596, 87 N.W.2d 263 (1958); Weggeman v. Seven-Up
Bottling Co., 5 Wis.2d 503, 93 N.W.2d 467 (1958), 94 N.W.2d 645 (1959).
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manufacturer or producer may prove due care and avoid all respon-
sibility. Yet in spite of this, the trend is unmistakably in the direction
of greater consumer protection. 2 2 7
In this field, surprisingly enough, it appears that the Pennsyl-
vania courts have taken the initiative. Thus, is a leading case, Rozu-
mailski v. Philadelphia Bottling., Co.,2 2 8 the court found that where it
was established by plaintiff that there was ground glass in the bottom
of a bottle containing an allegedly potable beverage, this was a demon-
stration of negligence: "It is a case where the accident proves its own
negligence cause, and the jury would be permitted to infer negligence,
as the court below instructed it, from the fact that ground glass had
been found in the bottom of the bottle." 2 2 9
Other difficulties standing in the way of plaintiff-consumer's re-
covery are assumption of risk and contributory negligence. These
are usually questions for the jury and must depend on the facts in a
given case. Where the consumer disregards directions as to use, or
fails to observe the limitations the manufacturer has pointed out,
recovery may be denied. 2 3 0 The upshot of the cases makes it increas-
ingly difficult to determine whether the court was holding that the
mere existence of the defect is sufficient evidence of negligence, or
whether the manufacturer is liable for injury caused by certain cate-
gories of goods without any negligence and merely because there were
deleterious effects not attributable to any misuse by the consumer.
It may be that the past generation has witnessed the evolution of
insurance liability on the part of the manufacturer based on "negli-
gence," as the courts find it, regardless of actual negligence in fact. 2 3 1
227. This trend was evinced more than twenty years ago in the classic
case of Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc., v. Capps, supra note 1, and has more re-
cently been emphasized in Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 8upra note 1; Sofman
v. Denham Food Service, Inc., 37 N.J. 304, 181 A.2d 168 (1962) and Greenberg
v. Lorenz, supra note 1.
228. 296 Pa. 114, 145 At. 700 (1929).
229. Rozumallski v. Philadelphia Bottling Co., supra note 228, at 118, 145
At. at 701.
230. Mannsz v. Macwhyte, supra note 1.
231. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939)
noted 15 FLA. L. REV. 97, where the court observes: "Whether the result reached
is best justified by holding the privity concept inapplicable because of its historical
origins ... or that the requirements of privity are satisfied by the commercial
advertising and merchandising methods of defendant... or by finding the dealer
under the circumstances defendant's agent to warrant its products . . .or by
holding that the express warranty is similar to a covenant running with the
land and follows the product to the ultimate consumer . . .or by application of
the third party beneficiary statute to the transaction between defendant and its
retail dealer ... we have no occasion to decide. It is sufficient to state that the
liability... is imposed on the maker of false statements and may be enforced by
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Not infrequently, where there is a pertinent pure food and drug
statute, or similar legislation, and the manufacturer has violated its
provisions, he may be held liable, not only criminally, but civilly on
the ground of negligence. 2 3 2
Since the dawn of the century, there has been considerable pre-
occupation with the slow but sure poisoning of the citizenry by pre-
servatives, adulterants, and additives of all descriptions ranging from
formaldehyde to copper sulphate. Pure food and drug "addicts," that
is, forceful and vociferous advocates of laws to regulate and control
the marketing of foodstuffs and beverages to prevent this decimation
of the population, eventually won a qualified victory in the enact-
ment of statutory measures designed for the protection of the public.
"Qualified" because the federal legislation only regulated articles in
interstate commerce, 2 33 and not all of the states2 3 4 followed suit. 2 3 5
In any case, here was a clear demonstration of public policy expressed
by the Congress of the United States and the legislatures of a number
of the several states. 2 3 6
The consumer has another string to his bow: Fraud or deceit in
the labelling, branding or advertising of products by the manufacturer
results in liability if injury follows the use of the product. 2 37 But
even this remedy has not been too effective when it is necessary to
the ultimate consumer of the product to whom the statements are directed."
BahIman v. Hudson Motor Co., supra; this decision foreshadowed a similar one
in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. 2d.
873 (1958), stated infra in text at notes 681 et seq.
232. Peterson v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Ore. 511, 106 Pac. 337 (1910). The
Congress of the United States enacted the original Food and Drugs Act in 1906,
and a subsequent broader statute, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in
1938.
233. Supra note 232; see Symposium, Advertised-Product Liability, 8 CLEVn-
LAND-MARSHALL L. REv. 1 (1959).
234. Pennsylvania is not listed in the table cited infra, note 235.
235. Dunsmore, Advertising Law and Product Liability, 8 CLEVELAND-
MARSHALL L. REV. 62, Table 1, listing statutes of the various states governing the
advertising of foods, drugs and cosmetics. About thirty states have laws similar
to the federal statutes, supra note 232.
236. Supra, notes 232 and 235.
237. Wright v. Carter Products, 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957), deodorant;
Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1961), giving an exten-
sive discussion of misrepresentation and nondisclosure; Gentry v. Little Rock
Road Machinery Co., 232 Ark. 580, 339 S.W.2d 101 (1960), false representation
that tractor was in A-1 condition; Dixie Seed Co. v. L.A. Smith, 103 Ga. App. 386,
119 S.E.2d (1961), requiring a showing of intent to deceive the plaintiff; Pearl
v. William Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass. 529, 58 N.E.2d 825 (1945) ; Smith v. Leppo,
360 Mich. 557, 104 N.W.2d 128 (1960); Miller v. South, 174 N.E.2d 140 (Oh. App.
1960); Hobbs v. Smith, 27 Okla. 830, 115 Pac. 347 (1911), punitive damages
awarded where defendant knew he was selling diseased hogs.
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prove that the representation was conscious and intentional. 2 38 More
recently, the courts have been increasingly inclined to base recovery
on the mere making of the representation, a demonstration of its
falsity and resultant injury to the consumer. 23 9 This, of course, is
where action on the warranty has its greatest advantage since it mat-
ters not whether the warrantor knew or did not know the truth or
falsity of the affirmation.
The ultimate has probably been reached in Massachusetts where
the court, holding for the plaintiff in Carter v. Yardley,2 40 made
short shrift of privity: "The time has come for us to recognize that
that asserted general rule [of privity] no longer exists. In principle
it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust results. It has been
abandoned by the great weight of authority elsewhere." 2 4 1
Privity has received a set-back in many particular fields, as a
recently decided case in California, Lucas v. Hamm, 2 4 2 suggests.
In an able and carefully-reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court, speak-
ing through Chief Justice Gibson, disapproving and overruling Buck-
ley v. Gray,2 4 3 declared that a beneficiary under a will would have a
right of action against an attorney where the latter was negligent in
drafting the will: 2 4 4
The reasoning underlying the denial of tort liability in the
Buckley case, i.e., the stringent privity test, was rejected2 4 5
238. Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937); Dixie Seed
Co. v. L.A. Smith, supra note 237; Cantwell v. Harding, 249 fli. 354, 94 N.E. 488
(1911) ; Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625 (1922) ; Dobbin
v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash.2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946).
239. Hammond v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Worley v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., supra note 1; Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,
supra note 1; Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., supra note 1; General
Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960); Baxter v.
Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
240. 310 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
241. Id., quoted in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply;
supra note 1, at 128, 90 N.W.2d at 878, discussed in 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§.378A (3d ed. Jaeger 1959).
242. 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cart. den. 368
U.S. 987.
243. 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895), JAEGER, LAW OF CONTRACTS, p. 353
(1953).
244. It was, however, determined, contrary to the view of the lower court,
that the attorney in question had not been proved to be lacking in ordinary "skill
and capacity," and that he had "drafted the will in such manner that the trust
was invalid because it violated the rules relating to perpetuities and restraints on
alienation. These closely akin subjects," observed Chief Justice Gibson sagely,
"have long perplexed the courts and the bar."
245. Emphasis supplied.
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in Biakanja v. Irving,2 4 6 where we held that a notary public
who, although not authorized to practice law, prepared a
will but negligently failed to direct proper attestation was
liable in tort to an intended beneficiary who was damaged
because of the invalidity of the instrument. It was pointed
out that since 1895, when Buckley was decided, the rule that
in the absence of privity there was no liability for negligence
committed in the performance of a contract had been greatly
liberalized. 2 47 In restating the rule it was said that the
determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of
policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among
which are the extent to which the transaction was intended
to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury, and the policy of preventing future harm. 2 4 8
The same general principle must be applied in determining
whether a beneficiary is entitled to bring an action for negli-
gence in the drafting of a will when the instrument is
drafted by an attorney rather than by a person not author-
ized to practice law. 2 4 9
Of transcending importance in bringing about this disregard of
privity were the changes in the nature of the goods being manufac-
tured, the means of transportation and especially of communication.
From a localized economy, the country progressed to a national, or
even super national economy where goods were advertised and sold
on a gigantic, indeed worldwide scale. 2 5 0 Also, the possibility of
discovering concealed or latent defects became increasingly difficult
if not virtually impossible as processing and packaging became ever
more complex and the possibility of inspection dwindled to the van-
ishing point.
246. 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
247. Citing 49 Cal.2d at 649.
'48. Citing 49 Cal.2d at 650.
249. Lucas v. Hamm, supra note 242.
250. It is interesting to note that in this advertising race for a share of the
consumer's dollar, the principal products advertised were (1) Food and food
products; (2) Cosmetics and the like; (3) Automotive products; (4) Soaps,
Cleaners, and Detergents; (5) Drugs and Pharmaceuticals; (6) Cigarettes and
other tobacco products; (7) Building products and household equipment; and (8)
Wearing apparel and accessories; see Dunsmore, op. cit. supra note 235.
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VI. GRADUAL EROSION OF PRIVITY OF WARRANTY
Privity having been largely eliminated as an essential prerequisite
in certain types of negligence cases previously discussed, ways and
means were found to circumvent, obliterate or discard it in actions
for breach of warranty. Some of these departures from the privity
"rule" are noteworthy; they may be grouped under the headings of
fictions, exceptions or, quite simply, elimination or obliteration. It
should be understood, however, that the courts at times use an eclec-
tic theory and combine these devices to achieve greater consumer
protection. 2 5 1 One thing is quite clear-the plaintiff is completely
indifferent as to theory so long as the practical result is judgment in
his favor. Nor is there any valid reason why the courts should be
too concerned about rejecting this judge-made rule when it seems
too self-evident to be argued that what they have done they can also
undo where the justification is so clear. 2 5 2
By way of fiction, the courts have resorted to the agency theory,
the "household-fund" variation, the general offer, the direct war-
ranty to the consumer, the conduit concept, warranty "running with
the goods," and the third party beneficiary principle. Exceptions
have been created in favor of certain categories of products to which,
it is judically asserted, the privity "requirement" just does not apply.
Finally, an increasing number of jurisdictions with commendable
candor simply declare that it is in the public interest to abolish this
baseless and untoward defense.
The agency theory was applied in Ryan v. Progressive Stores,
Inc.,2 5 3 where the wife was held to be the agent of the husband when
she purchased food. Actually, the agency had not been proved, but
the court presumed from the relationship of husband and wife that
the husband furnished the money for the purchase. Following this
251. Quite often, these fictions and exceptions shade into each other and
no fixed line of demarcation can be drawn.
252. That what the judges have done they can also undo is recognized In a
variety of cases such as Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, supra
note 1; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1; Parish v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 1.
However, in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has expressly declined to do this, saying: "Under the Statutory
Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, 46 P.S., § 533, words and phrases
must be construed according to their common approved usage. Further, it is
not for us to legislate or by interpretation to add to legislation, matters which
the legislature saw fit not to include [Citations omitted]." This argument is not
very impressive since the privity "requirement" so-called actually originated in
dicta formulated by certain judges in Winterbottom v. Wright, supra note 208.
253. 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
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reasoning, the court in Mouren v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.2 5 4
and Welch v. Schiebelhuth,2 5 5 held for the plaintiff (who was not
in privity) on a breach of warranty complaint. These decisions were
based on the "household-fund" theory formulated in Bowman v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,256 according to which the plaintiff,
who was not the purchaser, was held entitled to recover, although her
sister had made the purchase, since the money came out of a common
household fund.
It has also been held that the manufacturer who uses various ad-
vertising media makes a general offer of a continuing unilateral
character to the public as illustrated by Carlill v. Carbolic Smokeball
Co. 2 5 7 and Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Manufacturing Co.;25 8
the manufacturer is held directly liable to the customer who has
purchased the product and is injured thereby. Somewhat related
to this is the conduit concept where the retailer or distributor is
held to be a medium of transmission (or even the agent) for the
warranties made by the manufacturer. This is the reasoning in
General Motors Corp. v. Dodson2 5 9 where the court said "the jury
could have found that General Motors was the actual person or
entity with whom plaintiffs were dealing and [the dealer] was a
conduit or subterfuge by which General Motors tried to exempt it-
self from liability to the consumers who are the plaintiffs." 2 6 0 When
the defendant sought a rehearing basing its petition on an earlier
case, Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg., 26 1 the court declared that
the latter had been specifically overruled. 2 62
In the oft-quoted classic, Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent,26 3
the Supreme Court of Ohio held that since the defendant company
had engaged in extensive advertising of its hair preparation and
stated on the label that it was "Very Gentle" the manufacturer
would be held liable on its express warranty:
254. 1 N.Y.2d 884, 154 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1956).
255. 11 Misc.2d 312, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. 1957).
256. 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165 (1955).
257. [1893] 1 Q.B. 256.
258. 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932).
259. 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
260. Id. at 661.
261. 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421 (1912).
262. By Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479
(1954).
263. Supra note 1; Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent has been quoted and
cited repeatedly as, for example in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v.
Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958), at 151-152.
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Occasions may arise when it is fitting and wholesome to dis-
card legal concepts of the past to meet new conditions and
practices of our changing and progressing civilization. Today,
many manufacturers of merchandise, including the defend-
ant herein, make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals,
signboards, radio and television to advertise their product.26 4
The worth, quality and benefits of these products are de-
scribed in glowing terms and in considerable detail, and the
appeal is almost universally directed to the ultimate con-
sumer. Many of these manufactured articles are shipped
out in sealed containers by the manufacturer, and the re-
tailers who dispense them to the ultimate consumers are but
conduits or outlets through which the manufacturer dis-
tributes his goods. The consuming public ordinarily relies
exclusively on the representations of the manufacturers in
his advertisements. What sensible or sound reason then
exists as to why, when the goods purchased by the ultimate
consumer on the strength of the advertisements aimed
squarely at him do not possess their described qualities and
goodness and cause him harm, he should not be permitted
to move against the manufacturer to recoup his loss. In our
minds no good or valid reason exists for denying him that
right. Surely under modern merchandising practices the
manufacturer owes a very real obligation toward those who
consume or use his products. The warranties made by the
manufacturer in his advertisements and by the labels on his
products are inducements to the ultimate consumers, and
the manufacturer ought to be held to strict accountability
to any consumer who buys the product in reliance on such
representations and later suffers injury because the product
proves to be defective or deleterious. 2 6 5
Soon thereafter, the question of implied warranty presented itself
with respect to a beauty preparation in Markovich v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc.;2 6 6 the court refused to recognize any distinction be-
tween liability on an express or implied warranty and held that the
case should have been submitted to the jury.
264. Similar reasoning is used by the court in General Motors Corp. v.
Dodson, supra note 1, where the conduit theory was invoked; it would appear
that a similar result would obtain in Pennsylvania according to the rules formu-
lated in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, with this significant
difference: A subpurchaser within the distributive chain could maintain an ac-
tion for breach of warranty regardless of any advertising campaign.
265. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent, supra note 1.
266. Supra note 1.
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It has even been held that a warranty "runs with the goods," in
two Iowa decisions, Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co. 2 6 7 and Anderson
v. Tyler,2 68 as well as in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lyons.2 6 9 In
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 2 7 0 a concurring opinion suggested
adoption of the same theory. In the latter case, the majority rested
its decision on res ipsa loquitur which covered the bottle containing
the beverage. In Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 27 1 the court held
that the warranty "inures to the consumer's benefit" even in the
absence of privity. An appellate court in Texas has endorsed this
theory in Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan. 2 72
But of all the devices used to enable the injured third party to re-
cover, none has been as appropriate as the generally accepted doctrine
of the third party beneficiary. 2 7 3 The leading case was decided in
Ohio, Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 2 7 4 where the court held that the
"contract between the groceryman and the Ward Baking Co. to all
intents and purposes was a contract entered into for the benefit of a
third party, to wit, the ultimate consumer."2 7 5 Application of this
doctrine is strongly advocated by Professor Williston :276
One of the most significant extensions of the doctrine of
third party beneficiaries is the recognition of a right of
action by consumers of food or users of certain products to
recover damages from a manufacturer or dealer for breach
of warranty of wholesomeness or fitness, even though the
particular consumer had no contractual relationship with
the manufacturer or dealer and was not in privity with him.
In the ever-increasing tendency to permit recovery on
warranties covering foods or other substances intended for
human use of consumption, even in the absence of privity
267. Supra note 1.
268. 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); cf. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v.
Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
269. Supra note 268.
270. 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
271. Supra note 1.
272. 328 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
273. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 378A (3d ed. Jaeger 1959).
274. 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
275. Since the decision in Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, supra note 274, Ohio
has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code which consecrates this principle in
§ 2-318 under the title "Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or
Implied," but limits it "to any natural person who is in the family or household
of his buyer [meaning the seller's buyer] or who is a guest in his [the buyer's]
home .... A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
276. Op. cit. § 378A. Recovery by Undetermined Beneficiary on Warranty.
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of contract, the third-party beneficiary concept is playing a
significant role ....
It seems curious that where third party beneficiaries have
been recognized for so many decades in so many fields, there
should be so much reluctance to recognize them in their
most important aspect; ofttimes, in a matter of life or
death. 2 7 7
The third party principle is adverted to in a recent case 2 78 in
Michigan. Referring to the strictures imposed by the privity "re-
quirement," the Supreme Court of that State said: "Thus the older
and narrower doctrines have given way in response to the 'ever-
growing pressure for protection of the consumer, coupled with a
realization that liability would not unduly inhibit the enterprise of
manufacturers and that they were well placed both to profit from its
lessons and to distribute its burdens.' 2 7 9 As a result, the requirement
of privity has been abandoned outright in many jurisdictions rather
than by the use of fictions, 28 0 thereby opening the door to the wide-
spread use of the warranty theory."' 2 8 ' As to "the use of fictions,"
the court observed: "E.g., The consumer is a third-party beneficiary
of the manufacturer-dealer contract," 28 2 Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. 283
This doctrine has much to recommend it and was approved in
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 28 4 citing Dryden v. Continental
Baking Co., u 5 where the court observed that, although the husband
bought the bread, "assuming that privity is an essential element of
such an action, it might well be urged that the wife ... was a third
party beneficiary of the contract."2 8 6
In an exhaustive review of the authorities, Judge Starke of the
New York Supreme Court called attention to the trend away from
privity and towards greater liberality, Parish v. Great Atlantic &
277. Id. at 967 et seq.
278. Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 N.W.2d 918 (Mich.
1961), where "mold filaments and mold spores" were found.
279. Quoting HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS, § 28.1, at 1535.
280. Such as, the court suggests "the assignment" of the dealer's cause of
action to the consumer.
281. Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 278 at 921-22.
282. This is stated in a footnote id. at 922.
283. Supra note 278.
284. Supra note 1.
285. 11 Cal.2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938).
286. Quoted in Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., supra note 1; emphasis
supplied.
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Pacific Tea Co.,2 s8 and the adoption of the third party principle.
This trend culminated in the holding by the Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals that an infant who was injured by eating some
canned salmon which contained a sharp metal tag would be allowed
recovery against the vendor although clearly, privity was lacking;
he observed: 28 8 "The injustice of denying damages to a child be-
cause of nonprivity seems too plain for argument. The only real
doubt is as to the propriety of changing the rule ... but the present
rule which we are being asked to modify is itself of judicial making
since our statutes say nothing at all about privity and in early times
such liabilities were thought to be in tort. 28 9 Alteration of the law
in such matters has been the business of the New York courts for
many years." 2 9 0
Perhaps the most vigorous abolition or better still, annihilation, of
privity is based on public policy. Courts which have accepted this
method of awarding damages to the injured consumer simply declare
that it is in the interest of the public to protect the purchaser or user
against breaches of warranty'by the manufacturer or vendor, regard-
less of privity. 2 9 1 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,2 9 2 decided some
twenty-one years ago, has reached its majority and become the lead-
ing precedent on this approach to the problem. The Supreme Court of
Texas notes a growing tendency "to discard the requirement of priv-
ity and to hold the manufacturer liable directly to the ultimate con-
sumer." 2 9 3 The same court again held for the plaintiff where canned
spinach caused food poisoning stating that its decision was based on
287. Supra note 1.
288. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
289. Citing PROSSER, TORTS § 84, at 507 (2d ed. 1955); 1 WILLISTON, SALES
§ 195, at 502 (rev. ed. 1948).
290. Citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
"To decide the case before us," the court added, "we should hold that
the infant's cause of action should not have been dismissed solely on the
ground that the food was purchased not by the child but by the child's father.
Today when so much of our food is bought in packages it is not just or sensi-
ble to confine the warranty's protection to the individual buyer. At least as to
food and household goods, the presumption should be that the purchase was
made for all the members of the household."
291. Chapman v. Brown, supra note 1; Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,
supra note 1; Nichols v. Nold, supra note 1; Spence v. Three Rivers Builders &
Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 1; Williams v. Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp.
865 (W.D. Mo. 1948); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1; cf.
Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944).
292. Supra note 1.
293. Id. at 617, 164 S.W.2d at 832.
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grounds of public policy. 2 9 4 Much more recently, the Supreme Court
of Florida also found the vendor liable when worms were found in a
can of spinach, Food Fair Stores v. Macurda :
2 9 5
The evidence here clearly supports the conclusion that the
can of spinach was crawling with worms. Can the worms be
considered deleterious, unwholesome or unfit for human con-
sumption?
Admittedly we are not connoisseurs of cuisine that quali-
fies us to view as delicacies some foodstuffs that might be
indigestible by others. To certain tribes of American Indians
we understand that such creatures as worms, grasshoppers,
snails and the like are acceptable as delicious morsels of
food. We are told that canned Mexican worms grace the
shelves of many delicatessens and in certain swank social
levels, which few of us ever reach, it is said that roasted
snails are available with the trays of hors d'oeuvres at the
pre-dinner cocktail party. However, for the masses who
have moved ahead of the Indians but who perhaps have not
yet reached the "snail set," such invertebrates as worms and
snails are generally frowned upon as totally unwholesome
and unfit for human consumption. Indeed, they are in a
class with roaches, mice, flies and other nauseous intruders
that the cases indicate have at times found their way into
bottles, cans or other foodstuff containers. We therefore
hold that worms such as those revealed by the photographic
exhibits here are deleterious and unfit for human consump-
tion. 2 9 6
This doctrine was reaffirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas in Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan2 9 7 where a "T-V Chicken Din-
ner" contained a metal washer which caused injury to the consumer;
citing the Capps case,2 98 the court emphasized the rejection of the
privity requirement by the Supreme Court of Texas and its basic
reliance on public policy.
Kansas2 99 and Hawaii 00 are equally outspoken in their insistence
294. Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
295. 93 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957).
296. Food Fair Stores v. Macurda, supra note 295 at 861.
297. Supra note 1.
298. Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, supra note 1.
299. In Nichols v. Nold, supra note 1; cf. Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg.
Co., supra note 1.
300. Chapman v. Brown, supra note 1; one might wonder whether there is
any connection between insularity and consumer protection in light of the en-
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that privity must not be a bar to a person who has been injured
or damaged by some injurious substance which has been warranted,
expressly or impliedly, to be safe and non-noxious. Michigan, 3 0 1 New
Jersey 3 0 2 and New York 3 0 3 have cases that follow this general line
of reasoning, although the situation in the last mentioned jurisdic-
tion is not entirely clear because of the indication in Greenberg v.
Lorenz3 0 4 that the elimination of privity would be accomplished
one step at a time. However, since the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code,3 0 5 legislative approval has been given to the
Greenberg extension, that is, to members of the family, and beyond
that, to guests in the home. 3 0 6 And in an even more recent case,
Randy-Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.307 the court ap-
pears to have taken another step in the elimination of privity.
However, there seems to have been no more explicit and compre-
hensive rejection among the more recent cases than in Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 3 08 and Chapman v. Brown.3 0 9 Here the
courts in able and well-documented opinions have made no
bones about recognizing the effect of public policy upon privity of
warranty and its relegation to the limbo of lost defenses. These and
a number of other cases are analyzed and discussed in the next
section.
VII. PRODUCTS LIABILITY BY CATEGORY: RECENT CASES
The first faltering attempts to circumvent the privity requirement
were dictated, as has been indicated, by a desire to alleviate the
hardships resulting from a rigid application of this requirement.
But in this analysis, it will be observed that the courts are going
far beyond comestibles, viands, sweet-meats and potables in seeking
to preserve the consuming public from the ill-effects of harmful and
lightened thinking revealed in the opinon of the federal court applying Puerto
Rican law in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, supra note 264.
301. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 1.
302. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1.
303. Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 1; cf. Parish v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., supra note 1.
304. Supra note 288.
305. To become effective in New York on September 27, 1964.
306. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of War-
ranties Express or Implied.
307. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962), stated in text, infra notes 695 et
seq.
308. Supra note 1.
309. Supra note 1.
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noxious products. In fact, injury or harm to the person is no longer
essential in the more advanced jurisdictions; 3 1 0 it may suffice to
show damage to the purse. 3 1 And this latest and continuing trend
portends a potential protection of the ultimate consumer which
would cause the judges who sat during Winterbottom v. Wright3 1 2
to groan in their graves.
A. Foodstuffs, Beverages and Their Containers
Food. While the question of privity has been confused and muddled
as the cases have shown, it appears that Pennsylvania has repudiated
the "requirement" as to subpurchasers "in the distributive chain" so
completely that any further discussion would be a work of supereroga-
tion.3 1 3 So the point will not be labored, but instead, some of the
more recent cases from other jurisdictions which have seen the light
will be examined.3 14
Perhaps no more significant case dealing with foodstuffs has been
decided in the past quarter century than Jacob E. Decker & Sons v.
Capps.3 1 6 While it is true that there are earlier cases, 3 1 6 none
is as sweeping and definitive in its rejection or abolition of the privity
"requirement." The Supreme Court of Texas speaking through its
Chief Justice placed its decision squarely on the ground of public
policy-the necessity of protecting the consumer. 31 7 In the Capps
case, which reaches its majority this year, 3 18 a summer sausage
wrapped in cellophane was purchased from a retailer. It was eaten by
various members of the Capps family all of whom became ill, and one
310. As, for example, Michigan.
311. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); the case is stated and discussed with approval in 2 WILLIS-
TON, op. cit. § 378A at 968 et seq.
312. Supra note 208.
313. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently said, "it is now
established beyond argument in Pennsylvania that a subpurchaser may sue the
manufacturer directly in food cases for breach of an implied warranty of fitness
regardless of the lack of privity. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra
note 3.
314. Among the most recent of these is Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
363 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1961), which will be discussed subsequently, see infra note
328.
315. 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
316. Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Mazetti
v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913) are among the earliest.
317. Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, supra note 315.
318. The opinion has been cited and quoted in any number of cases, such as
Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 1, and Campbell Soup Co.
v. Ryan, supra note 1.
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of the children died. This action was brought against the manufac-
turer as to whom the jury found no negligence. However, since the
sausage was unfit for human consumption, judgment was rendered
for the plaintiffs and affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. Re-
viewing the entire history of implied warranties which accompany the
sale of food, and tracing its source to the early common law dating
back to 1266 A.D., the Supreme Court observed "a growing tendency
• . . to discard the requirement of privity and to hold the manu-
facturer liable directly to the ultimate consumer."
After having considered the matter most carefully, we
have reached the conclusion that the manufacturer is liable
for the injuries sustained by the consumers of the products
in question. We think the manufacturer is liable in such a
case under an implied warranty imposed by operation of law
as a matter of public policy. We recognize that the authori-
ties are by no means uniform, but we believe the better
reasoning supports the rule which holds the manufacturer
liable. Liability in such case is not based on negligence, nor
on a breach of the usual implied contractual warranty, but
on the broad principle of the public policy to protect human
health and life. It is a well-known fact that articles of food
are manufactured and placed in the channels of commerce,
with the intention that they shall pass from hand to hand
until they are finally used by some remote consumer. It is
usually impracticable, if not impossible, for the ultimate
consumer to analyze the food and ascertain whether or not
it is suitable for human consumption. Since it has been
packed and placed on the market as a food for human con-
sumption, and marked as such, the purchaser usually eats
it or causes it to be served to his family without the precau-
tion of having it analyzed by a technician to ascertain
whether or not it is suitable for human consumption. In
fact, in most instances the only satisfactory examination
that could be made would be only at the time and place of
the processing of the food. It seems to be the rule that where
food products sold for human consumption are unfit for that
purpose, there is such an utter failure of the purpose for
which the food is sold, and the consequences of eating un-
sound food are so disastrous to human health and life, that
the law imposes a warranty of purity in favor of the ultimate
consumer as a matter of public policy. 3 1 9
319. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, supra note 315, at 617, 164
S.W.2d at 832.
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Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey3 20 is a companion case decided the
same year by the same court. Here the situation was further compli-
cated by the fact that the spinach which caused the food poisoning
was sold in a sealed container. 32 1 However, this did not deter the
court from holding the canner liable to the ultimate consumer. The
fact that Texas continues to adhere to its enlightened policy is
demonstrated by a recent decision, Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan.3 22
The purchaser of a "T-V Chicken Dinner" brought this action against
the manufacturer alleging that he was injured by a metal washer con-
cealed in the "dinner." Citing Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,32 3
the Court of Civil Appeals declared that liability of a manufacturer
to the consumer of defective food products "does not rest in tort or
contract in Texas, but upon a broad principle of public policy im-
posing an obligation in the nature of an implied warranty to protect
public health." It also emphasized the fact that the Supreme Court
of Texas had seen fit to reject the requirement of privity, stating that
"the rule that the implied warranty 'runs with the article' is logical
and sound. The rationale of the decision [Capps] is that the manu-
facturer expects the 'appearance of suitableness to continue with the
product until someone is induced to consume it as food.'" Judgment
was given for the plaintiff.3 2 4
A few years earlier, another landmark case had been decided by
the Supreme Court of California. 32 5 In this instance, too, the prod-
uct (a ham and cheese sandwich) was encased in its original
wrapping, sealed waxpaper, when purchased by the husband of the
consumer. The action was brought against the manufacturer who
promptly defended on the ground of lack of privity. During the trial
it was shown that the sandwich was "crawling with maggots and
worms" which caused the consumer to become ill and experience
320. Supra note 294.
321. As to the so-called "sealed container" exception, see text at note 369,
infra.
322. Supra note 1.
323. Supra note 315.
324. The quoted excerpts are from Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d
821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), at 822.
325. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., supra note 1. The case has served as a
leading precedent and is cited or quoted in any number of opinions including:
Chapman v. Brown, supra note 1; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra note 1;
Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal.2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960); Collum v. Pope
& Talbot, Inc., supra note 1; Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal.2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948);
Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961); Parish v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 1; Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal.
App.2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954).
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great pain.3 2 6 Rejecting the lack of privity defense, the Court gave
judgment for the plaintiff. 3 27
Proceeding across the continent in an easterly direction, a case
recently decided in Colorado is worthy of mention. In Gonzales v.
Safeway Stores, Inc.,32 8 a husband and wife brought an action
against the vendor of a can of peas labelled "A Safeway Guaranteed
Product." Preparatory to serving dinner on Washington's birthday,
the wife opened the can, poured the peas into a clean saucepan and
heated them. She then served her husband and herself on clean plates
on which, in addition to the peas, she placed a small piece of steak
and a baked potato. When the husband had eaten two spoonfuls of
peas and was on the verge of eating another, he found a "bug"
among the peas. The husband became nauseated and vomited for
three days. Citing Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 3 2 9 the Supreme Court
of Colorado reversed the trial court which had granted defendant
company's motion to dismiss. Although it was the wife who had
purchased the peas, no mention of privity was made. Apparently,
the court did not consider this a stumbling block to eventual recovery
of judgment. 3 3 0
Continuing on this eastbound flight, a profound change in the
treatment of privity is discernible in New York. In particular, two
cases, Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.3 3 1 and Greenberg v.
Lorenz, 33 2 must be examined. In the Parish case, Judge Starke em-
barks upon a veritable dissertation as to the means whereby consumers
not in privity have been afforded remedies for injuries suffered from
eating or using unwholesome products. 333 Here, a mother had pur-
326. There is early precedent for recovery of damages by persons so afflicted.
For many centuries in England food handlers who sold noxious products were
criminally liable, and from an early day, the plight of the unhappy consumer
was recognized by the English courts and authorities. Thus, it was laid down
broadly that "in contracts for provisions it is always implied that they are whole-
some, and if they be not, the same remedy [damages for deceit], may be had,"
3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 166. And in a leading case, Burnby v. Bollett, 153
Eng. Rep. 1348, 1352 (Ex. 1847), it was said: "That they, the common dealers ...
are liable criminally for selling corrupt victuals, is clear; . . .if a man sells cor-
rupt victuals ... an action lies, because it is against the commonwealth.
327. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., supra note 1.
328. Supra note 314.
329. Supra note 294.
330. This would seem to align Colorado with those jurisdictions which hold
that privity is not essential for recovery of judgment in actions for breach of
warranty in food cases.
331. Supra note 1.
332. Supra note 288.
333. The grave significance of the food warranty cases prompted Judge
Starke to write: "This Court was greatly disturbed by the inanity of the strict
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chased a sealed jar of jam from the defendant; when her two infant
daughters began to eat the jam, they found it contained worms and
became sick. When the mother brought this action, the time-honored
(but anachronistic) defense of lack of privity, as might be expected,
was interposed. However, the court was ready with a 33-page broad-
side and refused to follow alleged precedent. 3 3 4 The reasons adduced
were, inter alia, "The New York Trend" which Judge Starke found
was in the direction of discarding "the requirement of privity alto-
gether." 33 5
The court then proceeded to examine "The Effect of the Agency
and Third Party Beneficiary Doctrines on Privity. '" 3 3 6 In this con-
nection, two significant cases, Ryan v. Progressive Stores, Inc.
3 3 7
and Bowman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,ss s were discussed,
the former under the agency concept, the latter as an illustration of
the "household-fund" variation of this concept. 3 3 9 In a more recent
case, Mouren v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,3 40 the court was
quoted as stating: "I find, as a matter of law that the implied war-
ranty extended to the benefit of the plaintiff wife [the husband had
application of the privity doctrine when the subject arose in the Conklin case
[Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., 5 Misc.2d 496, 161 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1957)).
As a result, the Waldorf case represents the first direct and concentrated judicial
attack in New York upon the citadel of privity. The Court was roused into investi-
gating the entire privity problem far beyond the precise question in the case, and
made an exhaustive research and study of the subject. That which went beyond
the decisional need for the Waldorf case was submitted in the form of Articles
to the New York Law Journal and appeared in its editorial columns on April 8, 9,
10, 1957. The Articles reviewed the modern trend, aspect and approach by courts
in this state and other states, with emphasis on the non-purchaser consumer's
rights against the manufacturer as well as the dealer, for breach of warranty
rather than in negligence.... It is hoped that, because the privity problem is of
vital concern, the higher courts will clarify the legal atmosphere clouding the sub-
ject. As Lord Mansfield said: 'Lawyers and litigants are entitled to know where
they stand as to what their rights are and what the law is.'"
334. The court makes a careful analysis of the New York cases beginning
with Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923), where all the
mischief of privity started, and declares that "a state of confusion presently ex-
ists." Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 1, at 10.
335. Id. at 11; undoubtedly, Judge Starke was at least moderately gratified
to find the New York Court of Appeals in Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 288,
taking cognizance of the fact that there was a split of authority among the lower
courts in New York and giving at least a qualified approval to his views as
expressed in Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 1.
336. Id. at 26.
337. 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
338. 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1954).
339. See text following note 252, supra.
340. Supra note 254.
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made the purchase] ."341 Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp.3 4 2 was
cited in support of this proposition. 3 4 3 In the next section of the
opinion in the Parish case, "Historical Background and Error," at-
tention is invited to the hybrid nature of the action for breach of
warranty:
3 4 4
It starts out contractually but in reality emanates from
the failure to either perform a duty to provide food which
is wholesome, or to carry out an implied representation that
the food is wholesome. Thus, it is actually sui juris, a com-
bined tort and contract action-commencing in contract and
resulting in tort where the seller has violated his obligation
and the tacit representation that the food is wholesome.
The warranty is imposed by law, in the name of public
health and public policy, and not because of any express or
implied-in-fact understanding of the parties.3 4 5
Historically, there is no justification for the notion that
privity of contract is essential to support an action for
breach of an implied warranty. Originally the remedy for
breach of such warranty was an action on the case for
breach of an assumed duty, a tort action in the nature of
deceit but in which scienter or intent to deceive did not have
to be alleged. Warranty was viewed as a form of misrepre-
sentation and the gravamen of the action was the warranty
and not conscious deception .... 346
341. Quoted in Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 1 at 15.
342. 265 App. Div. 278, 38 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1942).
343. As follows: "In Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App.Div. 278,
38 N.Y.S.2d 788, the Appellate Division, 1st Dept., stated the petitioner * * *
might be in a position to show the son who purchased the crabmeat was acting
simply as his agent in making the purchase and that the cause of action accrued
to the father, relying on Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175
N.E. 105, 74 A.L.R. 339, and sent the case back for a new trial. In the Ryan case,
the Court sustained the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The first paragraph of
the opinion reads as follows: 'Plaintiff, through his wife, who acted as his agent,
bought a loaf of bread at the defendant's grocery. The loaf had concealed in it
a pin, which hurt the plaintiff's mouth.'"
344. The court cites the following authorities: Prosser, The Implied War-
ranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV.; James, Products Liability, 34
TEx. L. REV. 192; HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS, Sec. 28.15 et seq.; 34.ORE. L.
REV. 59; 8 VAND. L. REV. 149; 1 WILLISTON, SALES, Sec. 197.
345. Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 1, at 16-17.
346. And the court observes: "Whether the action be one on warranty or
negligence, it comes to the same thing. It sounds in tort." Davis v. Williams,
58 Ga. App. 274, 278, 198 S.E. 357, 360.
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The court places considerable reliance on Klein v. Duchess Sand-
wich Co.,3 4 7 heretofore discussed, 3 48 in rejecting the argument
that to eliminate privity legislative action is essential. 3 4 9 Observ-
ing that the pertinent sections of the California and New York stat-
utes3 5 0 imposing the applicable warranties are identical, Judge
Starke could find no reason for supposing that the legislative intent
did not extend to others than the immediate purchasers. In any
event, a doctrine early found in New York law in Lawrence v. Fox3 5 1
would support recovery by such others as third party beneficiaries,
said the court, citing numerous cases including Ward Baking Co. v.
Trizzino.3 52 Finally, under the heading "The Public Policy Factor,"
it is strongly urged that consumer protection is a cogent reason
for the elimination of the privity requirement:
"The rule limiting the right to recover for breach of an implied
warranty in the sale of foodstuffs to those in privity with the seller,
being obviously technical, and shown to be historically unsound, has
created dissatisfaction in the legal profession with the result that it
has been repeatedly criticized." 3 5 3
Great dissatisfaction with the strict privity doctrine has
been frequently expressed by modern legal educators and
writers. They view the problem as essentially an enterprise
liability, and that the ultimate consumer in food cases should
not only have the right of suing the retailer for breach of
warranty but should also have that right against the manu-
facturer as the guarantor of the fitness and wholesomeness
of its product when it is used for the purpose and in the
manner intended. In no other way, they argue, can a fair
347. Supra note 1.
348. Text at notes 271 and 284, supra.
349. Of Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., the Court said: "The intention of
the legislature was discussed in the thoroughly illuminating, educational and con-
vincing decision by a California court (where their Sec. 1735 WEST'S ANN. CI,.IL
CODE, is absolutely identical with our Sec. 96, Personal Property Law, Sub. 1),
in Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 1939, 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799, 804 (1938)"
at 23.
350. Supra.
351. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859), JAEGER, LAW OF CONTRACTS, 338 (1953).
352. 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
353. Here the court cites: "7 CAL. L. REV. (1919), 360; 23 CAL. L. REV.
(1935), 621; 33 COL. L. REV. (1933), 868; 1 DUKE UNIV., Law and Contemporary
Probems of the School of Laws (1933), 1; 4 FORDHAM L. REV. (1935), 295; 34
HARV. L. REV. (1921), 762; 42 HARV. L. REV. (1929), 414; 30 ILL. L. REV. (1935),
398; 5 IOWA L. BULL. (1919), 86; 29 MICH. L. REV. (1931), 906; 9 N.Y. UNIV. L
REV. (1932), 366; 4 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (1929), 80; 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (1935),
216; 27 YALE L.J. (1918), 1068; 29 YALE L.J. (1920), 782; VOLD, SALES, p. 476."
[Vol. 1 : p. I
PRIVITY OF WARRANTY
and reasonable measure of security be obtained for the pub-
lic at large. Courts throughout the land have endeavored
to extend the buyer's protection under classic warranty law
to the non-buyer consumer by either abandoning or liberally
construing the privity requirement, some being on 'public
policy,' some on 'breach of duty,' others on 'social justice,'
and still others on the third party beneficiary rule. Again,
it is the food cases with their constant stress upon the pro-
motion of public health which have led the way.... 354
"Public policy and the sacredness of human life demand that the
warranty right of the ultimate consumer be extended against the
manufacturer, particularly in the case of sealed food and drug prod-
ucts. .... ,"355 Saying this, the court held for the plaintiffs.
Adopting a rather more guarded approach, the New York Court
of Appeals suggested that any inroads on the privity requirement
should be made one step at a time. The factual situation in Green-
berg v. Lorenz was similar to the one in the Parish case. An infant
was injured by a metal tag contained in a can of salmon purchased
by plaintiff's father. The trial court gave judgment for the infant
plaintiff and refused to permit the defense of privity of warranty
where plaintiff was alleging the existence of an implied warranty of
fitness for human consumption. By a divided court, the Appellate
Term affirmed. Also by a divided court, the Appellate Division re-
versed the decision of the lower courts invoking strict privity as laid
down in Chysky v. Drake Bros. and Salzano v. First Nat'l Stores.
Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was then granted;
the latter, reversing the Appellate Division, declared: "Our difficulty is
354. The numerous authorities and cases cited by the court are omitted.
355. Borrowing a leaf from the advertising notebook used in General Motors
Corp v. Dodson, supra note 1, and similar cases, the court adds: "The require-
ments of privity are satisfied by today's commercial advertising, printed labels
and merchandising methods wherein the dealer, in acting as the distributor of
the manufacturer's product for the purpose of resale to the public, may be rightly
considered under the circumstances to be the manufacturer's agent for the purpose
of warranting the fitness and wholesomeness of the product. The manufacturer's
goal, in marketing a product, is the ultimate consumer. From the very moment
the manufacturer puts the product on the market, he makes a tacit representation
through his distributors aimed squarely at 'Joe Doakes', the man on the street,
that the product is fit and wholesome. Therewith Is privity supplied. The war-
ranty and representation is not made only to the dealer and does not stop there.
The contract between the manufacturer and the dealer that the food be fit for
human consumption is made for the benefit of a third party-not only the pur-
chaser but the ultimate consumer. It continues from the time of marketing until
the process of reaching the ultimate consumer through merchandising channels
is attained, the retailer merely acting as a conduit." Parish v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 8upra note 1.
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not finding the applicable rule but in deciding whether or not to
change it. The decisions are clear enough. There can be no warranty,
express or implied, without privity of contract."3 5 6
The highest court of New York reviewed a number of the cases
which had been examined during the course of the opinion in Parish
v. Great Atlantic c& Pacific Tea Co.,3 5 7 and found that there had
been extensions of the doctrine of privity based largely on an agency
theory. "But a dependent child," said the court, "is not a contract-
ing party and cannot be a warrantee so no damages are due him." 3 5 8
"The unfairness of the restriction has been argued in writings so
numerous as to make a lengthy bibliography.... About twenty states
have abolished such requirements of privity, the latest being Virginia
and New Jersey." The court then cited Swift & Co. v. Wells and
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. as illustrative of the latest
defections from the ranks of the jurisdictions requiring strict privity
and quoted the Uniform Commercial Code in pertinent part: "A
seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the opera-
tion of this section." 35 9
The Court of Appeals concluded by saying:
The injustice of denying damages to a child because of
non-privity seems too plain for argument. The only real
doubt is as to the propriety of changing the rule .... But the
present rule which we are being asked to modify is itself of
judicial making since our statutes say nothing at all about
privity and in early times such liabilities were thought to
be in tort. Alteration of the law in such matters has been
the business of the New York courts for many years .... To
decide the case before us, we should hold that the infant's
cause of action should not have been dismissed solely on the
ground that the food was purchased not by the child but
the child's father. Today when so much of our food is bought
356. Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 288; Chysky v. Drake Bros. cited
above may be found supra note 334; Salzano v. First Nat. Stores, 268 App. Div.
993, 51 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1944).
357. Supra note 1.
358. Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 288 at 199, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
359. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318; at this time New York had not
yet adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213,
110 S.E.2d 203 (1959) and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1
indicate the current trend toward the abrogation of the privity requirement.
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in packages it is not just or sensible to confine the war-
ranty's protection to the individual buyer. At least as to
food and household goods, the presumption should be that
the purchase was made for all the members of the house-
hold. 3 6 0
Although the court was unanimous in ordering the reinstatement
of the infant's recovery, a separate concurring opinion embodied
the thought that the decision should be "limited to the facts of this
case." It reads in pertinent part:
However much one may think liability should be broad-
ened, that must be left to the Legislature. There are two
sides to the problem before us-and one of them is the plight
of the seller. It is just as unfair to hold liable a retail gro-
ceryman, as here, who was innocent of any negligence or
wrong, on the theory of breach of warranty, for some defect
in a canned product which he could not inspect and with the
production of which he had nothing to do, as it is to deny
relief to one who has no relationship to the contract of pur-
chase and sale, though eating at the purchaser's table. 3 6 '
This argument that any change should be left to the legislature
does not take into consideration that the privity requirement was
originally judge-made, as the principal opinion emphasizes, and
certainly, if the Supreme Court of New Jersey could decide that
under certain circumstances privity was unnecessary, there seems
no cogent reason why the high court of New York could not do the
same in an increasing number of situations where public policy might
require it. Also, as to the plight of the retailer: He may seek re-
covery from the manufacturer or canner whose products he selected
in the first place and thereby set in motion the entire train of events,
culminating in the consumer's injury. It may tend to induce him to
be more careful in the selection of the foods he offers for sale and
of the manufacturers and food processors upon whom he bestows
his patronage. 3 6 2
This argument is admirably dealt with in Parish v. Great Atlantic
6 Pacific Tea Co. 3 6 3 where, analyzing and interpreting the statutory
360. Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 288 at 200, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42, citing
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
361. Id. at 201, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 43. Much the same argument appears in
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3.
362. This thought is expressed in Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., supra
note 1, and stated infra, text at note 366.
363. Supra note 1.
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language of the sales law found applicable, the court stated, "there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for
such purpose [as is made known to the seller by the buyer]." ' 364
The court concluded:
There is absolutely no need for legislative change because
it never could have been the intention of the legislature to
deprive an infant of the warranty right simply because the
mother purchased the goods.
The words 'reasonably fit for such purpose' means that
the goods are fit 'for the purpose for which they are sold and
bought'. ... [T]he ordinary purpose for which a housewife
purchases foodstuffs is for human conumpton-'domestic
meals' and household table use ....
Ordinary 'household table use' and 'domestic meals' con-
templates consumption by the non-buyer consumer, whether
he be an infant, husband, or even a friend or relative who
has been invited as a guest to partake of a meal. 3 6 5
Moving northward to the "stern and rock-bound" coast of Maine,
the hardy traveller will soon discover that the Supreme Court of that
State has aligned itself solidly with the jurisdictions which hold that
the presence of a noxious substance is a breach of warranty in food
cases. Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co. 3 66 must be included among the
most significant and carefully prepared decisions of the past decade.
The effect of the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act 3 6 7 and various
departures from privity in other jurisdictions are reviewed. 3 68 Sams,
the plaintiff, had purchased and brought home certain sausages en-
cased in a sealed plastic bag. The retailer could not have detected the
presence of slivers of glass in the sausages, nor could the plaintiff
until he masticated the sausage meat and glass which injured him.
He brought this action against the vendor. The court concluded that
there was an implied warranty of merchantable quality which ac-
companied the sale of food products, whether in sealed containers or
not; this warranty was held to have been breached.
364. Quoting section 96 of the New York Personal Property Law, subdivision
1, which is the same as § 15 of the Uniform Sales Act in pertinent part.
365. Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 1 at 22; emphasis
supplied by the court.
366. 157 Me. 10, 170 A.2d 160 (1961).
367. This statute became effective in Maine in 1923, see R.S. 1944, c. 171,
§§ 1-78.
368. As, for example, Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388,
175 N.E. 105 (1931); Botti v. Venice Grocery Co., 309 Mass. 450, 35 N.E.2d 491
(1941); Mead v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 108 N.E.2d 757 (1952);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1.
[Vol. 1: p. I
PRIVITY OF WARRANTY
Suggesting that the entire case was predicated on a breach of the
warranty of merchantability, the court stated that a sausage contain-
ing glass is "not fit to eat and is therefore not of merchantable qual-
ity. The test under Clause II is not that buyer and seller treated the
goods as merchantable, but whether they were so in fact."3 6 9 The
court then adverted to the so-called "sealed container" exception; or,
in short, is "the retailer of food in a sealed container insulated from
an implied warranty of merchantability" under the Uniform Sales
Act?
After citing various cases including Ryan v. Progressive Grocery
Stores, described by the court as undoubtedly the "leading case in
the country under Clause II" of section 15 of the Sales Act, Botti v.
Venice Grocery Co., and Bigelow v. Maine Central R.R., the court
concluded that "liability of the defendant in this action rests solely
upon an implied warranty of merchantability under Section 15 II of
the Uniform Sales Act. It arises, if at all, by contract and is not de-
pendent in the slightest degree upon fault of the defendant." The court
then quotes the pertinent provisions of section 15 of the Uniform
Sales Act and compares the case with Ryan v. Progressive Grocery
Stores, finding a decided analogy between the glass in the sausages
and the pin in the bread in the Ryan case. 3 70 In fact, the court could
find no valid distinction between a can of asparagus (Bigelow), a
package of macaroni (Botti), a loaf of bread wrapped in paper and
sealed (Ryan), and the "hot dogs" in a sealed plastic bag in the in-
stant case:
In each instance we have a sealed container or an original
package effectively preventing inspection by the retailer at
any time and by the purchaser until the container is opened.
The basis of the sealed container exception is that the pur-
chaser could not have placed reliance upon the retailer's
skill or judgment in determining that the contents were fit
to eat.3 7 1
The court went on to address itself to the general purpose of the
Uniform Sales Act "to make uniform the laws of those states which
enact it," stating that, "the Uniform Sales Act codified, extended,
and liberalized the common law. Rules inconsistent with the Act were
thereby abolished." 372
The effect of Bigelow v. Maine Central R.R., decided some fifty
years ago and prior to the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act by
369. Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., supra note 366, at 14. 170 A.2d at 163.
370. The cases cited above will be found supra note 368.
371. Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., supra note 366, at 15, 170 A.2d at 164.
372. Ibid.
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Maine, was then considered. In that case, the court held that a dining
car operator was not liable for breach of an implied warranty of
fitness when a patron became ill from eating unwholesome canned
asparagus served him in the diner. Although the decision was primar-
ily based on an antiquated anachronism (if anything, even more
anachronistic than privity of warranty) to the effect that service
(or "uttering") of food is not a sale, the court said that Bigelow "may
fairly be said to state the common law of our state applicable, as
here, in the case of the purchaser-consumer against the retailer."
3 7 3
Speaking for the court, the Chief Justice concluded that "[u]nder
the Sales Act, by the great weight of authority, there is no 'sealed
container exception.' "374
Specifically disapproving Bigelow v. Maine Central R.R., 3 7 5 the
Supreme Court decided:
'Reasonably fit for such purpose,' under Clause I, and
'merchantable quality,' under Clause II, are equivalent with
respect to food for human consumption. The test is whether
the food is fit to eat.3 7 6
... Under the Sales Act, so interpreted, the purchaser-
consumer has the benefit of a warranty of merchantability
against the retailer. In turn the retailer may reach his seller
and so through the chain of distribution to the manufac-
turer. 3 7 7
373. Bigelow v. Maine Central R.R. cited and discussed by the court in Sams
v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., supra note 366, may be found infra, note 375.
374. Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., supra note 366 at 18, 170 A.2d at 165.
In support of this statement, which may be considered authoritative, the following
are cited: Jackson v. Watson & Sons (1909), 2 K.B. 193, 16 Am. & Eng. Annot.
cases 492; Martin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 301 Ky. 429, 192 S.W.2d 201
(changing sealed container rule under Kentucky common law); Ward v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918); D'Onofrio v. First
National Stores, Inc., 68 R.I. 144, 26 A.2d 758 (1912); Burkhardt v. Armour &
Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385, 90 A.L.R. 1260 and Annotation; Dow Drug Co. v.
Nieman et al., 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130; Prosser, The Implied Warranty
of Merchantable Quality (1943), 27 MINN. L. REV. 117; 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§§ 995, 996; PROSSER ON TORTS § 83, p. 495; 2 HARPER AND JAMES ON TORTS, Re-
tailer's strict liability § 28.30; DICKERSON, "PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD
CONSUMER" (1951) § 1.3 (common law); § 1.15 (Under Sales Act); generally
§§ 1.3 to 1.19; 22 AM. JUR. Food §§ 99, 100.
375. 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 396 (1912).
376. Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., supra note 366, at 21, 170 A.2d at 166.
377. If the frankfurts here had not been sold in a sealed bag, inspection
would not have disclosed the glass within the edible casing. Indeed, the North
Carolina Court, in holding there was no sealed container rule at common law,
treated a sausage as an article within a sealed container. Rabb v. Covington,
215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E.2d 705 (1939).
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However, as pointed out above, the Bigelow decision was based on
a further ground: Limitation of liability of innkeepers, hotel proprie-
tors and restaurateurs to negligence. 3 7 8 At the ancient common law,
the unhappy traveler who turned in for the night at some wayside
inn was deemed the beneficiary of his host's service of food and
lodging, and was therefore without benefit of warranties which were
only identified with sales. Representative of this archaic view is
Nisky v. Childs Co.3 7 9 The facts disclose that Mrs. Nisky had eaten
a meal in a restaurant operated by the defendant company in Newark,
New Jersey. She ordered half a dozen fried oysters of which she ate
three. Although the last one tasted bitter, Mrs. Nisky managed to
swallow it but felt so sick that she complained to the waiter who gave
her a cup of coffee to take away the bitter taste. She soon became
nauseated, shaky, chilly, and feverish. Returning home immediately,
a physician was summoned who applied a stomach pump. Mrs. Nisky
recovered her health but no damages.
At common law, the court observed, "food served at a restaurant
is not a sale," and a purveyor of food was only required to exercise
due care in the service of food to his patrons; there being no showing
of lack of due care, the granting of defendant's motion for a nonsuit
by the trial court was not error, and the judgment would have to
be affirmed. Here, too, the highest court in New Jersey reviewed the
early cases in support of its conclusion that an innkeeper does not
sell "but utters his provisions," and that the guest may consume the
food he requires but take no more, nor may he remove any uneaten
portion of the food served him. This conclusion alone serves to em-
phasize how thoroughly obsolete this concept is today. The effect
of changing times and mores is reflected in the contrary decisions in
Massachusetts and New York, respectively Friend v. Childs Dining
Hall Co. and Temple v. Keeler, both of which are cited by the court
in the Nisky case. 38 0
While not expressly overruling Nisky v. Childs,381 the holding of
378. This theory was adopted in the following cases: Pappa v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 42 Del. 358, 33 A.2d 310 (Super. Ct. 1943); a piece of tin in sandwich
bread, Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 197 Atl. 105 (1938); and
a mouse in roast chicken dressing, Kenny v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Atl. 343
(1925). For other examples of the rule see McCarley v. Wood Drugs, Inc., 228
Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934); Albrecht v. Rubenstein, 135 Conn. 243, 63 A.2d 158
(1948); Rowe v. Louisville & N.R.R., 29 Ga. App. 151, 113 S.E. 823 (1922); F. W.
Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 A.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1934); Horn & Hardart Baking
Co. v. Lieber, 25 F.2d 449 (3rd Cir. 1928).
379. 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 At. 805 (1927).
380. Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918);
Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924).
381. Supra note 379.
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that absurd case is so thoroughly discredited in Sofman v. Denham
Food Service,38 2 that there is hardly a vestigial remnant of its au-
thority left to survive. Said the majority:
We see no resemblance between the operation of a cafe-
teria and the operation of the ancient inn. If it be assumed
the inn did not "sell" food but merely satisfied whatever
might be the needs of its wayfarer guest, surely the same
cannot be said of a cafeteria, at which the consumer buys
and pays for the food he wants and may carry it to where
ever he wishes, on or off the premises. We can see no justifi-
caton for applying the innkeeper rule to a factual pattern
in which the consideration underlying the innkeeper rule
cannot be found. 3 8 3
Of special significance is the concurring opinion: 3 8 4
There are two general lines of authority on the issue of
a restaurateur's liability in implied warranty. Of those
jurisdictions, which have had the opportunity to pass upon
the question, the numerical majority supports the view,
referred to as the 'Massachusetts-New York rule,' that one
serving food for immediate consumption on the premises
impliedly warrants that the food served is wholesome and fit
382. 37 N.J. 304, 181 A.2d 168 (1962).
383. Sofman v. Denham Food Service, Inc., supra note 382, where the court
in a PER CURIAM opinion continued: "Nisky may indeed be unsound on its own
facts but we believe that whether it is, should be reserved for a case in which
the issue must be met. The question may not arise, since the Legislature has
overturned Nisky, as well as the underlying rule which Nisky applied to a restau-
rant, by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, effective January 1, 1963....
All that need now be decided is that the rule applicable to an inkeeper should not
be applied to a cafeteria where it would be plainly a myth to say that food is
not 'sold,' and that a refusal to go beyond the precise holding of Nisky is well
supported by the Legislature's disapproval of the underlying concept which Nisky
invoked."
384. By Mr. Justice Schettino who favors a clear-cut overruling of Nisky v.
Childs Co., supra note 379, saying: "Although I concur in the result reached by
the majority, in my view, the question presented by this case is the broad one,
i.e., whether a defendant engaged in the business of preparing and offering
food designed primarly to be consumed on the premises is liable to a patron
upon an implied warranty that the food was fit for human consumption. Because
this approach would require the overruling of Nisky, I set forth my views in full.
"In my opinion the scope of the Nisky decision does cover the instant factual
situation. Research disclosed only two jurisdictions which have had occasion to
apply the doctrine of implied warranty to food sold in a cafeteria. Neither dis-
cussed any distinction for this purpose between a cafeteria and a restaurant.
McAvin v. Morrison Cafeteria Co. of La., 85 So.2d 63 (La. Ct. of App. 1956);
Franke's, Inc. v. Wallace, 219 Ark. 467, 242 S.W. 2d 968 (1951). When a person
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for human consumption and is liable for a breach of the
implied warranty. The numerical minority of jurisdictions
adheres to the view, designated as the 'Connecticut-New
Jersey rule,' which is exemplified by Nisky....
The Connecticut-New Jersey rule has been severely criti-
cized; however, as already noted, the rule was based on the
belief that at common law an innkeeper merely uttered his
food; and therefore, by analogy, the service of food in a
restaurant today does not constitute a sale. But there is con-
siderable doubt that a rule to that effect ever existed at
common law .... 385
Upon an analysis of Nisky and the authorities relied upon
by that court for its opinion and upon the balancing of the
views of the Connecticut-New Jersey rule against the
Massachusetts-New York rule, I feel that the latter is much
more effective in securing the public health and safety. At
the same time it is more realistic.
Plaintiff here selected and purchased his food at a counter
and was free to eat whereever he might choose, either in-
side or outside the premises. Viewed in this light, I perceive
no material difference between the instant case and those
which hold that retail dealers impliedly warrant the fitness
for human consumption of the food they sell for consump-
tion off the premises. Clearly the transaction is no less a
sale than that where a customer purchases a loaf of
bread ..... 386
The gratifying increase in the number of jurisdictions which have
adopted the view that the owner or operator of a restaurant or tavern
is liable to a patron or customer who suffers injuries from food or
drink that is unwholesome or contains foreign substances of a del-
eterious nature is attributable to the recognition of the applicability
of an implied warranty of the wholesomeness and fitness for human
consumption or use of the food or beverage served. This is certainly
orders food in a restaurant today, he selects a listed portion for which the restau-
rateur has set a fixed price. Reality would be ignored if it is said that a sale is
not effected, at least as to that food which the patron consumes. Thus, while a
distinction can be made between a cafeteria and a traditional restaurant, for
present purposes the difference is so negligible that we should face the problem
four square."
385. Citing DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER, 25
(1951).
388. Citations omitted.
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indicative of a clear trend towards a rule of law inspired by better
reasoning and sound public policy. 38 7
Beverages. Because of the frequency with which foreign sub-
stances such as dead mice, 3 88 worms, 38 9 spiders,3 9 0 cockroaches 3 91
387. Williston expresses this view and suggests that whether the transaction
is regarded as a sale or not, "every argument for implying a warra'nty in the
sale of food is applicable with even greater force to the serving of food to a guest
or customer at an inn or restaurant . . . a sale is not the only transaction in
which a warranty may be implied . 1. " I WILLISTON, SALES § 242 (b), at 640
(rev. ed. 1948). This statement is quoted with approval in Sartin v. Blackwell,
200 Miss. 579, at 583, 28 So.2d 222, at 223 (1946).
388. Gray v. Pet Milk Co., 108 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. den. 309 U.S.
688; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st
Cir. 1958); Bellingrath v. Anderson, 203 Ala. 62, 82 So. 22 (1919); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Barksdale, 17 Ala. App. 606, 88 So. 36 (1920); Alabama Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Ezzell, 22 Ala. App. 210, 114 So. 278 (1927); Eisenbeiss v.
Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.2d 162 (1933); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Davidson, 193
Ark. 825, 102 S.W.2d 833 (1937) aff'd; Hope Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 222
Ark. 52, 257 S.W. 272 (1953); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Misenheimer, 222 Ark.
581, 261 S.W.2d 775 (1953); Moss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 103 Cal. App.2d 380,
229 P.2d 802 (1951); Martin v. Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ga. App.
226, 89 S.E. 495 (1916); Duvall v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 329 Ill. App. 290, 68
N.E.2d 479 (1946); Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864,
64 So. 791 (1914); Blount v. Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 184 Miss. 69, 185
So. 241 (1939); Norman v. Jefferson City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 211 S.W.2d 552
(Mo. App. 1948); Trembley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 App. Div. 539, 138
N.Y.S.2d 332 (1955); Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S.C. 392, 154 S.E. 431 (1930); Amarillo
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Loudder, 207 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
As one court facetiously observes in dialectic vein: "A 'sma' mousie' caused
the trouble in this case. The 'wee, sleekit, cow'rin, tim'rus beastie' drowned in a
bottle of coca-cola .... [The thirsty purchaser] did not get joy from the antici-
pated refreshing drink. He was in the frame of mind to approve the poet's words:
'The best-laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang aft aglay
An' lea'e us nought- but grief an' pain,
For promts'd joy!'"
Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, supra at 869, 64 So. at 791, also
quoted in Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, note 44 at 1106.
389. Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537
(1931); Peters v. Double Coca Bottling Co., 224 S.C. 437, 79 S.E.2d 710 (1954);
Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Land, 189 Va. 35, 52 S.E.2d 85 (1949);
Parr v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 121 W. Va. 314, 3 S.E.2d 499 (1939).
390. Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 29 Ala. App. 324, 195 So.
560 (1940); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Eudy, 193 Ark. 436, 100 S.W.2d 683 (1937);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Morrison, 194 Ark. 248, 106 S.W.2d 601 (1937); Hollis
v. Ouachita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 So. 376 (La. App. 1940); Smith v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 152 Pa. Super. 445, 33 A.2d 488 (1943).
391. Whited v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 88 Ga. App. 241, 76 S.E.2d
408 (1953); Laborde v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 15 So.2d 389 (La. App.
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and other vermin, 3 9 2 cigar stubs or cigarette butts, 3 9 3 acids, 3 9 4
particles of glass, 3 9 5 and any number of other deleterious items
3 9 6
appear in bottled beverages, the cases dealing with them are legion.
The rule applied to them in the main is the same as has been formu-
lated for foodstuffs: They are considered an exception to the privity
"requirement" by the great majority of jurisdictions. There are a
few, however, which cling with a certain dogged tenacity to this
outmoded and pernicious concept. 3 97 It is only a question of time
1943); Coast Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Bryant, 236 Miss. 880, 112 So.2d 538
(1929); Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dillard, 208 Okla. 126, 253 P.2d
847 (1953); Caines v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 198 S.C. 204, 17 S.E.2d 315
(1941); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 97 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Heckman, 113 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
392. Whistle Bottling Co. v. Searson, 207 Ala. 387, 92 So. 657 (1922); Dr.
Pepper Co. v. Brittain, 234 Ala. 548, 176 So. 286, (1937); Crystal Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957); Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Swilling, 186 Ark. 1149, 57 S.W.2d 1029 (1933); Anheuser-Busch v. Southard,
191 Ark. 107, 84 S.W.2d 89 (1935); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cromwell, 203 Ark.
933, 159 S.W.2d 744 (1942); Rowton v. Ruston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 17 So.2d
851 (La. App. 1944); Ferguson v. Parr, 85 So.2d 117 (La. App. 1955); Tafoya v.
Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955); Peters v.
Double Coca Bottling Co., 224 S.C. 437, 79 S.E.2d 710 (1954).
393. Try-Me Beverage Co. v. Harris, 217 Ala. 302, 116 So. 147 (1928); Macon
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 216 Ga. 61, 114 S.E.2d 517 (1960); Sheenan
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 41 N.J. Super. 213, 124 A.2d 319 (1956); Keller v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 Or. 654, 330 P.2d 346 (1958); Boyde v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1915); Von Herr v. Louisiana Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 148 So. 75 (La. App. 1933); cf. Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Watford, 31 Ala. App. 493, 19 So.2d 77 (1944).
394. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1938); Slaughter
v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 48 Ga. App. 327, 172 S.E. 723 (1934); Laurel
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hankins, 222 Miss. 297, 75 So.2d 731 (1954); Evans v.
Charlotte Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 216 N.C. 716, 6 S.E.2d 510 (1940); Caskie v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953).
395. Albany Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shiver, 63 Ga. App. 755, 12 S.E.2d
114 (1940); King v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 151 So. 252 (La. App.
1933); Gunter v. Alexandria Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 197 So. 159 (La. App. 1940);
Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Grubbs, 143 Miss. 590, 108 So. 732 (1926);
Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942); Manning
v. Harvey C. Hines Co., 218 N.C. 779, 10 S.E.2d 727 (1940).
396. Fisher v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 66 App. D.C. 7,
84 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Opelika Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McEachern, 242
Ala. 628, 7 So.2d 570 (1942); Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App.2d
707, 135 P.2d 676 (1943); East Kentucky Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66,
230 S.W.2d 106 (1950); Basile v. World Bottling Co., 17 So.2d 734 (La. App. 1944);
Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 413; Rupy v. George
Schneider & Co., 286 App. Div. 1095, 145 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1955); Murray v. P.
Ballantine & Sons, 75 R.I. 13, 62 A.2d 895, 63 A.2d 730 (1948).
397. Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64
(1921); Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942);
Soter v. Griesedleck Western Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d 575 (1948).
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until they too will be converted, if not by judicial action, then by
statute. 39 8 Analysis of some of the more recent cases may prove
useful in establishing this trend.
In a leading case, Caskie v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 399 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff in an
action for damages resulting from breach of warranty of fitness for
human consumption. 4 0 0 The plaintiff, a police officer, had purchased
a bottle of Coca-Cola from an enclosed vending machine in a police
station just prior to reporting for duty at four o'clock in the after-
noon. The odor that emanated from the bottle after he had con-
sumed about half of its contents resembled that of "brake fluid" and
he vomited repeatedly. Actually, chemical analysis showed the pres-
ence of 6/10ths of one percent of hydrochloric acid which made the
Coca-Cola "unfit for human consumption." Citing an earlier case,4 0 1
the court found that the presence of this concentration of acid
"established a breach of the implied warranty of fitness and plaintiff
did not have the burden of proving that the presence of the hydro-
chloric acid was due to some negligence or dereliction on the part
of the defendant."' 40 2
A more recently decided case involving the same beverage, Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Negron Torres,40 3 expressly re-
jected any "requirement" of privity and awarded a substantial judg-
ment to the plaintiff. The plaintiff bought a bottle of Coca-Cola from
a retailer in Puerto Rico; upon drinking a part of it, he noticed an
objectionable taste, apparently caused by the presence of the putrid
body of a small mouse, which led to his illness. The United States
District Court found the defendant distributor liable for breach of
warranty, relying on Castro v. Payco, Inc.4 0 4 In the Castro case, the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico affirmed a judgment awarding dam-
ages to the plaintiff for personal injuries occasioned by the consump-
tion of unwholesome ice cream. The award was based on breach of
implied warranty. In the Castro case, however, there was privity of
contract which was lacking in the instant case. Therefore, the fur-
398. As, for example, Connecticut, Georgia and Virginia; in addition, it is
to be noted that the Uniform Commercial Code has made certain inroads on the
privity concept, see § 2-318, Text at note 306, supra; for jurisdictions which
have adopted the Code, see note 196, supra.
399. 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953).
400. At this time, the Uniform Sales Act was in effect in Pennsylvania.
401. Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145
Atl. 700 (1929).
402. Caskie v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 399, at 903, note 1.
403. Supra notes 1, 388.
404. 75 P.R.R. 59 (1953).
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ther question still confronted the court as to whether privity of
contract was essential to recovery by a consumer of unwholesome
food. As there appeared to be no case in point in Puerto Rican juris-
prudence, the court concluded that its decision would have to be
based "upon general considerations." 40 5 It pointed out that Profes-
sor Williston in his work on sales 4 0 6 had called attention to the fact
that historically, "the requirement of privity has no place in actions
on warranties because originally redress for breach of warranty was
given by an action for deceit, i.e. for a false and fraudulent mis-
representation, which sounds distinctly in tort; that redress by action
sounding in contract was a later development to give an alternative
remedy; and furthermore, that the obligation of an implied warranty
is imposed by law irrespective of a promise by the seller."
4 0 7
The court continued by suggesting that, whether correctly or not,
the orthodox rule required privity of contract between parties to an
action for breach of warranty. It then signalized the fact that for
many years, a number of courts have recognized an exception to the
general doctrine in the case of medicines and foodstuffs, holding that
"the manufacturer warrants to the ultimate consumer that his article
is fit for human consumption." The court added:
We think this exception rests upon a sound basis in view
of present day methods of merchandising products for hu-
man consumption, particularly those sold in cans, capped
bottles or sealed containers .... 408
Having examined "general considerations," as stated in an excerpt
from Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,409 quoted at some
length, 4 1 0 the United States Court of Appeals undertook to deter-
mine what the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico might be expected to
hold under the circumstances. The federal tribunal felt justified in
thinking that the theoretically sound basis for the exception to the
privity rule and its intrinsic merit would persuade the Supreme
Court to recognize and adopt the exception. Also that in all proba-
bility, such a holding would be based on public policy rather than
upon a determination that the implied warranty of fitness for human
consumption is a matter of contract law. Quoting from Castro v.
Payco, Inc.,4 1 1 the court added:
405. This case is quite similar to Chapman v. Brown, supra note 1, in that
the federal court was called upon to state local law.
406. 1 WILISTON, SALES §§ 195-97, 244 (3d ed. 1948).
407. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, supra note 388 at 151-52.
408. Ibid.
409. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
410. The quoted excerpt Is reproduced supra, text at note 265.
411. Supra note 404.
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When the manufacturer of an article used for food offers it
for sale for human consumption, the presumption is that
he has complied with the [Puerto Rico Pure Food, Drug
and Cosmetic] Act, and that he has placed on the market
an unadulterated article and that he warrants that it is fit
for its intended use. 4 1 2
Affirming the judgment of the lower court, it was held that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover for breach of an implied warranty
of fitness for human consumption and that lack of privity was not
a bar to this action under Puerto Rican law.
In a much more recent case, Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.,41 3 the Supreme Court of Michigan was called upon to determine
whether the wife of a purchaser of Coca-Cola could maintain an
action for breach of warranty when she became ill from consuming
the contents of a bottle of this beverage. 4 1 4 Chemical analysis re-
vealed that "mold filaments and mold spores" were present. Defend-
ant urged a rather curious argument indicating a complete lack of
familiarity with the underlying concepts; in effect, it said that plain-
tiff sued on an implied warranty, but there is "no distinction between
a count in implied warranty or in tort;" therefore, "the burden was
upon the plaintiffs to show negligence." Since plaintiffs had failed
to show negligence, they were not entitled to recover. Of this con-
tention, the court said:4 15
The fallacy in what is urged is the assertion that there is no
distinction between counts in warranty and in tort. Their
similarity in the present context lies only in the fact that
each is a remedy aimed at the liability of the manufacturer
and that each may be grounded upon the presence of a dele-
terious or harmful substance (e. g., mouse, fly, snake, mold,
animal or human organs or residue) in an article intended
for human consumption. At this point, however, similarities
end and distinctions take over. The warranty action, of
ancient lineage, did not require a showing of negligence
(though a showing of negligence, of course, did not defeat
it) but it did require privity of contract. The negligence
action, on the other hand, did not require privity but it did
require that the plaintiff show a lack of due care with
respect to the particular article, e. g., the bottle of Coca-
412. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, supra note 388. at 152.
413. 109 N.W.2d 918 (Mich. 1961).
414. For various kinds of foreign substances which have been found in
Coca-Cola, see supra notes 388-396.
415. Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 413.
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Cola in the present case. Either of these doctrines, literally
applied, gave the manufacturer a virtual immunity. As for
privity, the injured consumer and the manufacturer were
contractual strangers, unless related by a fiction. As for
negligence, the annual output of such bottles often ran into
the millions. To show the negligence of the manufacturer
with respect to any particular bottle was an impossibility. 4 1 6
The court then comments on the extensive changes wrought by the
facts of modern trade and commerce, centralized manufacturing
operations in strategic areas, and the tremendous volume of adver-
tising and "assurances of quality directly aimed at the ultimate con-
sumers." 4 1 7 The net result of the operation of these forces has been
a significant change in legal theory. Foods and beverages constitute
but a small segment in the ever-broadening field of products lia-
bility: 41 8 "It ranges through areas both of contract and tort," as the
court remarks, "from the liability of the manufacturer of a defective
automobile wheel, 41 9 or cinder blocks 4 2 0 to that of the seller of an
inflammable dress,4 2 1 or the distributor of unwholesome food 4 22 or
contaminated drink,4 2 3 or even the purveyor of a caustic per-
fume." 4 2 4
416. Id. at 920; as to the warranty action, the court cites Kenower v. Hotels
Statler Co., 124 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. (1942); also, as to negligence, the court indi-
cates that during the year, defendant's "plant bottled 14,000,000 bottles of Coca-
Cola," citing Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Krausse, 162 Va. 107, 112,
173 S.E. 497, 498 (1934).
As Mr. Justice Smith so clearly states it, either doctrine, whether breach of
warranty or tort, when literally applied can readily defeat the rights of the
consumer. This is well illustrated by the recent case of Hochgertel v. Canada
Dry Corp., supra note 3, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relegated
the innocent victim of an exploding soda bottle to his remedy in tort because
he was not a subpurchaser within the distributive chain. The case is stated,
supra in text, notes 80a to 80k inclusive.
417. Mazoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 413 at 921.
418. See Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 614, 809 (1955).
419. Citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 360.
420. Citing Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.,
supra note 1.
421. Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460
(1944) af]'d without op. 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E.2d 839 (1945); cf. Frank R. Jelleff,
Inc. v. Braden, 98 App. D.C. 180, 233 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1956), inflammable
smock; Chapman v. Brown, supra note 1, hula skirt.
422. Citing Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, supra note 1.
423. Citing Sharp v. The Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 180 Kan. 845,
308 P.2d 150 (1957); see cases cited in notes 388-396.
424. Citing Carter v. Yardley & Co., Ltd., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693
(1946), quoted in text at note 240, supra.
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Quoting extensively from the closely reasoned and ably formu-
lated opinion of Mr. Justice Francis in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,4 2 5 Mr. Justice Smith, delivering the opinion of the
Michigan Supreme Court, declared: "The Supreme Court of New
Jersey has recently given this modern development exhaustive
examination." 4 2 6
In Michigan, it appears that recovery in these cases is afforded
"either on a theory of negligence, or implied warranty. ' 42 7 The
court expressly refuses to retract its earlier decision in Spence v.
Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.4 28 and adheres to
the view that it is unnecessary to show negligence in a suit upon
breach of warranty of fitness for human consumption, and that "such
warranty is available to all who may suffer damages by reason of
their use in the legitimate channels of trade." 4 29 Citing a precedent
of almost forty years' standing, Hertzler v. Manshum, 4 30 wherein
the same court had stated, "the poisoned flour speaks for itself; un-
explained, it evidences negligence, for no proof of negligence could
be more direct than the flour with arsenate of lead in it. ' ' 4 31 Com-
menting on this, Mr. Justice Smith adds:
It speaks with equal clarity when the action is brought on a
theory of warranty. Unexplained it evidences such breach, as
well as negligence. Here the jury was not satisfied with the
explanation tendered, and we are not persuaded there was
error of law in their determination. 4 3 2
Affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the court noted that manu-
facturers are well placed to shoulder liability and to distribute its
burdens and in consequence, many jurisdictions have abandoned the
requirement of privity outright. It may safely be concluded that
beverages are assimilated to foodstuffs in most jurisdictions. 43 3
425. Supra note 1.
426. Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 413 at 921.
427. Quoting Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.,
supra note 1.
428. Id. at 135, 90 N.W.2d at 874.
429. Quoting LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash.2d 645, 314 P.2d
421 (1957).
430. 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924), later app. 237 Mich. 289, 211 N.W.
754 (1927).
431. Hertzler v. Manshum, supra note 430 at 421, 200 N.W. at 156.
432. Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 413 at 922.
433. Dr. Pepper Co. v. Brittain, 234 Ala. 548, 176 So. 286 (1937); LeBlanc v.
Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So.2d 873 (1952); Tafoya v. Las
Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N. Mex. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955); cf. Caskie
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953); Keller v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 214 Ore. 654, 330 P.2d 346 (1958).
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Bottles and Other Containers. In some jurisdictions, fortunately
a small minority, a rather illogical distinction has been attempted
between containers and their edible or potable contents. Somewhat
akin has been the "distinction" sometimes made between the sale of
the container and its bailment where the container may be returned
and the deposit recovered. 4 3 4
In the first category are numerous instances of "exploding" bottles,
or other defectively made containers. 4 3 5 A recent case of novel im-
pression in California, Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 4 3 6 dealt
with this question. Vallis was employed as a helper in the kitchen of
a restaurant, whose proprietor had purchased the bottle of "Club
Soda" which exploded and injured the plaintiff. The trial court
entered a judgment of nonsuit; on appeal, this was reversed on the
ground that an implied warranty of merchantability as to the bottle,
distinguished from its contents, extended to the employee. The court
reviews the precedents pro and con citing cases on both sides and
quotes a leading article :437 "This metaphysical distinction between
the container and the contents can only be regarded as amazing. The
two are sold by each seller, and received by the ultimate purchaser,
as an integrated whole; and where the action is against the imme-
diate seller, it is well settled that the warranty covers both." 4 3 8 It is
the court's reasoned conclusion that it is a matter of general knowl-
434. McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D.
Mo. 1949) appeal dis. 184 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1950); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); McAlester Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Lynch, 280 P.2d 466 (Okla. 1955); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Butler, 180 S.W.2d
096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
435. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla. v. Shaw, 118 So.2d 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960), wherein the split of authority is discussed; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan.
613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); cf. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 116
F. Supp. 122 (S.D.W.Va. 1953); Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44,
15 A.2d 181 (1940); Atwell v. Pepsi-cola Bottling Co. of Washington, D.C., 152
X.2d 196 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1959); Canada Dry Ginger Ale Co. v. Jochum, 43
A.2d 42 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1945); Poplar v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 180 Md.
389, 24 A.2d 783 (1942); Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65
N.E.2d 305 (1946).
436. 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Cal. App. 1961) reh. den. See also Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Mahoney v.
Shaker Square Beverages, 102 N.E.2d 281 (Ohio C.P. 1951); Tennebaum v. Pender-
gast, 89 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio C.P. 1948); cf. Alaska Pacific Salmon Co. v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1947); Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal.2d 217,
324 P.2d 583 (1958); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514, 203 P.2d 522
(1949); Healey v. Trodd, 124 N.J.L. 64, 11 A.2d 88 (1940); Cooper v. Newman, 11
N.Y.S.2d 319 (1939).
437. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); see also Pound, The Problem of the Exploding
Bottle, 40 BOSTON U. L. REv. 167 (1960).
438. Prosser, supra at 1138.
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edge that the explosion of a defective bottle containing a carbonated
beverage may cause serious physical harm to those handling it or near
it when the explosion occurs. Such a bottle is not of merchantable
quality, and it is to be expected that an employee of the vendee will
handle it in the normal course of his job. That he will be injured by
a defective bottle is entirely foreseeable, citing another recent Cali-
fornia case, Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 4 3 9 in support, and com-
paring Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories.4 4 0
In sharp and deplorable contract to Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger
Ale, supra, is the most recent Pennsylvania case, Hochgertel v. Can-
ada Dry Corporation.4 40a Here, the facts are strikingly similar: sub-
stitute "bartender" for "helper" and "fraternal organization" for
"restaurant," and the cases are factually on all fours. Also, in each
case, the lower court held for the defendant, accepting the defense of
lack of privity; however, on appeal, the decisions are diametrically
opposite for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order
of dismissal, insisting on privity of warranty to the extent that only
a purchaser, or a subpurchaser within the distributive chain, could
be granted recovery for breach of warranty.4 4 0b
As to the second of these spurious "distinctions" indicated above,
namely, between the sale or bailment of the container, the court
quotes extensively from Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 4 4 1 where the
first of the concurring and dissenting opinions reads:
"However, a question does arise as to whether there was a sale of
the bottle. This has never been authoritatively answered in Califor-
nia; there is a split among the cases in other jurisdictions that have
considered the question, but the weight of authority is that there is
a sale of the bottle."' 4 4 2
Pointing out that the English Sale of Goods Act has a section
nearly identical with the California Code provision regarding implied
warranties,4 4 3 the court discusses Geddling v. Marsh,4 4 4 an Eng-
lish precedent, where the suggested distinction was summarily re-
439. 54 Cal.2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
440. 182 Cal. App.2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
440a. Supra note 3; the facts are stated in text at notes 80a to 80k inclu-
sive.
440b. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3.
441. 50 Cal.2d 217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958).
442. Id. at 232, 324 P.2d at 592.
443. Sale of Goods Act (1893) 56 & 57 Vict. § 14, and § 1735, CALIFORNIA
CIVIL CODE, corresponding to Uniform Sales Act § 15.
444. [1920] 1 K.B. 668.
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jected and the warranty held applicable whether the bottle was sold
or bailed.4 4 5 This seems a sound conclusion.
Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Florida v. Shaw4 4 6 is an example
of similarly enlightened reasoning. This time the offender was a
bottle of soda which broke when plaintiff attempted to open it. The
broken bottle injured the purchaser's hand and she brought this
action. Referring to the doctrine of strict liability obtaining in num-
erous jurisdictions, 4 4 7 and citing cases in support, the court rejected
the purported distinction:
The warranty which these courts find is one of merchantable
quality or fitness for the general purpose for which the goods
are made, rather than any special purpose of the buyer. The
deliberate policy of carrying the responsibility back to the
manufacturer who is best able to meet it is indicated by a
few decisions which have refused to find any warranty from
a wholesaler to the consumer. Less comprehensible are the
decisions of three courts which have confined the manufac-
turer's warranty to the food or beverage inside of a con-
tainer, and have refused to find any warranty that the
container itself will not explode in the customer's face....
The distinction of course makes no sense. One may spec-
ulate that these courts were uneasy about the proof that the
plaintiff had not damaged the container himself. 4 4 8
Recognizing that the trend is definitely in the direction of greater
consumer protection, the court concluded:
The implied warranty theory of liability comports with
the general trend of the best reasoned cases. The man-
ufacturer knows the content and quality of the food prod-
ucts canned and offered to the public for consumption. The
public generally is vitally concerned in wholesome foods, or
its health will be jeopardized. If poisonous, unhealthful and
deleterious foods are placed by the manufacturer upon the
445. This is also the view expressed in 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 227, note 1 (3d
ed. 1948), citing Geddling v. Marsh, supra note 444.
446. 118 So.2d 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
447. California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Washington, and possibly in Alabama, Arizona, and Kentucky.
448. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Florida v. Shaw, supra note 446.
The same question was presented in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra
note 3, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania asked: "Did the warranty cover
the container as well as the contents of the bottle ?" However, since the Court
found that the plaintiff had no cause of action, not being "a purchaser or sub-
purchaser in the distributive chain," no answer was deemed necessary.
1963]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
market and injuries occur by the consumption thereof then
the law should supply the injured person an adequate and
speedy remedy. It is our conclusion that the implied war-
ranty remedy of enforcement will accomplish the desired
end.4 4 9
B. Drugs and Related Products
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories,4 5 0 a recent California decision,
is a further step in the repudiation of the obsolete privity require-
ment. Coming a century after the first really significant deviation, 4 5 1
this case involves the sale of polio-myelitis vaccine manufactured by
Cutter laboratories and found to contain "live and active poliomye-
litis virus." Two children who were vaccinated with it became in-
fected and made ill thereby. The court refused to give the manu-
facturer immunity from liability for his breach of the implied war-
ranties of fitness for use or merchantable quality and held him to
strict liability. Using a somewhat unique reverse approach, the court
suggested that if such immunity were to be granted, it would have to
be done by statute, not by judicial legislation. 4 5 2
There are any number of cases which have held the manufacturer
or vendor of drugs and pharmaceuticals liable, regardless of privity,
where the negligence of either has been responsible for the death or
injury of those who have taken them. 4 5 3 Typical of these is Martin
v. Bengue, Inc., 454 where an ointment was rubbed on the patient's
chest and shoulders; when he struck a match, its head fell off and
ignited his pajama top which was impregnated with the salve. The
fire burned with greater intensity than it otherwise would, and the
court held that a jury could properly find the manufacturer liable. 4 5 5
449. Id. at 843, quoting the opinion in Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Jordan, 62 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1953), which quotes the leading case of Blanton v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944).
450. 182 Cal. App.2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
451. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
452. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, supra note 450.
453. Valmas Drug Co. v. Smoots, 269 Fed. 356 (6th Cir. 1920); Hruska v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 6 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1925); Abbott Laboratories v. Lapp, 78
F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1935); Wennerholm v. Stanford University, 20 Cal.2d 713, 128
P.2d 522 (1942); Keating v. Hull, 78 Conn. 719, 62 Atl. 661 (1905); Blood Balm
Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S.E. 118 (1889); Fuhs v. Barber, 140 Kan. 373, 36
P.2d 962 (1934); Tiedje v. Haney, 184 Minn. 569, 239 N.W. 611 (1931); Martin
v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957); Willson v. Faxon, 208 N.Y. 108,
101 N.E. 799 (1913); cf. Gielski v. State, 10 App. Div.2d 471, 200 N.Y.S.2d 691
(1960), rev'g 18 Misc.2d 508, 191 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1959), settled 11 App. Div.2d
974, 205 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1960).
454. Supra note 453.
455. Martin v. Bengue, Inc., supra note 453.
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The manufacturer of a certain vaccine known as "Bacterin" was
held liable to the plaintiff who had vaccinated his sheep to provide
them with immunity from certain diseases. Instead, the sheep died,
allegedly as a result of the vaccination; the court, in Brown v. Globe
Laboratories,4 5 6 held that a circular issued by the manufacturer
stating that "a protective degree of immunity is established" con-
stituted a warranty for the breach of which the plaintiff was entitled
to judgment. Privity was not even mentioned as a requirement.
Surgical nails and similar devices have occasioned litigation when
shown to have been defectively made. Thus, in Bowles v. Zimmer
Manufacturing Co.,4 5 7 the federal court, following Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders cd Masonry Supply Co.,4 5 8 held that privity was not
essential to recovery for breach of warranty when certain surgical
nails were found defective. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit also had occasion to determine the liability of a
manufacturer of surgical nails which had been misbranded, Ortho-
pedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler.4 5 9 The plaintiff was permanently
injured because of the use of one of these nails; from a judgment in
his favor, defendant company appealed. Affirming, the court found
that there had been a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act 4 6 0 when the nails were misbranded: "the breach of this
duty may give rise to civil liability," said the court. 4 6 1 The facts in
this case are of considerable interest: While assisting his father to
remove a tree from the paternal farm, the plaintiff was injured when
the tree fell on him. Examination at a nearby hospital disclosed a
fracture of the leg and other injuries; an operation was considered
456. 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
457. 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960).
458. Supra note 1.
459. 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960).
460. Sections 91-902(b), 201(j), 301(a), 502; 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392.
461. Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, supra note 459 at 460; see Note,
26 VA. L.REV. 100 (1939). The court states that the following cases which it cites
are representative of the majority rule: "Donaldson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 213, 128 A.L.R. 456 (1938); Doherty v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 227 Wis. 661, 278 N.W. 437 (1938); Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63,
181 P. 326 (1919); Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119
N.W. 428 (1909); Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newtown By-Products Mfg.
Co., 248 N.Y. 293, 162 N.E. 84 (1928); Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio
St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (1924); Tedder v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 224 S.C. 46, 77
S.E.2d 293 (1953). Contra: Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656
(1935); Cheli v. Cudahy Bros Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 414 (1934); Gearing v.
Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785, L.R.A. 1916D, 1006 (1916)." See also
Cotton, A Note on the Civil Remedies of Injured Consumers. 1 LAW AND CON-
TEMP.PROB. 67 (1933); Note, 26 VA. L.REV. 100 (1939); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 28.26 (1956); Annotation, 128 A.L.R. 464.
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necessary. The contemplated surgery required the use of a "Kunt-
scher Cloverleaf Intramedullary Nail." After a hole had been drilled
in the thigh bone, a nail of the specified type was selected based on
its being labelled "9 mm." in width. When it was driven into the ori-
fice previously prepared, it stuck and would not penetrate as intended.
Thereupon, the upper or protruding part was cut off, the wound
closed and a plaster cast applied in the hope that the bone would
atrophy sufficiently to permit the withdrawal of the nail. The first
attempt to accomplish this proved abortive, and it was not until two
months after the operation that the nail could be removed. When
measured, it was found that the width of the nail varied from "a min-
imum of 9.27mm. to a maximum of 10.12mm." Because of the mal-
functioning of the nail, plaintiff lost the use of his leg permanently,
and ultimate amputation was to be expected. The defense raised by
the company was to the effect that its products were not covered by
the Act; 4 6 2 this the court flatly rejected. 4 6 3
There is one group of cases which may well be disapproved. These
concern the furnishing of blood plasma which causes the death of
the patient. Adopting a specious distinction between "supplying" or
"furnishing" on the one hand, and a "sale" on the other, somewhat
resembling the pseudo-distinction said to exist between "uttering"
food and selling it in a restaurant, 46 4 the courts have held hospitals
immune from liability on any theory of warranty, or even of negli-
gence where death or injury results. A leading case is Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital,4 6 5 where the statement appears:
The supplying of blood by the hospital was entirely sub-
ordinate to its paramount function of furnishing trained
personnel and specialized facilities in an endeavor to restore
plaintiff's health. It was not for blood-or iodine or band-
ages-for which plaintiff bargained, but the wherewithal of
the hospital staff and the availability of hospital facilities
to provide whatever medical treatment was considered ad-
462. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, supra note 460.
463. Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, supra note 459; in fact, the court
found to the contrary. "The dicta quoted in defendant's brief to the effect that
the Act was designed primarily to protect the public, especially consumers, do not
support the inference that defendant seeks to draw, namely that surgical instru-
ments are not meant to be covered by the Act since they are not ordinarily sold
to members of the public. On the contrary, these expressions are more consistent
with the inclusion of such instruments within the scope of the Act, for the patient
as a member of the public is the ultimate consumer," at 460.
464. Text at note 379, supra.
465. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954), reversing 283 App. Div. 789, 129
N.Y.S.2d 232, and 128 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp.
Dist., 48 Wash.2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956).
[Vol. I : p. I
PRIVITY OF WARRANTY
visable. The conclusion is evident that the furnishing of
blood was only an incidental and very secondary adjunct
to the services performed by the hospital and therefore, was
not within the provisions of the Sales Act.4 6 6
The suggestion that "the furnishing of blood was only an incidental
and very secondary adjunct" to the services rendered by the hospital
seems open to serious criticism. What could be more important, what
could be more a matter of life and death to the patient than provid-
ing the right type of blood? It would seem that here again, a techni-
cality is depriving the user or consumer of essential protection. 4 6 7
C. Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products
As has been noted in an earlier section, 4 68 Pennsylvania took an
early lead in this field in Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke.4 6 9 Of far
more recent vintage is Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.4 7 0
While it does not precisely answer the question whether tobacco
products intended and produced for human consumption should be
assimilated to foodstuffs, it does hold that the manufacturer may be
liable for a breach of warranty of fitness for use and of merchantable
quality, as well as any express warranties made during an advertis-
ing campaign. It may be recalled that the plaintiff had been smoking
Chesterfield cigarettes for more than thirty years, relying on num-
erous representations and assurances that the "nose, throat and ac-
cessory organs" are "not adversely affected by smoking Chester-
fields." 4 7 1 These statements were contained in advertisements in
various newspapers and periodicals and were also made on a national
television program. As the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania had dismissed the action, the plaintiff
466. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, supra note 465 at 106, 123 N.E.2d
at 795, quoted in Krom v. Sharp & Dohme, 180 N.Y.S.2d 99 (App. Div. 1958) at
101, and holding that there was no cause of action for breach of warranty where
death resulted from using blood plasma carrying jaundice germ.
467. However, this technicality seems to have taken such a firm hold that
legislation may be essential to safeguard the lives of hospital patients threatened
with blood plasma infusions.
468. Supra Section 11.
469. Supra note 18.
470. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
471. Id. at 296-297, where the court quotes verbatim many of the claims
made by defendant company through various advertising media.
If the decision in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, is a cri-
terion, it would appear that an advertising campaign is not essential to finding
the existence of a warranty and giving a remote purchaser rights for a breach
thereof provided he is "in the distributive chain." However, it is equally clear
that the plaintiff must be a purchaser or subpurchaser to have this right.
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appealed; and the Third Circuit, after a comprehensive review of the
Pennsylvania cases, reversed on the ground that a jury question was
presented which precluded granting defendant's motions to dismiss
and for a directed verdict.
The appellate court observed: 47 2 "From the evidence, the jury
could very well have concluded that there was a breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability. ' 4 7 3 The court rejected defendant's
argument that the plaintiff had failed to show that Chesterfield cig-
arettes did not meet the standards of merchantability of cigarettes
sold generally, citing Frantz Equipment Co. v. Leo Butler Co.4 7 4 in
support. It is interesting to note in passing that the Supreme Court of
New Jersey also cited the Frantz case in its epoch-making decision in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.4 7 5 Upon remand, it is under-
stood that the jury returned a verdict for the defendant company. 4 7 6
As to the allegations made, and the facts in general, there is a re-
markable similarity between Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.4 7 7 and the Pritchard case. An examination of the advertisements
which the defendant company used disclosed a statement that "20,000
doctors say that 'Camel' cigarettes are helpful." Also, on television
programs, Camel cigarettes were described as "harmless to the respir-
atory system." Although the trial court had granted a motion by de-
fendant company to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, the appellate court
reversed on the ground that the representations regarding the non-
injurious nature of the cigarettes were untrue and actionable.
Upon a subsequent appeal in this case, 4 7 8 summary judgment for
the defendant company was affirmed after it had filed an affidavit
stating that no copy of advertisements of any kind relative to Camel
cigarettes was furnished for publication by any newspaper or other
472. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 470 at 297.
473. Here, the court added: "If supported by the record, the district court
could charge the jury that they are to consider the practices of other cigarette
manufacturers and the quality of cigarettes they manufacture as bearing on the
question of merchantability. Such practices, however, are not conclusive, for
'what usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought
to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is
complied with or not.' Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 1903, 189 U.S. 468,
470, 23 S.Ct. 622, 47 L.Ed. 905. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
supra note 470.
474. 370 Pa. 459, 88 A.2d 702 (1952).
475. Supra note 1.
476. This understanding is based on a news report, but no official report has
been received; see editor's note, supra note 28.
477. 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).
478. Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958),
cert. den., 358 U.S. 875.
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publication, or by radio or television, during the period under con-
sideration which contained the statements regarding the helpfulness
of Camels alleged in the complaint. This, of course, does not decide
what the liability of the company might have been had the state-
ments been made and actually relied on. It has been held that there
can be recovery for injuries resulting from breach of warranty in
the sale of tobacco products such as chewing tobacco, 4 7 9 or smoking
tobacco. 48 0 It has even been held that a warranty of merchanta-
bility applies to retail sales of tobacco products when sold in the
original sealed packages received from the manufacturer. 4 8 ' The
chewing tobacco cases are probably more nearly assimilable to the
food cases than any of the other tobacco products. Any number of
courts have held the manufacturer liable when the "chew" was found
to contain some foreign deleterious substance which injured the user.
Typical of these is Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,4 8 2
where a plug of "Blood Hound" chewing tobacco was found to con-
tain a dead worm with numerous stingers which injured the con-
sumer. Judgment for plaintiff against defendant manufacturer was
affirmed.
In Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Wallace,48 3 "an enormous
quantity of small metal particles resembling steel filings or bits of
small wire" were found in "Tinsley's Natural Leaf Tobacco" and
injured the plaintiff who sued the manufacturer. Lack of privity was
held no bar, judgment being rendered against the manufacturer.
The most recent case involving tobacco products, Green v. Amer-
ican Tobacco Company,48 4 came up on appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit last year. As in Pritchard
supra, and Cooper supra, the question was whether the manufacturer
was liable on an implied warranty. Lung cancer was alleged to have
been brought on by the constant and exclusive use of Lucky Strike
cigarettes. After a vigorous contest, the trial court gave judgment
for the manufacturer which was at first affirmed after an extensive
479. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S.W.2d 612
(1932); Weiner v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 375 Mass. 379, 176 N.E. 114 (1931); Corum
v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N.C. 213, 171 S.E. 78 (1933); Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co. v. Wallace, 69 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Webb v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W.Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898 (1939).
480. Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 468, 241 N.Y.S. 233
(1930) afJ'd without op. 232 App. Div. 822, 249 N.Y.S. 924.
481. Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 6 Ohio Ops. 77, 13 N.E.2d
130 (1936).
482. Supra note 479.
483. Supra note 479.
484. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
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review of the Florida cases which were held controlling. 48 5 How-
ever, upon petition for rehearing, it was decided to certify the ques-
tion to the Supreme Court of Florida. 4 8 6 The basis for this decision
was first, there was no controlling precedent in Florida: and second,
there was a strong and ably-reasoned dissenting opinion which also
reviewed the Florida cases 4 8 7 but reached a diametrically opposed
conclusion. The dissent discussed the Pritchard case supra, upon
which defendant company placed some reliance, but found that it
was not applicable since Florida is governed by common law. 4 s 8 No
word has come from the Florida Supreme Court as of this writing. 4 8 9
D. Cosmetics, Detergents and Related Chemical Preparations
Cosmetics. Of the many cases dealing with hair preparations or
wave lotions, it is probable that none has been cited more frequently
than Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent.4 9 0 Plaintiff's mother applied
a wave preparation to her daughter's hair, following the directions
on the package. However, instead of creating the hoped-for curls,
plaintiff's hair fell out, to her discomfiture and embarrassment. The
label on the product stated that it was "Very Gentle;" one might
wonder what would have happened had it not been "Gentle." When
defendant company's demurrer was sustained with respect to the
breach of warranty action which plaintiff had filed, the Supreme
Court of Ohio examined the authorities and concluded that in a grow-
ing number of cases, "a warranty of fitness for human consumption
carries over from the manufacturer or producer to the ultimate con-
485. The Florida cases reviewed included Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., 144 Fla.
500, 198 So. 223 (1940); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d
313 (1944); Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949), where
the Supreme Court of Florida quoted from the able opinion in Cushing v. Rodman,
65 App. D.C. 258, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So.2d
434 (Fla. 1952); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953); Food
Fair Stores of Florida v. Macurda, 93 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957); Miami Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1958); Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128
So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
486. This certification is provided for under § 25.031, FLORIDA STATUTES 1959,
F.S.A.
487. Cited in note 485 supra.
488. Green v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 484 at 83. Cf. Ross v. Philip
Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
If the teaching of Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, is cor-
rectly understood, a plaintiff in the situation of Green who purchased the ciga-
rettes would have a cause of action in Pennsylvania if he could prove breach
of warranty, express or implied, by the manufacturer since plaintiff could show
he was within the distributive chain.
489. February 1, 1963.
490. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
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sumer, regardless of privity of contract. ' 4 9 1 This was in spite of
the holding in Wood v. General Electric Co.4 9 2 where privity was
deemed a prerequisite in cases of breach of warranty. The Supreme
Court limited its holding to finding a breach of an express warranty
since the manufacturer had by means of advertisements and labels
made positive representations as to the non-injurious nature of his
product.4 9 3
Only a few years later an intermediate appellate court in Ohio had
occasion to consider the liability of a manufacturer on an implied
or constructive warranty when a permanent wave lotion sold under
the name of "Prom Home Permanent" caused a "quantitative loss of
hair.",4 9 4 Or, as the attending physician described his patient: "The
hairs, were still there, just like short grass would be after cutting
the lawn." In short, plaintiff acquired an involuntary cosmetic crew-
cut. President Judge Skeel delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Ohio Court of Appeals holding the defendant company liable for
breach of the implied warranty, following and quoting Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent: 495
Where an implied warranty is imposed by law, words of
description used to identify the property which induced the
sale, can hardly be distinguished from an express warranty
as that term is defined by law, that is, a representation relied
upon by the buyer which has the effect of inducing the sale.
Under such circumstances where the obligations are imposed
by law, it would be most difficult to distinguish between them
in attempting to impose privity as a necessary element in
making out a cause of action. 4 9 6
After a careful analysis of the development of warranties and the
so-called requirement of privity the court concluded: "Under the
circumstances here presented, no distinction between establishing
an express or implied warranty should be made. The plaintiff's case,
491. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent, supra note 490 at 246, 147 N.E.2d
at 614.
There is no reason to suppose that the Pennsylvania courts would hold other-
wise since plaintiff in the Rogers case was the purchaser and quite clearly would
be found in the distributive chain, Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3.
492. 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
493. It expressly reserved any decision with respect to the breach of an
implied or constructive warranty.
494. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d
181 (1958).
495. Supra note 490.
496. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., supra note 494, 149 N.E.2d at
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based on implied warranty, should have been sustained for the con-
sideration of the jury. ' ' 4 97
Last year, in still another case involving a wave lotion, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was called upon to
decide what the Michigan courts would do if confronted with the
circumstances of the case. The trial court had rendered judgment for
the plaintiff and defendant company appealed, Bathory v. Procter &
Gamble Distributing Co.4 9 8 Again, loss of hair and dermatitis fol-
lowed the use of "Pin-It," the name of the permanent wave compound.
After discussing various cases, and the expert opinion expressed by
the medical witnesses, the court concluded that the judgment should
be affirmed, relying especially on an Ohio case, Sicard v. Roux Dis-
tributing Co.4 9 9
Before leaving the subject of cosmetics it seems appropriate to
point out that in a number of instances the allergy of the plaintiff
to a given ingredient has afforded a defense to the manufacturer. 00
This is an area of considerable controversy as illustrated by some
of the cases such as Zampino v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,5 0 1 Jacquot
v. Win. Filene's Sons, 50 2 and Crotty v. Shartenberg's New Haven,
Inc.5 0 3
497. Id. at 188. Cf. Kennedy v. General Beauty Products, Inc. 167 N.E.2d
116 (Ohio App. 1960), citing Rogers, supra note 490, and Wood, supra note 492.
Somewhat similarly, in a recent decision in Pennsylvania, Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, the court makes no distinction between express
and implied warranties, saying, "in express warranties the purchaser or sub-
purchaser can rely thereon, for they are considered a part of the consideration
for the purchase and are meant to be relied upon by the purchaser. See, Silver-
man v. Samuel Mallinger [supra note 36]. So also, the basis for recovery upon
an implied warranty . . . must be that the implied warranty forms a part of the
consideration for the contract, and flows from the manufacturer to subpurchaser
through the conduit of a contractual chain."
498. 306 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1962).
499. 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250 (1938); similar cases are Graham v.
Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954); Patterson v. George H.
Weyer, Inc., 370 P.2d 115 (Kan. 1962), citing the Bottenfield case supra.
500. In Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955), the
court defines cosmetic as "any external application intended to beautify and im-
prove the complexion, skin, or hair."
501. 10 Misc.2d 686, 173 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
502. 337 Mass 312, 149 N.E.2d 636 (1958).
503. 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960); Bonowski v. Revlon, Inc., 251
Iowa 141, 100 N.W.2d 5 (1959), consumer was allergic to sun-tan lotion; Ingham
v. Emes [1955] 2 All Eng. Rep. 740, allergy to hair dye which produced dermatitis.
See also Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Briggs v.
National Indus., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Haberly
v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958); cf. Casagrande v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., Inc., 340 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960); Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 144
Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941).
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Detergents. A decade ago, a Missouri court was faced with an
action based on injuries alleged to have been incurred while using
"Tide," Worley v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing 0.504 The ulti-
mate consumer was suing the manufacturer of this detergent which
was described as being "kind to hands;" in plaintiff's case, use of
Tide resulted in a skin infection. The court held that in spite of the
absence of privity, an exception would be recognized "in the case of
sales of foods, beverages, drugs and articles likely to produce physical
injury if improperly manufactured." 5 0 5
Since the opinion in Worley v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing
C0.506 was delivered, there has been an enormous growth in the
advertisement of detergents, soap powders and cleansers of every
description. In television, now seemingly a household necessity, the
manufacturer and his subsidiaries have found a magnificent sound-
ing board for indulgence in hyperbole as to the excellence of his
product. Hamon v. Digliani,50 7 decided less than a year ago, is a
shining example. "Lestoil" was the offending product, and the plain-
tiff sought recovery for breach of express and implied warranties.
5 0 8
Said the court:
Within recent years, numerous cases have arisen in
other jurisdictions in which the courts have extended breach
of warranty law to encompass a right of action against the
manufacturer for breach of either an express or an implied
warranty of his product and have eliminated privity of
contract as an element essential to recovery. Dean Prosser,
in an extensive review of the cases and trends in this regard,
points out that the privity requirement was abolished by
judicial fiat in cases involving the sale of food and that since
1934 thirteen jurisdictions have applied against the man-
ufacturer a rule of strict liability for statements which prove
to be false, if they were made to the public in labels on the
goods or in the manufacturer's advertising or disseminated
literature and it can be found that the plaintiff relied on the
statements in making his purchase .... 509
504. 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
505. Id., 253 S.W.2d at 534.
506. Supra note 504.
507. 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1962).
508. See text at notes 133-153, supra.
509. Hamon v. Digliani, supra note 507 at 712-13, 174 A.2d at 295, referring
to Prosser, "The Assault Upon the Citadel, (Strict Liability to the Consumer)",
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); the court added: "As these counts are not affected by
the judgment on the demurrer they remain to be tried when issue is joined. The
plaintiff, by her appeal, is endeavoring to change the rule, which has existed in
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Chemical Preparations. Any number of chemical preparations
have caused injury to the user, not infrequently in the face of an
assurance by the manufacturer of their harmless nature. Examples
are furnished by such products as shoe-dye, 5 1 0 dry-cleaning fluids, 5 1 1
fish-net preservative, 5 1 2 hydraulic fluid,5 ' 3 caustic drain clean-
ers,5 1 4 and disinfectants. 51 5 But of all the chemical preparations
which have occasioned litigation, herbicides and insecticides appear
to be in the lead. McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co.5 1 6 is one of the
best of the recent cases. As mentioned above, 5 1 7 the federal court
applied Pennsylvania law since the contract for the sale of the insec-
ticide spray was made in Pittsburgh, and the injury to the plaintiff
occurred there. 51 8 The court held that the lack of privity could not
be a valid defense whether the action was regarded as breach of
warranty in contract, or as sounding in tort. In fact, the court did
not seem too concerned as to which theory of recovery was adopted,
relying largely on Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co.5 1 9 Defendant's motion
to dismiss the complaint was denied.
this state at least since Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 A.
271, that in order to sustain an action for breach of express or implied warranty
there has to be evidence of a contract between the parties, for without a con-
tract there could be no warranty ... "
Since nearly three years have elapsed since the article referred to above
was written, it should be noted that other jurisdictions have adopted the rule of
strict liability, as, for example, Hawaii (Chapman v. Brown), New Jersey (Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.), Virginia (by statute) and perhaps Con-
necticut (Hamon v. Digliani).
510. Steber v. Kohn, 149 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1945); Idzykowski v. Jordan
Marsh Co., 279 Mass. 163, 181 N.E. 172 (1932).
511. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 41 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
512. Richardson v. De Luca, 53 So.2d 199 (La. App. 1951).
513. Celanese Corp. of America v. John Clark Industries, Inc., 214 F.2d 551
(5th Cir. 1954).
514. Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1951) cert. den. 342
U.S. 893.
515. Cumberland v. Household Research Corp., 145 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass.
1956); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Shoultz, 56 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1932); Miller v. New
Zealand Insurance Co. 98 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1957).
516. 190 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Conn. 1960). Cf. Herndon v. Southern Pest Con-
trol Co., 307 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1962), holding that buyer of insecticide which
killed hogs was entitled to go to the jury.
517. Supra, Section H.
518. This being a diversity of citizenship case the court declared that under
the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it would be obligated
to follow the conflict of laws rules prevailing in the State of Connecticut.
519. Although Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., supra note 1, has been overruled
to a certain extent by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a recent decision,
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, it would appear that the holding
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Even more recently, stating Oregon law, a federal district court
was rather emphatic in rejecting privity:
This Court is quite of the opinion that if the Oregon
Supreme Court today was presented with the question, that
it would determine that the absence of privity of contract
does not remove or permit the mentioned warranties run-
ning to the ultimate user, who stands within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties to the warranty, might be rea-
sonably expected to suffer a harm from its use.
5 2 0
However, in spite of this conclusion, judgment was entered for
defendant company because plaintiff had failed to give timely notice
of his claim for damages to his bean crop as the result of using the
herbicide manufactured by defendant.
Where a chemical compound was sold for the purpose of extermi-
nating caterpillars on pecan trees, and the trees themselves died, the
Supreme Court of Alabama held that a warranty had been made since
the buyer had disclosed the purpose for which he was purchasing the
lethal mixture, Van Antwerp-Aldridge Drug Co. v. Schwarz.5 2 1 From
a judgment for the buyer, the drug company appealed; affirming, the
court held that there had been no error in the finding of breach of
warranty.
Two western jurisdictions have had occasion to look into this ques-
tion: California and Washington have made their contribution. Burr
v. Sherwin-Williams Co. of California,5 2 2 which has become a classic,
discusses in detail the various questions which are raised by this type
of case. When plaintiff found insects infesting his cotton field, he was
advised to spray with DDT, manufactured by defendant company.
When the cotton was damaged he brought this action; judgment in
his favor was affirmed on appeal. 5 2 3 Relying on Klein v. Duchess
Sandwich Co., 5 2 4 the District Court of Appeal held that liability in
this type of case does not depend on warranty "nor does it depend on
in McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., supra note 516, would still emerge un-
scathed since the plaintiff was a subpurchaser "in the distributive chain." The
Hochgertel case is stated in text, sapra notes 80a-80k inclusive.
520. Spada v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 195 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. Ore. 1961).
521. 263 Ala. 207, 82 S.2d 209 (1955).
522. 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954), reversing 258 P.2d 58 (Cal. App.
1953).
523. Although affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, it
was subsequently reversed, supra note 522.
524. Supra note 1.
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privity of contract.... liability depends rather on a breach of a public
duty owing to all persons into whose hands the article may lawfully
come and by whom it may be used. This rule has been applied to food
and drug cases intended for human consumption, and might properly
be extended to chemicals which are contaminated and therefore unfit
for the purposes for which they are compounded and the uses and
purposes contemplated by the label under which they are sold." 5 2 5
Wise v. Hayes,5 2 6 a companion case, involved the use of a spray
designed for the destruction of insects in orchards. There was a
label on the ten-gallon drum containing the "DDT-50" spray material
which described its contents. The manufacturer "guaranteed the
material to be true to label," but otherwise disclaimed the making of
any warranty. Upon damage to the orchard from use by the spray,
this action was brought. Affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the
Supreme Court of Washington formulated the three exceptions to the
privity rule:
The rule that, if there is no contractual privity, there
can be no warranty, has three exceptions: (1) Where the
article causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous
nature, (2) where fraud or deceit has been shown on the
part of the offending party, or (3) where the manufacturer
has been negligent in some respect with reference to the
sale or construction of an item not imminently danger-
ous.5 2 7
E. Wearing Apparel
What is probably the principal case in Pennsylvania dealing with
clothing, Barrett v. S. S. Kresge Co., 5 28 has heretofore been dis-
cussed. 5 2 9 The case is similar to various others in that it related to
a dress which caused dermatitis; however, it appeared that the
wearer was overly sensitive to the dye the dress contained and the
plaintiff could not recover.
525. Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 258 P.2d 58 (Cal. App. 1953) at 64; this
holding by the Court of Appeal was the basis for the reversal in 42 Cal.2d 682,
268 P.2d 1041 (1954) which was anticipated in Pruett v. Burr, 118 Cal. App. 2d
188, 257 P.2d 690 (1953).
526. 361 P.2d 171 (Wash. 1961).
527. Id. at 173.
528. 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941).
It does not appear that the most recent pronouncement of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, would affect
the defense of "allergy," as interposed in the Barrett case, supra.
529. Text at note 81, supra.
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But an even more frequent cause of action is furnished by the
inflammable nature of certain kinds of fabric used in the manufacture
of wearing apparel. Frank R. Jelleff, Inc. v Braden5 3 0 is in point.
Plaintiff had purchased a housecoat or smock from defendant cloth-
ing store and while wearing it, the smock was ignited by an electric
stove. A fierce and sudden fire caused deep burns, and this action
resulted. Affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the court held that
the evidence was sufficient to warrant submission of the question of
breach of warranty to the jury.
In a rather similar case, Martin v. J. C. Penney Co.,531 a mother
bought her son a shirt which suddenly burst into flames when it
came into contact with an electric range which had been left on caus-
ing the wearer to be severely burned. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington had no hesitancy in deciding the case for the plaintiff, although
privity was absent. Actually, this "requirement" was not even men-
tioned; this is not altogether singular in light of the much earlier
case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 5 3 2 which had substantially dis-
carded privity some twenty-five years before. And in another burn-
ing shirt case in a sister jurisdiction, Owen v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 5 3 3 there seemed no doubt as to the right of recovery for breach
of warranty. The federal court, however, since it was a diversity of
citizenship case, applied Oregon law which included the Uniform
Sales Act 5 3 4 requiring notice within a reasonable time.5 3 5 While
recognizing that the material was highly inflammable the court was
constrained.to hold that there could be no recovery since the condition
530. 98 App. D.C. 180, 233 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
531. 50 Wash. 2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957).
Since by its latest decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania requires the
plaintiff in breach of warranty cases to be "in the distributive chain," the query
arises, would the plaintiff (son of the purchaser) in the Martin case, supra,
have been nonsuited in Pennsylvania since he was not thd purchaser or subpur-
chaser? It appears that he would be, and left to his action in tort according to
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3.
532. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
533. 273 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1959).
534. O.R.S. 75.490; U.S.A. § 49. Oregon has since adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code effective September first, this year.
535. As to notice, the Supreme Court of Oregon has said, "the clear and
practically unbroken current of authority establishes the doctrine that the re-
quirement of notice, to be given by the vendee charging breach of warranty, is
imposed as a condition precedent to the right to recover, and the giving of notice
must be pleaded and proved by the party seeking to recover for such breach
.... " Maxwell Co. v. Southern Oregon Gas Corp., 158 Ore. 168, 74 P.2d 594, 75
P.2d 9 (1937), quoted in and emphasis supplied by the court, Owen v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., supra note 533. And see Williston, op. cit. § 887 B.
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precedent of timely notice had not been performed. The plaintiff had
permitted two years to elapse before notifying the defendant of the
injuries suffered from the burning of his cigarette-ignited shirt.
Although the shirt was purchased by his wife, lack of privity was not
made a ground of defense; in fact, it was not even mentioned by the
court.
But of all the cases where the unfortunate wearers of highly inflam-
mable clothing were burned, none has received publicity or justly
deserved attention equal to the one colloquially denominated "the
case of the hot hula skirt," Chapman v. Brown.5 3 6 The purchaser of
the skirt permitted her infant niece to borrow and wear it to a mas-
querade party. Toward the end of the evening, the skirt suddenly
burst into flames, and the wearer was severely burned. When the
niece, Carol Chapman, had recovered, she brought this action against
the vendors, the complaint alleging, inter alia, the breach of an im-
plied warranty of fitness for use. As was to have been expected, a
most important ground of defense was lack of privity between the
vendors and the plaintiff. Also alleged were contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and failure to give notice of the breach of the
implied warranty within a reasonable time from the date of the acci-
dent. 5 3 7
As the skirt had been purchased from a gift shop in Honolulu by
the plaintiff's aunt, a resident of British Columbia, Canada, and the
plaintiff herself was a resident of the State of Washington, diversity
of citizenship was established and the case was tried in the federal
court. 5 38 The contract of sale having been made in Honolulu, the
court held that the law of Hawaii would apply. 5 3 9 As the jurispru-
dence of that state failed to disclose a case in point, it became neces-
sary, somewhat as in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Negron
536. 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962),
rehearing den.
537. As to the requirement of notice, see Section IV(A), supra at notes
174-183. It should be noted that § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act was in effect at
the time. The appellate court said, "the better rule is that contributory negli-
gence is not a defense to breach of warranty," Chapman v. Brown, 304 F.2d 149
(9th Cir. 1962) at 153.
538. Other cases which involve diversity of citizenship and are discussed
above include Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 1; Thompson
v. Reedman, supra note 1; McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., supra note 516.
539. Citing "Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Texas
Motorcoaches, Inc. v. A. C. F. Motors Co., 154 F.2d 91, 93 (3rd Cir. 1946);
Francis v. Flanchet, 2 Haw. 96, 109 (1858)."
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Torres, 5 4 0 to determine how the Supreme Court of Hawaii would
decide a similar case. 5 4 1
The court first disposed of what it considered the minor defenses,
including the allegation that the husbands of the women who had
sold the hula skirt were not parties to the contract; the complaint
had included them as defendants on the theory of a joint venture. 5 4 2
However, the issue having been submitted to the jury, the latter
found that Mr. Brown was a party to the joint venture while the
other woman's husband was not. The court also submitted to the
jury, the issues of assumption of risk, and the reasonableness or time-
liness of the notice given; as to each, the jury found for the plaintiff.
540. Supra note 388, where the federal court was called on to determine
how the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico would decide an action for breach of
warranty where privity was absent; judgment for the plaintiff was sustained on
appeal.
541. As to this, the court observed: "This being a diversity case based on
breach of an implied warranty claimed to have been made in Hawaii, the law of
Hawaii applies. Here there is no Hawaii decision clearly setting forth the rule
by which we are to be guided, and hence this court must guess at what the
Hawaii Supreme Court would decide in a similar case.
If there is no State Court decision, the Federal Court must attempt to deter-
mine what the State Courts would decide. McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F.Supp. 5
(D.C. Cal. 1954); Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Cohen, 194 F.2d 232,
241 (8 Cir. 1952).
In the absence of a decision by a court whose judgment is authoritative on a
court trying a case, a judge must exercise his best judgment on legal questions
submitted to him in accordance with his own views, although other courts have
reached a contrary conclusion. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 186, p. 297. United States v.
Hopkins, 95 F.Supp. 14, 17 (D.C. Ohio 1951)." Chapman v. Brown, supra note
536.
For an interesting instance of the unsuccessful endeavor to anticipate or
prognosticate what the highest state court would hold, see Mannsz v. Macwhyte,
supra note 1, which was partially overruled, or at least limited, by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, 16 years
later. Under the guidelines laid down in the latter case, it appears clear that the
plaintiff niece in the principal case (Chapman v. Brown, supra) would have no
cause of action for breach of warranty, express or implied, since she was not a
subpurchaser (nor a purchaser).
542. At the time of the purchase, the business of the shop was being operated
in the joint names of two of the defendants, Edith L. Brown, and Helen Chase,
doing business as a general partnership duly registered as such under the laws of
the State of Hawaii. Although the defendant husbands were not registered as
partners, plaintiff claimed that they were in fact partners or principals or joint
venturers in this enterprise, and the jury found on the evidence that Charles E.
Brown was in fact a general partner or joint venturer along with Mrs. Brown and
Mrs. Chase, but that Mr. Chase was not such a general partner or joint venturer.
As to joint ventures generally, see Jaeger, Joint Ventures, 9 AM. U.L. REV. 1,
111 (1960); Jaeger, Partnership or Joint Venture?, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138
(1961); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 317-18 (3d ed. Jaeger 1959).
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The court then proceeded to deal with "the crux of this case," namely,
privity of warranty. Basically, the question was whether it was cor-
rect for the trial court to instruct the jury that privity was not re-
quired in this case. It was defendants' contention that at the time
Hawaii adopted the Uniform Sales Act, 5 43 the majority or common
law rule required privity of warranty in actions for breach of war-
ranty. The Uniform Sales Act, said the defendants, embodied this
rule. Were this so, the court concluded, it would be necessary to hold
for the defendants non obstante veredicto.5 4 4
Although a "strong technical argument" had been made by the
defendants to the effect that privity was essential, and the court
scrutinized it carefully, it felt that the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in
the absence of a specific precedent, would look to the law of other
jurisdictions as propounded in their more recent decisions. With this
introduction, the court examined Martin v. J. C. Penney Co.,5 4 5
briefly discussed above, 5 4 6 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond,5 4 7 and
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.5 4 8 Finally,
the court placed great reliance upon Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.,5 4 9 analyzing the holding, quoting from the opinion, and then
followed its rationale. After this careful survey, the court concluded
that if the arguments advanced by the defendants were to be carried
to their logical end, the result would be that no one not in privity,
regardless of the category of goods involved, including food, would
ever be permitted to recover judgment. This result would have to
follow since the statute declares that the warranties in question run
only in favor of the buyer. However, by the clear weight of authority
today, this is not true, for these warranties (of merchantable quality
and fitness for use) have certainly been held to run to others with
respect to food and certain other products. 5 5 0
543. In 1929.
544. Chapman v. Brown, supra note 536 at 102.
545. Supra note 531.
546. Text at note 531, supra.
547. 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
548. Supra note 1.
549. Supra note 1.
550. As the court succinctly notes: "Yet, as hereinafter demonstrated, by
the clear weight of authority today, even in jurisdictions having the Uniform
Sales Act, with respect to food and/or some other categories of goods, such a
warranty runs to others than the immediate buyer as narrowly defined in the
Act. (§ 202-75 supra)." Chapman v. Brown, supra note 536 at 102.
In this connection, it is important to note that Pennsylvania (which adopted
the Uniform Commercial Code ten years ago) now permits breach of warranty
actions by subpurchasers "in the distributive chain," Hochgertel v. Canada Dry
Corp., supra note 3, nor is this limited to foodstuffs, but appears to have been
extended to other products as well. The case is stated in text, supra footnotes
80a to 80k inclusive.
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Judge Tavares, speaking for the court, found that a number of
expedients have been adopted to circumvent the privity requirement
and signalized three in particular: First, the theory of the third
party beneficiary; second, various agency concepts; and third, other
fictions tending to establish a relationship between the vendor or
manufacturer and the consumer. These fictions and exceptions make
it quite clear that the statute, in its interpretation, at least, is any-
thing but uniform. The court pointed out that in spite of Winterbottom
v. Wright 5 5 1 and its obiter dicta, there was no reference to privity
in the Uniform Sales Act. Also, since the privity requirement led to
harsh results, it was discarded in negligence cases to such an extent
that today, it is virtually extinct. And in warranty situations, where
not expressly rejected, so many deviations and exceptions have been
invented that they may be deemed to have swallowed up the require-
ment.
An analysis of the American authorities on privity led the court to
find that of the jurisdictions that have had occasion to consider the
privity requirement, a substantial majority have rejected it where
public policy is best served by so doing. 5 5 2 Even in England, where
551. Supra note 208.
552. In a table appended to the court's opinion the status of privity of
warranty in the various jurisdictions of the United States is shown; referring to
this, Judge Tavares remarked:
"The clear majority of jurisdictions today have rejected the requirement of
privity in implied warranty cases of this nature, either in whole or in part. As
proof of this statement there is attached to this decision, as Appendix I, a table
covering an exhaustive study of the American authorities on privity, with the
following results:
Number of American jurisdictions holding privity
necessary in all cases .......................................... 15
Number of American jurisdictions holding privity
not necessary in any case .................................... 4
Number of American jurisdictions holding privity
not necessary in food cases .................................... 17
Total 21
Add:
Washington, which holds privity not necessary in
food cases, and where product is inherently
dangerous .................................................................. 1
Totals .......................................................... 22 v. 15
In light of some of the more recent decisions and statutes, the listing of only
four jurisdictions in the column marked "Privity not necessary in any case" may
require modification. In addition to Florida, Georgia, Michigan and New Jersey,
it may be necessary to add Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota and Virginia.
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this entire train of events began, privity has been obliterated where
negligence is present. 55 3
As inroads have been made on the privity requirement, not only
in food cases but various others, 5 5 4 the court cannot find any satis-
factory reason for stifling the advances being made at any given
point, especially as "the doctrine of privity started as a common law
theory hatched up in the minds of the judges who wrote the Winter-
bottom decision."s5 5 5 The court then undertakes a careful survey of
the development of common law in Hawaii; numerous precedents are
discussed, all pointing to the fact that judicial law-making continues
where this is in keeping with the best interests of the body politic.
Law must adapt itself to conditions "as interpreted in the light of
modern experience, reason and the furtherance of justice."' 5 5 6 With
this in mind, the court held that were the question to be presented to
the high court of Hawaii, privity would not be considered essential to
the plaintiff's right of action. Thus, by sound judicial construc-
tion 5 5 7 does Hawaii, which but recently achieved statehood, take its
place among the more enlightened jurisdictions which prefer to pro-
tect the consumer rather than indulge in legal subleties or technical
niceties. 55 8
553. This is demonstrated by the following cases: M'Alister v. Stevenson
[1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (also known as the Donoghue case); Grant v. Australian
Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85 (Privy Council); Lockett v. A.M. Charles,
Ltd. [1938] 4 All Eng. Rep. 170, 55 T.L.R. 22, noted 17 CANADIAN B. REV. 202; 6
U. of CHI. L. REv. 514.
554. As, for example, in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply,
Inc., supra note 1.
555. Chapman v. Brown, supra note 531 at 104.
556. Kamau & Cushnie v. Hawaii County, 41 Hawaii 527, at 552 (1957).
557. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 602. Interpretation and Construction Dis-
tinguished (3d ed. Jaeger 1961).
558. In its interpretation or construction of the Uniform Sales Act, the
court, relying on Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799
(1939), follows this decision:
"Going back, now, to the Hawaii Uniform Sales Act, it would appear to be
obvious that the only way to reconcile with that Act decisions extending to a
consumer who is not strictly the buyer of the product a remedy against the seller
based upon implied warranty, as in this case, is to hold as was done by the
California court in the Klein case, that it was not the intent of the legislature.
at least with respect to the particular products there concerned, which happened
to be food stuffs, that the implied warranty provision should be exclusive, and
thereby exclude consumers other than the immediate buyer. This conclusion was
reached on substantially the same ground hereinabove stated, namely, that at
least as to food stuffs, most courts conceded that the consumer who was not
strictly the immediate buyer did have a cause of action in implied warranty
against the seller, notwithstanding the absence of privity. In so doing, it Is be-
lieved, the California court put its finger upon the exact ground upon which such
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It seems appropriate to mention Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills,
Ltd.5 5 9 before leaving the subject of wearing apparel. Plaintiff had
purchased woolen underwear manufactured by defendant and after
wearing it, he suffered from a severe case of dermatitis. The Supreme
Court of South Australia found that bisulphite of soda in the under-
garments caused this skin ailment and gave judgment for plaintiff in
the breach of warranty action. On appeal, the court cited Donoghue's
Case,5 60 and affirmed even though there was no privity between
plaintiff and defendant manufacturer. This case has been taken to
sound the death-knell of the Winterbottom-dictated privity require-
ment, at least in so far as negligence actions are concerned. 5 6 1
decisions eliminating or modifying the strict privity rule can be justified in the
face of the Uniform Sales Act.
"That such a construction of apparently all-inclusive language in a statute
having no express exceptions, is legitimate if the legislative intent (which is
believed simply to mean the public policy of the state otherwise manifested) is
sufficiently clear, is established by such decisions as the Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 1892, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 516, 36 L.Ed. 226, in
which, after considering the broad general language of the Immigration Act there
construed (prohibiting, without express exception, immigration of aliens under
service or labor contracts) and holding that the law did not prohibit immigra-
tion of ministers of religion under service contracts, the court said:
'It is the duty of the courts, under those circumstances, to say that, how-
ever broad the language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter,
is not within the intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the
statute." Italics supplied by the court in Chapman v. Brown, supra note 531.
For an intermediate position which appears to cover other products as well
as foods, see Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, where the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania declines to consider the privity requirement as "obliterated"
from Pennsylvania law as was stated in Mannsz v. Macwhyte, supra note 1,
but concludes that (although there is nothing specific in the statutes or the
cases which seems to require this conclusion) if the plaintiff in a breach of
warranty case is a purchaser or subpurchaser within the distributive chain, he
may have a right of action. Nevertheless, in spite of this holding, the Supreme
Court professes not "to legislate or by interpretation to add to legislation, mat-
ters which the legislature saw fit not to include [in the latest legislation, to wit,
the Uniform Commercial Code, specifically § 2-318, and Comment 2 and 3 thereto,
which the court quotes in extenso] .... " The rationale of Chapman v. Brown,
supra, seems preferable.
559. Supra note 553.
560. Supra note 553, involving the presence of a snail in ginger-beer.
561. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., supra note 559, cited in Barrett
v. S. S. Kresge Co., supra note 528, where the court, referring to Grant, supra
said that It "flatly sustains this view in a case almost exactly similar as to facts,
in which the express decision of the Privy Council is that the retailer was liable
in contract, and that there was an implied warranty justifiable under both ex-
ceptions 1 and 2 to section 14 of the British and Australian Sales Acts (equivalent
to the first and second exceptions under section 15 of the Pennsylvania Sales Act
of May 19, 1915, P.L. 543). The reasoning in that case is exhaustive and, we think,
conclusive."
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F. Automotive Vehicles, Aircraft and Their Accessories
Automobile and Trucks. Two recent and Outstanding decisions in
the field of automotive sales in Pennsylvania wherein a maximum
degree of protection was afforded the injured parties where the
automotive vehicle was found to have been defectively manufac-
tured present the question: Would they still be followed today, in
light of the decision in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corporation?5 6 1a
Specifically, Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.5 6 2 and Thompson v.
Reedman5 6 3 present a certain divergence of theory which cannot
be reconciled when the criterion laid down by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania is applied. The Jarnot case conforms to the standard
since the plaintiff was a purchaser or subpurchaser within the dis-
tributive chain. But in Thompson, the plaintiff was a passenger and
therefore in relatively the same situation as the bartender in Hoch-
gertel who was denied recovery for breach of warranty. 564 While
there may have been some doubts as to the interpretation to be given
Loch v. Confair,56 5 these appear to have been definitively settled by
the high court of Pennsylvania in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Cor-
poration, supra, which adhered to the requirement stated in Loch,
supra, that there had to be a sale and that the right of action would
be limited to the purchaser or subpurchaser in the distributive chain.
As these cases have been previously discussed,56 6 this brief reference
to the distinction now made in Pennsylvania may serve to intro-
duce instances of litigation involving automotive vehicles, aircraft
and accessories which have arisen in other jurisdictions.
Declared to be one of the earliest cases on record, Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co.5 6 7 led the way to the realization that a motor car manu-
facturer should be made to stand behind his product and be answer-
able for defects in its construction which resulted in injuries to
occupants. This seems quite astonishing when at the time, privity
of warranty was still very much the vogue and was still considered
essential with the possible exception of the food cases, and even here,
561a. Supra note 3; the case is stated in text, supra notes 8Oa to 80k in-
clusive.
562. 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
563. Supra note 1.
564. As to the similarity between Thompson and Hochgertel, neither plain-
tiff was a purchaser or subpurchaser "in the distributive chain."
565. 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
566. Supra notes 3 and 4; and see generally, Section II, Development of
Pennsylvania Law, supra.
567. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
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one of the leading cases, Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 5 68 was not
decided until several years later.
For the next quarter of a century, there were other cases dealing
with automotive products which indicated a gradual extension of
the exception which began with foodstuffs. These culminated in a
series of cases which courageously rejected the privity requirement
and quite simply declared that neither privity nor disclaimer would
be permitted to stand in the way of recovery by one who had been
injured by the defective manufacture of the automotive product in
question.56 9 Among them is an outstandingly happy trilogy which
encompasses the South, the West, and the Atlantic seaboard. 5 70
General Motors Corp. v. Dodson5 7 1 was decided by an intermediate
appellate court in Tennessee. Defective brakes on an Oldsmobile
purchased from an authorized dealer of the General Motors Corpora-
tion by the husband of the injured driver led to a serious accident.
Husband and wife brought suit and recovered judgment in the trial
court; General Motors appealed. The court affirmed on the theory
that the jury might well have found that the appellant was the actual
person or entity with whom the plaintiffs were dealing, the authorized
dealer being merely a conduit or channel for the distribution of its
products, and a means whereby General Motors sought to insulate
itself from liability to purchasers. Thus, both express and implied
warranties had been made to the plaintiffs by General Motors. This,
the court declared, was based on section 15 of the Uniform Sales
Act.572 When the defendant attempted to show that the Supreme
Court of Tennessee had held that privity was essential almost fifty
years before, 5 7 3 the Court of Appeals found that this early precedent
had been expressly overruled by the court in Dunn v. Ralston Purina
Co.5 7 4 At the same time, the court suggested that it can "hardly
be said that such a general rule [referring to the nonliability of a
568. Supra note 1.
569. The leading case is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note
1, where the court emphatically declared that neither privity nor disclaimer would
be a bar to recovery by one who was using an automobile with the permission
of the owner or was a passenger therein. This clearly extends the coverage
afforded by the Uniform Commercial Code which became effective in New Jer-
sey on the first of this year, supra note 196.
570. Dodson (Tenn.), State Farm Mutual (Iowa) and Henningsen (N.J.),
supra note 1.
571. 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960).
572. Text at note 171, supra.
573. In Burkett v. Studebaker Brothers Mfg., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421
(1912).
574. 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (1954).
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manufacturer to third parties] any longer exists.... the exceptions
have swallowed up the rule." 5 7 5
Following Horace Greeley's admonition, the next stop is Iowa,
where the purchaser of a new Mercury received a severe jolt when
he suddenly saw a sheet of flame burst from under the hood. With
rare presence of mind, the driver pulled the car to the side of the
road, and made a hasty exit. Flames were shooting up to a height
of ten feet from around the hood, and soon the car was a holocaust.
The Ford Motor Company disclaimed any liability under its "war-
ranty," and also alleged as a further defense lack of privity. The
Supreme Court of Iowa, undaunted, speaking through Mr. Justice
Snell in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber,
Inc.,5 7 6 declared that the facts in the case resembled those in the
Dodson5 7 7 and Henningsen cases and that the opinions therein rep-
resented the most advanced thinking as to new car warranties,
whether express or implied. Following these decisions, the court held
for the plaintiff, in spite of lack of privity.
But the piece de resistance for any lawyer trying an automotive
products case is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.5 78 Here he
will find the culmination in judicial rejection of the unfortunate
Winterbottom dictum. Claus Henningsen bought a new Plymouth
automobile from the defendant, Bloomfield Motors, Inc., and pre-
sented it to his wife as a Mother's Day gift. When the speedometer
reading on the Plymouth showed only 486 miles, and while Mrs.
Henningsen was driving her new car home from Asbury Park, New
Jersey, its steering mechanism suddenly failed, and the Plymouth
rammed a solid wall with disastrous results. Mrs. Henningsen was
badly injured, and the automobile was declared a total loss by the
insurance carrier after its representatives had inspected the wreck.
When both the vendor and manufacturer refused to be answerable
for the damages incurred, the Henningsens joined both Bloomfield
and Chrysler in an action based on breach of warranty. The latter
defended: (1) on the ground of lack of privity as to the wife who
was not a party to the sales contract; and (2) on the additional
ground, as to both parties plaintiff, of an express disclaimer of lia-
bility by the manufacturer for anything except "making good at its
factory any part or parts thereof [the automobile] . . . ; within
ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original pur-
chaser or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever
event shall first occur."
575. Id. at 233, 277 S.W.2d at 481.
576. 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961).
577. Supra note 571.
578. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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Referring to this disclaimer or exculpatory provision, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, with ample justification, observed:
The terms of the warranty are a sad commentary upon the
automobile manufacturers' marketing practices. Warranties
developed in the law in the interest of and to protect the
ordinary consumer who cannot be expected to have the
knowledge or capacity or even the opportunity to make
adequate inspection of mechanical instrumentalities, like
automobiles and to decide for himself whether they are
reasonably fit for the designed purpose .... But the inge-
nuity of the Automobile Manufacturers Association, by
means of its standardized form, has metamorphosed the
warranty into a device to limit the maker's liability. To
call it an equivocal agreement, as the Minnesota Supreme
Court did, is the least that can be said in criticism of it. 5 7 9
After reviewing numerous precedents, 58 0 the court delivered an
elaborate opinion and speaking through Mr. Justice Francis analyzed
the trend of the law and of the current decisions and discussed war-
ranties of merchantability and of fitness for the particular purpose
for which the product is acquired. It was stated that the first type
of warranty is an integral part of the transaction and simply means
that the article sold is reasonably fit for the general purpose for
which it is produced. The court emphasizes the fact that the dis-
tinction between warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a
particular purpose are in many instances "practically meaningless."
Thus, where the buyer notifies the automobile dealer that he wants
a car suitable for the purpose of business and pleasure driving on
streets and highways, and the dealer sells him an automobile selected
by the latter, a warranty of fitness for that particular purpose would
seem to arise. Yet, at the same time, a warranty of mechantability
would assure the purchaser that the automobile was reasonably fit
for the general purpose of being driven on streets and highways. Both
warranties would comprehend an assurance that the automobile in
question would be reasonably safe for driving. Nor would the sale
of an article by its trade name, such as an automobile being desig-
nated as a "Plymouth, Plaza 6, Club Sedan," negate the warranty
of merchantability. The court cites a well known Pennsylvania deci-
sion5 8 1 to the effect that even where a sale is made under a trade
579. Citing Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp. v. Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, at 9,
250 N.W. 713, at 715 (1933).
580. Including Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 293 P.2d
(1956); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, supra note 337; Mead v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., supra note 368; Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959).
581. Frantz Equipment Co. v. Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa. 459, 88 A.2d 702 (1952).
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name there is implied an obligation on the part of the vendor that
the article delivered will be of the same quality, material, workman-
ship and availabiltiy for use as articles generally sold under that
name. So, it would be quite unreasonable to suggest that merely
because an automobile was purchased under the trade name of
"Chrysler," "Ford," "Oldsmobile," or "Pontiac," no implied warranty
of merchantable quality accompanied the sale, when in reality the
automobile had a serious defect which prevented it from being driven
and made it therefore, quite useless for the general purposes for
which an automobile is designed and intended to serve. Actually, the
sale of an article by a trade name does not negate the existence of a
warranty of merchantability. 5 8 2
After a comprehensive discussion of the impact of the Uniform
Sales Act 58 3 on the common law, the court indicated that the uni-
form statute had "codified, extended and liberalized" the common
law of sales and that its purpose, at least in part, was to ameliorate
the harsh rule of caveat emptor and to substitute, by way of recip-
rocal obligation in part, caveat venditor. The true significance of
the legislation is that certain implied warranties were imposed by
operation of law and did not depend for their existence upon the
express agreement of buyer and seller. Of tremendous significance
in a rapidly expanding commercial society is "the recognition of the
right to recover damages on account of personal injuries arising from
breach of warranty." 58 4
Overruling or disapproving its earlier decisions, 58 5 which had
held that privity of warranty was essential whether the warranty
was express or implied, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was antici-
pating the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code which became
582. Citing "Adams v. Peter Tramontin Motor Sales, 42 N.J. Super. (App.
Div. 1956); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, supra [note 580]; Frigidinners,
Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954); 2 HARPER
& JAMES, LAW OF TORTS, § 28.20, p. 1082."
583. N.J. REv. STAT. 46:30-20-21(1).
584. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 578.
585. Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L. 748, 70 Atl. 314 (1908); Cassini
v. Curtiss Candy Co., 113 N.J.L. 91, 172 Atl. 519 (Sup. Ct. 1934). See also Schlosser
v. Goldberg, 123 N.J.L. 470, 9 A.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1939); General Home Improve-
ment Co. v. American Ladder Co., Inc., 26 N.J. Misc. 24, 56 A.2d 116 (Essex Co.
Cir. Ct. 1947); Cornelius v. B. Filippone & Co., Inc., 119 N.J.L. 540, 197 AtI. 647
(Sup. Ct. 1938). All of these appear to have been disapproved, if not overruled
at least by implication.
The Supreme Court of a sister jurisdiction (Pennsylvania )was afforded a
splendid opportunity to follow suit and sound taps for the interment of a
perniciously persisting inhibition adversely affecting adequate consumer pro-
tection in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3. Declining to do so, the
Court suggested that this was a legislative, not a judicial matter.
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effective in that State on January first of this year. The court
then formulated a general principle for the future guidance of the
lower courts:
It is important to express the right of Mrs. Henningsen
to maintain her action in terms of a general principle. To
what extent may lack of privity be disregarded in suits on
such warranties? In that regard the Faber Iv. Creswick]
case 58 6 ... points the way. By a parity of reasoning, it is
our opinion that an implied warranty of merchantability
chargeable to either an automobile manufacturer or a dealer
extends to the purchaser of the car, members of his family,
and to other persons occupying or using it with his consent.
It would be wholly opposed to reality to say that use by such
persons is not within the anticipation of parties to such a
warranty of reasonable suitability of an automobile for
ordinary highway operation. Those persons must be con-
sidered within the distributive chain. 5 8 7
The court then considered the effect of the express disclaimer pro-
vision in the standard automotive warranty, commenting on its
standardized form and its imposition upon the automobile purchaser.
In every sense, it is a contract of adhesion, a take-it-or-leave-it offer
as to which the individual buyer has no bargaining power. 58 8 The
court pointed out that this so-called form "warranty" was used by
all of the big automotive manufacturers. After an analysis of numer-
ous cases, the court concludes that it would be contrary to public
policy (since "an automobile is almost as much a servant of con-
venience for the ordinary person as a household utensil,") to enforce
such a disclaimer and that a refusal to do so does not improperly
interfere with freedom of contract. Thereupon, the court affirmed the
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
Thus it is demonstrated that what judges have made, whether by
way of dictum or otherwise, can be unmade by the courts, even after
586. Supra note 580.
587. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 578 at 414-15, 161
A.2d at 100. It is important to note that the court does not confine the right of
action in the absence of privity to the members of the purchaser's family, but
extends it "to other persons occupying or using it [the automobile] with his con-
sent." This goes beyond the scope of § 2-318 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
Following Henningsen is Pabon v. Hackeffack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super.
476, 164 A.2d 773 (App. Div. 1960). Cf. Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358
Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
588. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 626, 643 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961); Comment,
Effect of Disclaimer Clause on Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 7 So. D. L.
REV. 133 (1962).
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a century of error. Undoubtedly, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.5 9 represents the most definitive holding by the highest court of
a state that although privity of warranty is lacking an action for
breach may nevertheless be maintained. This makes Henningsen the
most significant decision since MacPherson,5 9 0 decided more than
a half-century ago.
In sharp contrast to the carefully reasoned and progressive cases
just discussed is Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc.,5 9 1 decided by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia last year. After a new
Ford pickup truck had been purchased from a local dealer under the
customary sales warranty "of 90 days or 4,000 miles,"' 5 9 2 a wheel
came off causing the total wreck of the truck. In an action for breach
of warranty, the Court reviewed the more recent cases, including
Henningsen,5 9 3 Dodson,5 9 4 and Anderson-Weber,5 9 5 but declined to
follow these and then concluded that where there was an express
warranty any implied warranty inconsistent therewith would be ex-
cluded.5 9 6 However, the various statements regarding privity and
breach of warranty must be considered obiter dicta since the court
concluded "that the plaintiff did not sufficiently bear the burden of
proof in the case as tried by showing that a defect existed prior to the
accident and became the cause thereof, which is necessary before
recovery would be allowed, even in the cases based on public
policy." 5 9 7 However, since the doctrine of privity was a judge-made
invention resulting from the obiter dicta in Winterbottom v.
589. Supra note 578.
590. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
591. 124 S.E.2d 622 (W.Va. 1962).
592. The following is the typical language of such a warranty: "The Manu-
facturer warrants each new motor vehicle, including all equipment or accessories
(except tires) supplied by the Manufacturer, chassis or part manufactured by it to
be free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service,
its obligation under this Warranty being limited to making good at its factory
any part or parts thereof which shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of
such vehicle to the original purchaser or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000
miles . .
593. Supra note 578.
594 Supra note 571.
595. Supra note 576.
596. Citing Hill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 W.Va. 554, 4 S.E.2d 793
(1939).
597. Here the court points out that the Uniform Sales Act was in force in
the three jurisdictions, Iowa, New Jersey, and Tennessee wherein the three cases
which it cites and discusses arose, namely, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Anderson-Weber, supra note 576; Henningsen, supra note 578; Dodson,
supra note 571.
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Wright 5 98 it is difficult to understand why this error should be con-
secrated by further judge-made law. 5 9 8a In any event, the court or-
dered a new trial.
Aircraft. When the pilot of a private airplane was killed, allegedly
because of failure of the aircraft and its consequent crash, the fed-
eral court was called upon to apply Pennsylvania law, Prashker v.
Beech Aircraft Corp.;5 9 9 the executrix brought the action. It was
stated in the complaint that there had been a breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability; negligence was also claimed. The trial
court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant vendor and man-
ufacturer from which this appeal was taken. After reviewing the
facts, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence was insuffi-
cient to go to the jury nor was it sufficient to demonstrate any breach
of either an express or implied warranty by the manufacturer. There-
fore, it was unnecessary to decide whether privity between the man-
ufacturer and the plaintiffs was essential for maintenance of this
action according to Kansas law which was stipulated as governing
the transaction. It would appear, however, from the analysis of
Kansas decisions heretofore made that privity would not be re-
quired. 6 0 0
As to the action against the immediate vendor, the court concluded
that "the damage complained of must stem from the breach of war-
ranty and not from some other cause."16 0 1 Since it could be estab-
lished that the pilot had been negligent, and that negligence had not
been shown on the part of the manufacturer, there could be no re-
covery.
The result in Goldberg v. American Airlines, Inc.,6 0 2 also an action
for wrongful death, was similar. Although the airplane had been sold
598. Supra note 208.
598a. Nevertheless, incomprehensible as it may be, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania refused to correct this judge-made error in Hochgertel v. Canada
Dry Corp., supra note 3, and persisted in requiring privity in breach of warranty
actions, but signalized an exception in favor of those who are purchasers or
subpurchasers "in the distributive chain." The Court did not limit the type of
product which might give rise to such an action.
599. 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958).
600. As the action was brought in the United States District for the District
of Delaware, the conflict of laws rule of the latter state was held to govern since
the contract of sale of the airplane was entered into there between the manu-
facturer and the vendor, although they stipulated that Kansas law would govern.
Cf. Nichols v. Nold, supra note 1; Graham v. Bottenfleld's, Inc., supra note 499;
Patterson v. George H. Weyer, Inc., supra note 499.
601. Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., supra note 599 at 607.
602. 199 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1960); cf. Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955), where it was said: "The assault
upon this 'citadel of privity,' Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,
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in California, the court held that since the accident occurred in New
York, the law of the latter would govern: "And where recovery is
sought on the theory of breach of warranty the governing law is that
of the jurisdiction in which the accident rather than the sale took
place."'0 0 3 This holding seems rather peculiar in light of the deci-
sions which are to the contrary and fix the obligations of the parties
according to the law of the jurisdiction where the sale was made. 60 4
In any event, the court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the
case. The validity of this holding may be questioned since the deci-
sion in Greenberg v. Lorenz6 0 5 and perchance, Randy Knitwear, Inc.
v. American Cyanamid Co.,6 0 6 although the latter was held to involve
an express warranty.
In Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp.,6 0 7 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York had occasion to apply
its version of California law in a case where a passenger lost his life
when his airliner crashed. The widow and the surviving children of
the deceased brought this action. Relying on the California appellate
court's decision in Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 6 0 8 the court ob-
served: "Under California law, privity has been held to be not essen-
tial to recovery for breach of warranty of contract." 09 In the Peter-
son case, discussed below, 6 1 0 an action for breach of warranty, the
court had held that privity was not a prerequisite for maintenance
of the action and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Ironically enough,
when defendant appealed, the Supreme Court of California held that
privity was present between the manufacturer of the grinding wheel
which injured the plaintiff, and the latter, who was an employee of the
180, 174 N.E. 441, 445, 74 A.L.R. 1139, began even before MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. [supra note 218]. Manufacturers of dangerous articles were held liable
to subvendees having no privity of contract with them for defects therein causing
personal injuries, Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852); Devlin v. Smith, 89
N.Y. 470 (1882); Torgesen v. Schultz, 192 N.Y. 156, 84 N.E. 956, 18 L.R.A.,N.S.,
726 (1908); Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909)
. at 287.
603. Citing Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948).
604. As, for example, in Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670
(1959); cf. Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962),
citing Beck v. Spindler, supra. See also B. F. Goodrich v. Hammond, infra note
649, and especially Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 108 N.W.2d 149 (Wis.
1961), lack of privity no defense.
605. Supra note 1.
606. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
607. 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
608. 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. App. 1959); this opinion was subsequently vacated,
see 54 Cal.2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960).
609. Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., supra note 607 at 33.
610. Text at note 660, infra.
[Vol. 1 : p. I
PRIVITY OF WARRANTY
purchaser. 6 1 1 It seems apparent that with this extension of the
concept of privity, courts could go far in holding increasingly large
categories of persons entitled to recover in breach of warranty ac-
tions. In addition to its reliance on the appellate court's opinion in
Peterson v. Lamb,6 1 2 the federal court in Hinton, citing Klein v.
Duchess Sandwich Co.,6 1 3 also made extensive use of the celebrated
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Fresno61 4 where he suggested that the privity re-
quirement should be discarded and that absolute liability be imposed
on the manufacturer of a defective product. The court refers to a
number of other cases wherein privity was discussed as, for example,
Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.6 ' 5 where the court urges
that "the privity 'bugaboo', historically unsound, should be perma-
nently discarded." 61 6 After a further extensive quotation from the
same case, the federal court denied defendant corporation's motions
to dismiss holding that a cause of action for breach of implied war-
ranty had been stated within the provisions of the California Wrong-
ful Death Statute.6 ' 7 The Hinton case was followed in Middleton v.
United Aircraft Corp.6 1 8 about a year later.
Applying Michigan law in a diversity of citizenship case, the same
federal court denied the manufacturer's motion to dismiss a complaint
based on breach of warranty of fitness of an aircraft in Conlon v.
Republic Aviation Corp.6 1 9 Relying on Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc.,6 20
and citing Goldberg v. American Airlines, Inc., 6 2 1 the court stated
that since the accident had occurred in Michigan, "the New York
Conflict of Laws Rule requires that the substantive law of the State
of Michigan be applied." 6 2 2 The court found the Michigan law
applicable to this situation to have been formulated by the Supreme
Court of that state in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
611. Peterson v. Lamb, 54 Cal.2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960),
which vacated the appellate court judgment, supra note 608.
612. Supra note 608.
613. Supra note 607.
614. 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
615. Supra note 1.
616. Id. at 63, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
617. CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 377 (1872); amended Stats.
1935, c. 108, p. 460, § 1; Stats. 1949, c. 1380, p. 2401, § 4.
618. 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D. N.Y. 1960), applying Death on the High Seas
Act, Title 46, U.S.C. §§ 761 et seq. And see Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 204
F. Supp 861 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
619. 204 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
620. Supra note 603.
621. Supra note 602.
622. Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp., supra note 619 at 866.
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Supply, Inc. 623 from which it quotes extensive excerpts and con-
cludes: "The present law of Michigan appears to require no priv-
ity."624 The court also notes "the tendency of the courts to whittle
away at the 'privity' requirement either by expanding the concept
of privity to bring more people within its terms, or by overruling
the doctrine in certain specific areas." 6 25
In a rather unusual case, Krause v. Republic Aviation Corp.,6 2 6 a
libel was filed by the administrator of the decedent's estate when the
helicopter in which decedent was flying crashed into the Gulf of
623. Supra note 1.
624. Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp., supra note 619 at 867, where the
court added: "It must be noted that the question here involved is not the nature
of liability; that is the province of the trial court. The sole question is whether
the plaintiff is precluded from attempting to assert a claim against the manu-
facturer because of the absence of a direct contractual relationship or privity
with such a defendant .... It may be argued that the determination that privity
is not required is a drastic innovation. The progressive decline of the older rule,
based as it was on an infirm and fallacious foundation, is clearly evident., The
fact that a manufacturer of an aircraft whose plant is located in Connecticut, for
instance, may become involved because of a disaster happening in Michigan or
in Texas, may have unfortunate aspects, but that is not determinative of the
question at issue. This happens in respect to other obligations. The fact that
modern life and developments, such as transportation, have taken on complex re-
lationships is no anomaly. With such relationships go correspondingly complex
responsibilities. If life is complex, so are the laws of human relationships, which
are the results thereof."
625. Quoting 35 N.Y.U. L.REv. 319, 324 (1960), and summarizing: "The
argument against the requisite of privity may be summarized as follows:
1. The decisional approach which requires privity in breach of implied
warranty actions is based upon fallacious reasoning.
2. While some courts have followed the earlier cases requiring privity, the
fallacy of this approach has become apparent in many jurisdictions and the
privity doctrine has been discarded in numerous cases involving food.
3. The requirement of privity in negligence causes of action has been dis-
carded, particularly in cases where the product involved is 'a thing of danger.'
4. The same considerations which have prompted the demise of the privity
requisite in negligence actions and in implied warranty actions involving food
are present in this breach of warranty action involving an aircraft. The nature
of this product is one which may well place life and limb in danger if it is de-
fective.
5. There has been no logical or realistic reason advanced why privity should
be retained in a breach of implied warranty case. The Spence case, supra [note
1], and the other cases cited herein indicate that the definite and persuasive trend
is toward the abrogation of this anachronism." Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp.,
supra note 619 at 868.
It would appear that Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3 would
support the observation quoted in text since the concept of privity has been ex-
panded by extending it to purchasers or subpurchasers "in the distributive chain."
626. 196 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. N.Y. 1961).
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Mexico. The French manufacturer and the employer were joined,
and it was alleged that there had been a breach of war-
ranty for which the manufacturer and the employer were liable as
joint venturers. 6 2 7 The court overruled the exceptions and objections
filed by the manufacturer on the theory that if the joint venture
could be proved, the manufacturer might be liable even if privity
were found essential. It also held that admiralty jurisdiction extended
to this case since the accident happened on the high seas; however,
where the accident occurred within the navigable waters of a state, as
when an airliner crashed in Boston Harbor, the federal court held that
the contract pursuant to which the airline agreed to provide safe and
airworthy transportation had no maritime aspects. Therefore, there
was no admiralty jurisdiction as to an alleged breach of the contract
of transportation, Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.6 2 8
Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,62 9 decided last year, also in-
volved the death of an airline passenger. An "Electra" of the North-
west Airlines crashed in Indiana and a number of passengers includ-
ing the decedent were killed. Was privity essential to maintaining an
action against the manufacturer of the aircraft? The court answered
this question in the negative by declaring that the "Electra" in
question was sold to defendant airline for the express purpose of
transporting passengers. Consequently, any warranty, express or
implied, as to fitness for commercial travel "would inure to the
benefit of those who were expected to be carried on the plane,' 63 0
alluding to Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp.6 31 and cases cited
therein.
The federal court found that Minnesota law would govern since
the contract made between Lockheed, the manufacturer, and the
airline would subject the former to the provisions of a statute which
governed foreign corporations doing business in Minnesota. 6 3 2 The
627. Article VII of the libel alleges: "Upon information and belief, that at
the times hereinafter mentioned, respondents * * * were and still are engaged in
a joint venture in the business, among other things, of designing, manufacturing,
altering, testing, inspecting, repairing, assembling and selling * * * helicopters
* * * and pursuant to the said joint venture employed various agents and em-
ployees and representatives." As to joint ventures generally, see Jaeger, Joint
Ventures, 9 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 111 (1960); Jaeger, Partnership or Joint Venture?,
37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138 (1961); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 317-18 (3d ed. Jaeger
1959).
628. 203 F.Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
629. 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962); see also Great Lakes Airlines, Inc.,
v. Smith, 14 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Cal. App. 1961); Boy v. Riddle Airlines, Inc., 124
S.E.2d 118 (N.C. 1962); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1
Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), should be disapproved.
630. Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., supra note 629 at 219.
631. Supra note 607.
632. Section 303.13, M.S.A., quoted by the court.
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court reviewed various circumstances which subjected Lockheed to
its jurisdiction and found that these would "not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ",633 In this connection
the court relies on Beck v. Spindler,63 4 wherein the Supreme Court
of Minnesota states the law of that jurisdiction.
Automotive Accessories. In the last mentioned case, 6 3 5 Beck
bought a house trailer from the defendant. It was found unsatis-
factory for use as a residence during cold weather since water col-
lected in large quantities in the ceiling and walls causing the interior
to warp. The court found that it was "unfit for use in a climate such
as exists in Hibbing, [Minnesota] ." 636 When this action was brought
against the immediate vendor and the manufacturer, the latter argued
lack of privity and stated that the court did not have jurisdiction
since it was a foreign corporation. The court rejected both defenses
and noted a continuing trend "towards greater liberality in permit-
ting state courts to take jurisdiction in this type of case," citing
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 6 37
Having disposed of the jurisdictional question, the court stated the
next issue:
We come then to the troublesome question of whether
plaintiffs, under the facts of this case, may recover for a
breach of implied warranty of fitness against the manu-
facturer, Ventoura, or if they are limited to a recovery
against the dealer, Spindler. In other words, the question
is whether a subvendee may recover against the manufac-
633. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
the court states that it is not unmindful of the caveat mentioned in Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) that the trend of expanding personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents must nevertheless have certain minimal contacts in order not
to offend these traditional notions of fair play and justice, Ewing v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., supra note 629 at 220.
634. 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959). Cf. Farmers State Bank v. Cook,
251 Iowa 942, 103 N.W.2d 704 (1960), involving the sale of a trailer, where the
court noted that "Undiscovered hidden defects do not deprive the buyer of the
benefit of an established warranty. Risser v. Cox, 187 Iowa 990, 174 N.W. 701
(1919).
"In this connection it must be pointed out that the tendency of all modern
cases on warranty is to enlarge the responsibility of the seller and restrict the
application of the maxim of 'caveat emptor.' 46 AM. JUR., SALES, § 339, p. 522 ...
And see Nyquist v. Foster, 44 Wash.2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954), masonite walls of
trailer became warped and buckled; rescission allowed.
635. Ibid.
636. Beck v. Spindler, supra note 634 at 673.
637. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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turer of a chattel, the purchase having been made from an
intermediate dealer. 638
The manufacturer contended that the plaintiffs could not recover
because of the absence of privity of contract. This argument did
not appeal to the court which, after quoting the provisions of the
Uniform Sales Act as adopted in Minnesota, 6 39 concluded that it
would be well to follow an outstanding precedent, Bekkevold v.
Potts: 6 4 o
An implied warranty is not one of the contractual ele-
ments of an agreement. It is not one of the essential elements
to be stated in the contract nor does its application or effec-
tive existence rest or depend upon the affirmative intention
of the parties. It is a child of the law .... Because of the
acts of the parties, it is imposed by the law. It arises inde-
pendently and outside of the contract. The law annexes it
to the contract. It writes it, by implication, into the con-
tract which the parties have made. Its origin and use are
to promote high standards in business and to discourage
sharp dealings. It rests upon the principle that 'honesty is
the best policy,' and it contemplates business transactions in
which both parties may profit .... The doctrine of implied
warranty should be extended rather than restricted. 64 1
Finding that the doctrine of implied warranty is favored and
should be liberally "construed," the court declares: "The rule is an
equitable one," following Iron Fireman Coal Stoker Co. v. Brown.6 4 2
Although much has been written on the subject of these implied
warranties and privity, it is, in the opinion of the court, a hopeless
task "to try to evolve therefrom any rational rule which would ap-
638. Beck v. Spindler, supra note 634 at 679-80.
639. M.S.A. § 512.15 reading: "Subject to the provisions of this chapter and
of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the
quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract
to sell or a sale, except as follows:
"(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower
or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose."
640. 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
641. Beck v. Spindler, supra note 634 at 680, quoting Bekkevold v. Potts,
supra note 640.
642. 182 Minn. 399, 234 N.W. 685 (1931).
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ply to this case." 6 4 3 After reviewing a number of Minnesota cases, 6 4 4
the impact of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 6 4 5 is considered,
and a growing tendency to permit recovery against the manufacturer
by a subvendee "even in the absence of privity where the theory of
recovery is negligence" recognized. "Originally," the court notes, "an
action for breach of warranty was a tort action." 6 4 6
It does seem difficult to understand why it is possible to recover
against the manufacturer on the basis of negligence where privity
is missing but not when the manufacturer has expressly or im-
pliedly represented that the product he is marketing is fit for the
use for which it is sold, especially where the obligations are crea-
tures of the law, not arising out of the actual agreement between
the parties. 6 4 7 Impressed by this rationale, the court affirmed judg-
ment for the plaintiffs, saying:
643. Beck v. Spindler, supra note 634 at 680, where the court mentions the
following writings: 33 CoL.. L.REv. 868 (1933); 18 CORNELL L.Q. 445 (1933); 42
HARV. L.REv. 414 (1929); 2 VANDERBILT L.REV. 675 (1949); 57 YALE L.J. 1389
(1948); 23 CALIF. L.REV. 621 (1935); 21 MINN. L.REV. 315 (1937); 1951 INSUR-
ANCE L.J. 797; 2 MO. L.REv. 73 (1937); 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 406 (1937); 37 COL.
L.REV. 77; 22 ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REV. 176 (1950); 5 VANDERBILT L.REv. 849
(1952); Annotations, 17 A.L.R. 709, 39 A.L.R. 1000, 63 A.L.R. 349, 88 A.L.R. 534.
For a list of articles dealing with products liability, privity and related sub-
jects, see supra note 64.
644. Including Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103
(1892); Heise v. J. R. Clark Co., 245 Minn. 179, 71 N.W.2d 818 (1955); Hartmon
v. National Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264, 60 N.W.2d 804 (1953); Lovejoy v. Minne-
apolis-Moline Power Imp. Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956); Hofstedt v.
International Harvester Co., 256 Minn. 453, 98 N.W.2d 808 (1959).
645. Supra note 218.
646. Beck v. Spindler, supra note 634 at 681, where the court continued:
"Historically, it probably was unfortunate that the implied obligation assumed
by the seller or manufacturer was ever referred to as a warranty. It could as
well have been referred to as an implied representation of fitness for the use for
which it was made or sold, in which event the action could have continued as a
tort action in the nature of one for deceit. It is difficult to justify a rule of law
which permits recovery against the manufacturer on the theory of negligence and
does not permit it on the theory that the manufacturer has represented that the
product he puts out is fit for the use for which it is sold, no matter by what
name that representation is denominated, where both obligations arise, not from
the agreement of the parties, but by an obligation imposed by law."
647. "Logically it seems difficult to find any intermediate ground between
basing the seller's liability either wholly on negligence or on an obligation imposed
by the law entirely irrespective of negligence-an obligation analogous to that
created by an express warranty. If a manufacturer is not liable for the use of de-
fective material, in the absence of negligence it is hard to see why any seller
should be liable for selling unmerchantable goods in the absence of negligence."
1 WILLISTON, SALES § 237 (3d ed. 1948) at 619, quoted by the court in Beck v.
Spindler, supra note 634 at 682.
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We think that the trial court correctly held that Ventoura
assumed contractual obligations to the purchaser and, hav-
ing done so, was a seller within the meaning of our Sales Act.
The implied warranty of fitness imposed by law, under the
liberal interpretation accorded such warranties by our de-
cision law, should be held to attach to all contractual obli-
gations arising out of the sales contract. We therefore hold
that, irrespective of whether privity of contract is essential
to a recovery by a subpurchaser against the manufacturer
of a chattel, the essential elements are present in the case
now before us. 6 4 8
In a leading case, B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond,6 4 9 the court
dealt with a fatal accident resulting from the "blowout" of a tubeless
tire. The manufacturer denied liability because of lack of privity.
However, applying Kansas law, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit rejected this defense. It appeared that Adrien
Hammond purchased four tires described as (to add a touch of maca-
bre-irony) Premium "Life-Saver" tubeless tires for the car in which
he and his wife were subsequently killed. In spite of the existence of
an express warranty, the court declared:
An implied warranty is not excluded by an express war-
ranty in a contract of sale, unless it is inconsistent therewith
and an express warranty limited to a particular person or
class of persons does not exclude an implied warranty to
another.
The question arises as to whether an implied warranty ran
to Berneice, privity between her and Goodrich being absent.
Under the law of Kansas an implied warranty is not con-
tractual. It is an obligation raised by the law as an inference
from the acts of the parties or the circumstances of the
transaction and it is created by operation of law and does
not arise from any agreement in fact of the parties. The
Kansas decisions are in accord with the general rule laid
down in the adjudicated cases. And under the Kansas de-
cisions privity is not essential where an implied warranty
is imposed by the law on the basis of public policy.6 5 0
648. Beck v. Spindler, supra note 634 at 683.
649. 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
650. Id. at 504, citing Nichols v. Nold, supra note 1; Graham v. Bottenfield's
Inc., supra note 499; Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., supra note 1;
Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., supra note 1.
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After reviewing a number of cases decided in Kansas and Mis-
souri (since the contract of sale was made in the latter state al-
though the accident occurred in the former), the court concluded
that these decisions "are in accord with the trend of modern au-
thorities" and that there was an implied warranty of fitness on the
part of the manufacturer to the decedent wife although privity was
absent. Since this warranty was breached, judgment of the trial
court in favor of the administratrix would be affirmed. 6 51
Although there have been a number of other cases6 52 where the in-
651. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, supra note 649 at 506, recognizing
that in Missouri, the highest court has not spoken:
"It is true that the Missouri decision is by an intermediate court of appeals.
However, where jurisdiction rests solely on diversity of citizenship and there is
no controlling decision by the highest court of a state, a decision by an intermedi-
ate court should be followed by the Federal court, absent, as here, of convincing
evidence that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.
It seems curious that the year before the United States Court of Appeals,
in Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1958) had declared that
'implied warranties, in the absence of privity, are restricted in Kansas to food
and beverage products, glass containers or beverages, and hair dye' " at 319. It
would appear that the later decision in Hammond, supra is compatible with the
progressive trend of the times.
652. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960),
discussing at some length BahIman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683,
288 N.W. 309 (1939) and ordering judgment to be entered for the plaintiff; Gray
Line Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 280 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1960); Lander
Motors, Inc., v. Lee Tire & Rubber Co. of New York, 78 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. App.
1953); Shoopak v. United States Rubber Co., 17 Misc.2d 201, 183 N.Y.S.2d 112
(1959); Levitt v. Ford Motor Co., 215 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1961), where the
court declines to entertain the suit, absent privity:
"With respect to the action for breach of warranty, it has long been the law
in this state that there can be no warranty, express or implied, without privity
of contract. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1961).
"Plaintiff argues, however, that the Greenberg case, supra, shows a departure
from that long-established rule. That is true, but in that very case the Court of
Appeals indicated that, for the present at least, the ancient rule has not been
completely abandoned. The court said:
'So convincing a showing of injustice and impracticality calls upon us to
move but we should be cautious and take one step at a time. * * * At least as to
food and household goods, the presumption should be that the purchase was made
for all the members of the household.'
"Whether the rule in the Greenberg case should be extended to automobiles
is a matter for the appellate courts to decide. As the law presently stands, it
does not appear that the Greenberg case has abolished, with respect to all forms
of merchandise, the ancient doctrine that privity of contract is necessary to sup-
port an action for breach of warranty."
State ex. rel. Herbert, Attorney General v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Ohio St. 376,
35 N.E.2d 437 (1941); Holley v. Central Auto Parts, 347 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ.
App 1961).
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jury was caused by tire failure, or the tires were not as represented,6 5 3
other automotive accessories or appurtenances have come in for
a fair share of litigation; Zahn v. Ford Motor Co. 65 4 is an example.
Here, the plaintiff lost the sight of an eye when he was thrown
against an ashtray on the dashboard when the driver of the car
in which he was riding had to brake suddenly. It appeared that the
ashtray was defective, and the jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff. Denying defendant manufacturer's motion for a new trial,
the court found that the evidence supported the verdict and that
liability existed even without privity.6 5 5
An automotive accessory which has been the subject of intensive
advertising is the seat belt. In one of the first of the cases wherein
such a belt failed to live up to the representations made for it, Kapp
v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 6 5 6 decided last year, the trial court
granted defendants' motions for directed verdicts. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that evidence as to the negligence
of the installer of an automobile seat belt and its failure to warn
users as to its limitations was insufficient for presentation to the
jury. The seat belt had been purchased by the employer of the plain-
tiff for installation in the latter's automobile. When used by the
plaintiff's wife it failed when most needed, that is, during a three-
car collision in which plaintiff's wife was seriously injured, largely
because of the failure of the seat belt to hold at the moment of im-
pact. The court refused to accept the theory of res ipsa loquitur on
the ground that a safety belt is not "such a piece of equipment" as
to which this theory would be properly applicable where the belt
breaks, quoting Sleezer v. Lang. 657 This seems open to serious ques-
tion; after all, what is the purpose of a safety belt? A strong and
well-reasoned dissenting opinion points out that there was ample evi-
653. Giove v. Lepcofker, 101 A.2d 259 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1953).
654. 164 F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn. 1958). Cf. Hermanson v. Town Motors, 126
F. Supp. 519 (D. Conn. 1953).
655. Citing Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955),
the court noted that in Minnesota a stranger to the contract can only maintain
an action ex delicto; query: How does this square with the holding in Beck v.
Spindler, supra note 634 ?
This appears to be in accord with the present state of the law in Pennsyl-
vania under the holding in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 3, since
a stranger to the consideration may not bring an action in breach of warranty,
although a purchaser or subpurchaser in the distributive chain may.
656. 353 S.W.2d 5 (Ark. 1962).
657. 170 Neb. 239, 102 N.W.2d 435 (1960), where the court, oddly enough,
stated that "a safety belt is not such a piece of equipment that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applies thereto in case it breaks." It is difficult to understand
why this should be so.
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dence to go to the jury on the question of negligence, and that it
was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendants. 6 58
It appears that separate suits were filed based on breach of war-
ranty; these, as far as is known, are still pending.65 9
G. Miscellaneous Products.
Aside from automobiles, trucks, trailers, aircraft and their innu-
merable accessories, there are a host of other mechanical devices and
contrivances which have proved defective and caused injuries to
their users. Other products covered by warranties have occasioned
property damage because of defects in their manufacture. A few
examples of each type will conclude this examination and analysis
of products liability cases. In the forefront of the first group is
Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co.,6 6 0 typical of the cases not involving
food or automotive products but dealing with other articles possessed
of dangerous propensities. In the Peterson case it was a two-inch
rubber bonded abrasive wheel which blew up and injured the plaintiff.
Similar cases are discussed by the California court and include
Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 6 6 1 Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel
Co.,662 and Zesch v. Abrasive Co.6 6 3 Although absence of privity be-
tween Peterson and the manufacturer was advanced as a defense, the
court decided that "the trend today is towards disappearance of
the requirement of privity of contract in cases where it is foresee-
able that someone other than the immediate vendee will be injured
by a defective product." Since the plaintiff was an employee of the
purchaser of the abrasive wheel, the court concluded that he "should
fairly be considered to be in privity to the vendor-manufacturer with
respect to the implied warranties of fitness for use and of mer-
chantable quality upon which recovery is here sought." 66 4
658. Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., supra note 656 at 19, pointing out
that plaintiffs offered proof that belt was defective, that it broke, and that the
breaking, with other facts, caused the injury to Mrs. Kapps.
659. It appears that two separate actions were instituted, one against the
vendor, the other in a federal court against the manufacturer of the automobile
and the producer of the seat belt.
660. Supra note 611.
661. 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio C.P. 1951).
662. 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E. 482 (1907).
663. 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944).
664. Peterson v. Lamb, supra note 611 at 342, 353 P.2d at 577; this reason-
ing is somewhat similar to the view of the court in Rogers v. Toni Home Perma-
nent Co., supra note 1; General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, supra note 1, and Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Co., Inc., supra note 1.
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In a very recent case involving Pennsylvania law, Smith v. Hobart
Manufacturing Co., 6 6 5 a meat grinder from which the guard had
been removed by the employer was responsible for injuries to an
employee's hand. The trial court rendered judgment for the em-
ployee, 6 6 6 and the manufacturer and employer appealed. After a
careful review of the evidence, and citation of various cases includ-
ing Mannsz v. Macwhyte,6 6 7 the appellate court reversed and re-
manded "with directions to order a partial new trial" in order to de-
termine whether the employee would have been injured even if the
guard had not been removed. 6 68 Since the decision in Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corporation,6 6 8a this holding, at least as to the manu-
facturer, seems no longer valid since the employee was not a subpur-
chaser within the "distributive chain."
Another product which has been responsible for personal injuries
when defectively manufactured is wire rope or cable. In Mannsz v.
Macwhyte,6 6 9 mentioned above, the federal court had occasion to
consider breach of warranty in a case where wire rope manufactured
by the Macwhyte Company had been sold to plaintiff by one Bradford.
While being used to support a scaffold, it broke causing serious in-
juries to the plaintiff. The court examined case by case the manner
in which the requirement of privity had been encroached upon and
finally concluded that the requirement "has been obliterated from the
Pennsylvania law." However, it was found that the rope had not been
used in accordance with the directions, and therefore, no recovery
was permissible. In this conclusion, the Third Circuit seems to have
been mistaken in light of the latest asseveration emanating from the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Cor-
poration6 6 9a which must be deemed as overruling Mannsz v. Mac-
whyte, supra, at least in so far as it pertains to plaintiffs who are
not purchasers or subpurchasers in the distributive chain.
Florida seems to have definitely discarded the requirement of
privity as is demonstrated by a similar case, Continental Copper &
665. 302 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1962).
666. 194 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Pa. 1961); see also 185 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Pa.
1960).
667. 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
668. In addition to Mannsz v. Macwhyte, supra note 667, the court also
relied on Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949); Tohan
v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 265 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1959); Solomon v. White
Motor Co., 153 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
668a. Supra note 3; the case is stated, supra in text, notes 80a to 80k in-
clusive.
669. Supra note 667.
669a. Supra note 3.
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Steel Indus. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., where the plaintiff re-
covered damages from the manufacturer when a wire rope or cable
proved to be defective. 67 0
Two years later, a court of appeals in Florida cited Cornelius, supra,
in support of the proposition that privity of contract is not necessary
in an action for recovery upon an implied warranty, Hector Supply
Co. v. Carter,6 7 1 when a defective lawn mower injured the pur-
chaser's employee. The court cited another Florida case where an
aluminum rocking chair had cut off one of the plaintiff's fingers,
Matthews v. Lawnlite Co.6 72 Reversing the trial court's judgment
dismissing the complaint, although privity was absent, the appellate
court felt that "no one would ever suspect danger under the arm
of a lounge chair designed for ease and comfort." However, in the
Carter case, supra, the court found that no warranty had been made.
In what promises to be a fertile field for extensive litigation, ex-
posure to radioactive substances, there is a recent case, McVey v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 6 7 3 which gives full effect to a disclaimer
provision. 6 7 4 The court also found that a causal connection between
the injury and the alleged negligence had not been established by
the evidence although it was clear that "two radioactive pellets upon
opening the reactor can [had become] pulverized and contaminated
the air as radioactive dust." 6 7 5 The disclaimer provision was very
broad and effectively exempted the parties from any possible warran-
ties or other representations relative to the radioactive materials
which it covered. This clause in the contract is set forth below. 6 7 6
In the face of this disclaimer, it would seem that some form of in-
surance would be necessary so long as the provision is not found
670. 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958).
671. 122 So.2d 22 (Fla. App. 1960).
672. 88 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956); this case is discussed in Noel, Manufac-
turers' Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J.
816 (1962).
673. 288 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1961).
674. See Section IV (B), text at notes 184-207, supra.
675. McVey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 673 at 54.
676. "6. Neither the Government, the Commission, nor the operator of the
AEC facility filling this order makes any express or implied warranty or other
representation that (a) materials accepted for a service irradiation will not be
destroyed, damaged, or otherwise altered in physical or chemical properties in
the process of irradiation, or (b) materials furnished under this order (1) will not
result in injury or damage when used for the purpose authorized by the Commis-
sion, (2) will accomplish the results for which they are requested and authorized
by the Commission, (3) are safe for any other use, or (4) have particular physical
or chemical properties or are of a particular quantity * * *."
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contrary to public policy as in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
InC.6 7 7
A great many products liability cases have arisen from defective
heating 6 78 or cooling installations.6 7 9 Likewise, agricultural trac-
tors, implements and similar machinery have often been the subject
of warranties not infrequently breached. 68 0 In many of these, there
is no question of personal injury, the only damage being to a prop-
erty interest. In this field, Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
677, Supra note 1.
678. Superior Combustion Industries v. Schollman Bros. Co., 271 F.2d 357
(8th Cir. 1959); Delta Tank Manufacturing Co. v. Weatherhead Co., 150 F. Supp.
525 (N.D. Ohio 1957); Kamen Coal Products Co., Inc. v. Struthers Wells Corp.,
159 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. N.Y. 1958); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal.2d
573, 360 P.2d 897 (1961); Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Affiliated Gas Equipment,
Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. App. 1961); Delgaudio v. Ingerson, 19 Conn. Sup.
151, 110 A.2d 626 (1954); Sum Wong v. Hazard, 167 N.E.2d 565 (Ill. App. 1960);
Hayes Construction Co. v. Silverthorn, 343 Mich. 421, 72 N.W.2d 190 (1955);
Pineau v. White, 101 N.H. 119, 135 A.2d 716 (1957); Altman Furniture Co. v.
Scarso, 122 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio App. 1954); Evens v. Young, 264 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn.
1954); Eliason v. Walker, 42 Wash.2d 473, 256 P.2d 298 (1953); Fonferek v. Wis-
consin Rapids Gas & Electric Co., 268 Wis. 278, 67 N.W.2d 268 (1954).
679. Burge Ice Machine Co. v. Weiss, 219 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1955); Universal
Major Electrical Appliances, Inc. v. Glenwood Range Co., 223 F.2d 76 (4th Cir.
1955) aff'g 124 F. Supp. 183 (D. Md. 1954); Donnelly v. Governair Corp., 145
F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Bayliss Machine & Welding Co. v. Huntsville
Ice & Coal Co., 265 Ala. 383, 91 So.2d 483 (1956); Davies v. Motor Radio Co., 236
S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1951); B. H. Tureen Hotels v. Nachman & Co., 317 S.W.2d 422
(Mo. 1958); Foodmaster, Inc. Y. Moyer, 141 A.2d 890 (N.H. 1958); Steele v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 159 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio App. 1958); Frigidinners v.
Branchtown Gun Club, supra note 33; Huddleston v. Lee, 39 Tenn. App. 465, 284
S.W.2d 705 (1955); cf. United Engineering Co. of Louisiana v. Durbin, 68 So.2d
614 (La. App. 1953).
680. United States v. Goodman, 111 F. Supp. 32 (W.D. N.C. 1953); Rasmus
v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Eaton v. Massey-Harris-
Ferguson, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 853 (W.D. N.Y. 1957); D'Orsay Equipment Co. v.
United States Rubber Co., 199 F. Supp. 427 (1961); The O.S. Stapley Co. v. F.O.
Newby, 57 Ariz. 24, 110 P.2d 547 (1941); Hambrick v. Peoples Mercantile & Im-
plement Co., 228 Ark. 1021, 311 S.W.2d 785 (1958); Archer v. Bucy, 357 S.W.2d
636 (Ark. 1962); Sanchotena v. Tower Co., 74 Idaho 541, 265 P.2d 1021 (1953);
Williams v. Shadow, 77 So.2d 48 (La. App. 1955); Sensabaugh v. Morgan Bros.
Farm Supply, Inc. 165 A.2d 914 (Md. 1960); Lewis v. Zukerman, 357 Mich. 326,
98 N.W.2d 566 (1959); Hess v. Koskovitch, 62 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1954); Har-
grove v. Lewis, 313 S.W.2d 594; Dugan v. Trout, 271 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. App. 1954);
St. George v. Grisafe, 2 N.J. Super. 297, 118 A.2d 835 (1955); Jones v. Klachkin,
199 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 557, 107
S.E.2d 170 (1959); Wyatt v. North Carolina Equipment Co., 117 S.E.2d 21 (N.C.
1960); Petrus Machinery, Inc. v. Radiator Specialty Co., 125 S.E.2d 367 (N.C.
1962); Northwestern Equipment v. Tentis, 74 N.W.2d 833 (N.D. 1956); Tharp v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 42 N.M. 443, 81 P.2d 703 (1938); Rogers v, J. I. Case Co.,
272 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Freeman v. Stemm Bros., 44 Wash.2d 189,
265 P.2d 1055 (1954).
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Supply, Inc.6 8 1 is as revolutionary as Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. 6 82 in its disregard of the so-called privity requirement.
The subject matter in Spence was a fairly innocuous product, cinder
blocks. These had been purchased by a builder for use in the con-
struction of a home for the plaintiff who was clearly not in privity
of contract with the defendant manufacturer. In a masterful opinion
the court examines the pros and cons of privity, reviewing all of the
pertinent precedents, and casts its lot with the more enlightened
group of jurisdictions which consider privity a waning concept. After
the cinder blocks had been installed, they developed red splotches de-
scribed as "bleeding," began to disintegrate and proved entirely unfit
for use in walls. Recognizing that in holding for the plaintiff, it was
breaking with the past, the court said:
As the court below correctly observed, there is little doubt
that in the past our Court has for the most part devotedly
followed the "general rule" and been reluctant to permit a
third person not in privity to recover from a manufacturer
on a theory of negligence or implied warranty. And it has
correspondingly been reluctant to extend recovery-beyond
what may loosely be termed food cases involving personal
injuries--to other defective products, regardless of whether
they involved personal injuries or injuries to property. 68 3
There had been a finding in the court below that the cinder blocks
were defective and that this constituted a breach of warranty that
the goods were of merchantable quality, contrary to Section 15 of
the Uniform Sales Act. Reverting to its discussion of the food cases,
the Supreme Court of Michigan, by a closely divided court, added:
In fact, in the past in these situations we have not only
tended to severely limit the factual area of recovery but we
have shown an equally ready disposition to adopt and em-
brace the whole dreary legal apparatus and rhetoric so long
employed in these situations to narrow or prevent any re-
covery at all. Some of these open sesame phrases are:
whether there was privity or the lack of it; whether the
defect was latent or patent; whether or not the offending
product was sold in the original package; whether a vague
requirement of a higher degree of care might sometimes
alter the application of the rule; or whether the defective
product did or did not contain an 'inherently or imminently
681. Supra note 1.
682. Supra note 1.
683. Srnolenski v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 280 Mich. 329, 273 N.W. 587
(1937).
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dangerous' article or substance harmful to humans. We do
not exhaust the list. There are other equally impressive and
ominous catch-phrases, and awesome have been some of the
semantic bogs negotiated by ours and other appellate courts
when in particularly harsh cases they have attempted by
such artificial exceptions to get around the barrier imposed
by their own equally artificial 'general rule' of non-
liability. 6 8 4
Various cases are reviewed in which the Michigan courts have "fal-
tered" in their reverence for the hallowed doctrine of privity as
exemplied in Smolenski v. Libby, McNeill c Libby,6 8 5 as in Bosch
v. Damm,68 6 where the court "strayed from the paths of virtue"
to the extent of approving a recovery by a remote vendee against
the manufacturer of a defective refrigerator. However, the judg-
ment was later vacated on other grounds. Another departure oc-
curred in Ebers v. General Chemical Co.687 where the user of a
defective insecticide was permitted to recover against the remote
manufacturer although privity was lacking. Nevertheless, these cases
were inconclusive.
Saddled with such a doctrine and its hair-splitting excep-
tions, it is not surprising that while a few of our decisions
have afforded passing illusory comfort to all, certainty has
been afforded to none. The reason is simple: A court lack-
ing a clear and understandable rule of its own can scarely be
expected to impart it to others. Legal confusion has in-
evitably resulted. Aggrieved plaintiffs have scarely known
whether to sue in deceit or fraud or for negligence or breach
of warranty--or indeed whether it was worthwhile to sue at
all. 6 88
In Hertzler v. Manshum,6 8 9 where poison was found in some flour,
the Michigan court "uttered the towering legal understatement of
the year" 6 9 0 when it observed that the cases "appear hopelessly
at variance." Adhering strictly to the privity concept, the court in
Hertzler held food cases to be an exception, but "only by reason of
684. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 1
at 127, 90 N.W. 2d at 877, noted 48 GEORGETOWN L.J. 606 (1960).
685. Supra note 683.
686. 296 Mich. 522, 296 N.W. 669 (1941).
687. 310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1944).
688. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 1
at 128, 90 N.W.2d at 878.
689. 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924).
690. The year was 1924, supra note 689.
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a want of a high degree of care." This case is not unique in the
"curious things courts can bring themselves to do and say when they
try vainly to wed the outmoded thinking and legal cliches of the
past to the pressing realities of modem life." 6 9 1
Then, after running through the entire gamut of variations, ex-
ceptions, the fate of privity in the negligence cases as exemplified
by MacPherson,6 9 2 and its interposition in breach of warranty
cases, the court concludes that it might be well simply to eliminate
the so-called "general rule" entirely in line with the suggestion of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Carter v. Yard-
ley: 693
The long opinion in the Yardley Case concludes very
simply: The time has come for us to recognize that the
asserted general rule no longer exists. In principle it was un-
sound. It tended to produce unjust results. It has been
abandoned by the great weight of authority elsewhere. We
now abandon it in this Commonwealth.
To these sentiments we utter a fervent amen. 6 9 4
In Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 6 9 5 decided
by the New York Court of Appeals last year, there appears to be a
further departure from the doctrine of privity. The plaintiff had en-
tered into a number of contracts for the purchase of certain textile
material. When some of this material did not conform to written
representations regarding its qualities, breach of warranty was re-
lied on in an action against the manufacturer. Lack of privity was,
of course, the defense introduced by the defendant who had pro-
duced the resins with which the textile material had been treated
to prevent the very shrinkage which had nevertheless occurred.
Beginning with Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co. 6 9 6 where the mischief
in New York all started and the privity requirement was strictly en-
forced, the court reviewed the cases right up to the most recent
pronouncement in Greenberg v. Lorenz.6 9 7 As has been noted in a
691. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 1,
supra note 688.
692. Supra note 218.
693. 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), described by the court as "a lead-
ing modern case in this field."
694. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 1
at 135, 90 N.W.2d at 881.
695. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
696. 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
697. Supra note 1.
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previous section, 698 the court held in Greenberg that, in cases in-
volving foodstuffs and other household goods, the implied warranties
of fitness and merchantability run from the retailer to the members
of the purchaser's household, regardless of privity of contract. In
Randy Knitwear the court was asked to extend the rationale of
Greenberg to an action for breach of an express warranty by a re-
mote purchaser against a manufacturer who induced the purchase
by representing the quality of the goods in public and on labels which
accompanied the goods. The court found that privity should be dis-
pensed with here, particularly in the context of the modern world
of merchandising in which the manufacturer launches a direct ap-
peal to the ultimate consumer through the use of mass media adver-
tising and "sanguine" representations on packages and labels. 6 9 9
The rationale underlying the decisions rejecting the priv-
ity requirement is easily understood in the light of present-
day commercial practices. It may once have been true that
the warranty which really induced the sale was normally
an actual term of the contract of sale. Today, however, the
significant warranty, the one which effectively induces the
purchase, is frequently that given by the manufacturer
through mass advertising and labeling to ultimate business
users or to consumers with whom he has no direct contract-
ual relationship.
The world of merchandising is, in brief, no longer a world
of direct contract; it is, rather, a world of advertising and,
when representations expressed and disseminated in the
mass communications media and on labels (attached to the
goods themselves) prove false and the user or consumer is
damaged by reason of his reliance on those representations,
it is difficult to justify the manufacturer's denial of liability
on the sole ground of the absence of technical privity. Man-
ufacturers make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals
and other media to call attention, in glowing terms, to the
qualities and virtues of their products, and this advertising
is directed at the ultimate consumer or at some manufac-
turer or supplier who is not in privity with them. Equally
sanguine representations on packages and labels frequently
accompanying the article throughout its journey to the
ultimate consumer and, as intended, are relied upon by re-
mote purchasers. Under these circumstances, it is highly
unrealistic to limit a purchaser's protection to warranties
698. Text at note 356, supra.
699. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 8spra 695.
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made directly to him by his immediate seller. The protec-
tion he really needs is against the manufacturer whose pub-
lished representations caused him to make the purchase.7 00
It is of the utmost importance to note that although the defend-
ant strongly urged that strict liability should not be imposed be-
cause the fabric shrinkage complained of would not cause personal
injury, the court declines, in the able opinion carefully prepared
by Mr. Justice Fuld, to so hold and finds that "most of the courts
which have dispensed with the requirement of privity in this sort of
case have not limited their decisions in this manner." 7 0 '
700. Id; the court continued:
"The policy of protecting the public from injury, physical or pecuniary,
resulting from misrepresentations outweighs allegiance to an old and out-moded
technical rule of law which, if observed, might be productive of great injustice.
The manufacturer places his product upon the market and, by advertising and
labeling it, represents its quality to the public in such a way as to induce reliance
upon his representations. He unquestionably intends and expects that the product
will be purchased and used in reliance upon his express assurance of its quality
and, in fact, it is so purchased and used. Having invited and solicited the use, the
manufacturer should not be permitted to avoid responsibility, when the expected
use leads to injury and loss, by claiming that he made no contract directly with
the user.
"It is true that in many cases the manufacturer will ultimately be held
accountable for the falsity of his representations, but only after an unduly
wasteful process of litigation. Thus, if the consumer or ultimate business user
sues and recovers, for breach of warranty, from his immediate seller and if the
latter, in turn, sues and recovers against his supplier in recoupment of his
damages and costs, eventually, after several separate actions by those in the
chain of distribution, the manufacturer may finally be obliged 'to shoulder the
responsibility which should have been his in the first instance.'
"Indeed, and it points up the injustice of the rule, insistence upon the privity
requirement may well leave the aggrieved party, whether he be ultimate business
user or consumer, without a remedy in a number of situations. For instance, he
would be remediless either where his immediate seller's representations as to
quality were less extravagant or enthusiastic than those of the manufacturer or
where . . . there has been an effective disclaimer of any and all warranties by
the plaintiff's immediate seller. ...
"We perceive no warrant for holding-as the appellant urges-that strict
liability should not here be imposed because the defect involved, fabric shrinkage,
is not likely to cause personal harm or injury. Although there is language in
some of the opinions which appears to support Cyanamid's contention . . . most
of the courts which have dispensed with the requirement of privity in this sort
of case have not limited their decisions in this manner. And this makes sense.
Since the basis of liability turns not upon the character of the product but upon
the representation, there is no justification for a distinction on the basis of the
type of injury suffered or the type of article or goods involved." Randy Knitwear,
Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., supra note 695.
701. Since the plaintiff was a subpurchaser in the distributive chain, it
seems probable that his action against the manufacturer would have been en-
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VIII. IS PRODUCTS LIABILITY INSURANCE THE ANSWER?
In an economy which boasts of so many labor saving devices, house-
hold and similar appliances, wherein defects are mostly latent and
rarely patent, some sort of protection for the user is essential. It has
been suggested that this protection can best be accomplished by
insurance. 7 0 2 And there are in effect any number of products liability
policies necessitated by the prevalence of "products hazard" exclu-
sionary clauses inserted in general liability contracts. This develop-
ment somewhat parallels the evolution of special airplane travel
coverage, which was developed because of the frequency with which
standard life policies excluded death or injury resulting from the use
of or travel in aircraft. 7 0 3 However, even where products liability
risks are covered, this coverage is often so hedged about and ringed
around with exceptions that its utility becomes doubtful. An examina-
tion of some of the cases may prove enlightening.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co.,704 the insured
sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the insurer was
obligated to defend the insured under a products liability provision
in a "Comprehensive General Liability Policy."' 7 0 The accident hap-
pened when a customer sat in a cane chair which was on display in
the vendor's store in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The chair collapsed
and the customer was injured. The insurance company denied cover-
age and refused to defend the action unless defendant company agreed
to hold the insurer harmless. The court, however, held that under
tertained in Pennsylvania under the most recent pronouncement of the Supreme
Court of that State as it appears in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note
3. For a statement of the case, see text supra, notes 80a to 80k inclusive.
702. More than twenty-five years ago, a writer suggested that consumer
protection might well be effectuated by insurance, see Jeanblanc, Manufacturers'
Liability to Persons Other Than Their Vendees, 24 VA. L.REv. 134 at 158 (1937).
703. Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d
555 (1954) which involved the interpretation of special "Airline Trip Insurance,"
and held the insurer liable in spite of an apparent exclusionary provision.
704. 261 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1958).
705. This policy provided:
"6. Definitions.
* * * * * * * *
"(c) Products Hazard. The term 'products hazard' means
"(1) the handling or use of, the existence of any condition in or a
warranty of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or
distributed by the named insured, * * * if the accident occurs after
the insured has relinquished possession thereof to others and
away from premises owned, rented, or controlled by the insured
* * *." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra note 704
at 776.
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the terms of the endorsement, the insurance company was clearly
obligated to defend the action and although the plaintiffs were un-
successful, the insured was nevertheless entitled to a recovery for
the expenses of litigation.7 0 6
In an action involving a policy which excluded liability for "prod-
ucts hazard," defined in the policy as meaning the handling or use of
goods or products manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed by the
insured if the accident should occur after the insured had relin-
quished possession, judgment was for the insurer, Bitts v. General
Accident Fire c Life Assurance Corp.7 0 7 Vendor-insured's customer
had been injured when the latter opened the end of a refrigerator
coil and it exploded. As the insured no longer had possession of the
coil, the appellate court affirmed.7 0 8
In two other cases, the customer fared no better. In United Pacific
Insurance Co. v. Schaecher,7 0 9 the insurer brought this action for
declaratory relief to interpret products liability coverage of a com-
prehensive policy where the damage was caused by the emergence
of live beetles in wood used in finished homes based on breach of a
warranty of quality. The insurer was held not liable since this was
not an accident within the meaning of the policy, and the insured had
not sustained the burden of proving coverage. 7 10
In the other case, Liberty Building Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 7 1 1
the trial court dismissed the case and this appeal resulted. Again,
the question as to the meaning of "accident" was before the court.
It was held that if the insured was obliged to repair or replace some
product of work which proved defective, this was not within the
706. Although Sears prevailed in the White litigation, while this appeal
was pending, this matter is not rendered moot. Sears seeks to recover its ex-
pense in defending the White suit, for which Sears contends Travelers is liable.
Id. at 777.
707. 282 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1960).
708. Furthermore, the coil was no longer on the premises of the insured, a
condition precedent to the insurer's liability.
709. 167 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
710. The court observed that: "The term 'accident' has been variously de-
fined. In United States Mutual Acc. Ass'n. v. Barry, 1889, 131 U.S. 100, at page
121, 9 S.Ct. 755, at page 762, 33 L. Ed. 60, 'accidental' is defined as 'happening by
chance, unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course of things,
or not as expected.' In Richards v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 1891, 89 Cal. 170, at
page 176, 26 P. 762, at page 763, 'accident' is defined to Include 'any event which
takes place without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or
affected by the event.'" United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Schaecher, supra note
709 at 508.
711. 2 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Cal. App. 1960).
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coverage of the policy.7 1 2 It appeared that substantial damage to
the stucco finish of certain houses was caused by a defect in the
soil upon which the houses were built. Since this was expressly
excluded, there could be no recovery.
However, to counterbalance these adverse decisions, there is a case
of novel impression wherein the insurer sought a declaration of non-
coverage of a claim being made against its insured which arose under
a "dram shop" act.7 1 3 But the court, in American Surety Co. v.
Rodek,7 1 4 found that the policy had been issued to defendants in
connection with the operation of their restaurant. They were alleged
to have sold liquor to an intoxicated patron thereby violating the
Connecticut Dram Shop Act. 7 1 5 Holding that the statute in ques-
tion was "primarily compensatory in purpose rather than penal,"
the court held that there was no prohibition on insurance coverage.
As to the second defense claimed by the company, namely an excep-
tion under the products liability provision, it was pointed out that
this exception would only cover a defect in the product sold, but did
not cover assaults committed by an intoxicated person to whom
liquor was sold. The insurance company was held liable.
Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co.7 1 6 is a decidedly more
representative type of products insurance case, one from which
prospective policy holders may take heart. When the insured was
faced with three suits in California and five in Michigan based on
alleged defects in certain tubing he had installed, he called on his
products liability insurer to defend or settle these actions. Thin
steel tubing, used by building contractors and plumbers for radiant
heating, was installed in the concrete floors of houses or other
buildings without basements. Hot water from a boiler flowed through
the tubing; when leaks developed, the aforementioned actions for
breach of warranty or negligence were filed against Bundy, the in-
sured. He settled several of these claims and then brought this action
against the insurance company. The trial court held that since the
law suits in question against the insured involved negligence or
712. As the court observed: "In this connection, Exclusion (f) expressly ex-
cludes from liability under the policy, damages sustained by any 'goods or products
* * * or premises alienated * * * or work completed * * * out of which the acci-
dent arises.' (Emphasis added.) This Exclusion means that if the insured be-
comes liable to replace or repair any 'goods or products' or 'premises alienated'
or 'work completed' after the same has caused an accident because of a defective
condition, the cost of such replacement or repair is not recoverable under the
policy." Liberty Building Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., supra note 711 at 331.
713. Connecticut Dram Shop Act, § 4307, G.S.1949.
714. 128 F. Supp. 250 (D. Conn. 1954).
715. Bupra note 713.
716. 298 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1962).
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breach of implied warranty, the damages were not caused by accident
and were therefore, not covered by the policies. The insurer appealed
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
holding:
The fact that the claims here involved breach of war-
ranty or negligence did not remove them from the category
of accident. Bundy would not be legally obligated to pay a
claim arising out of an accident occurring without its
negligence or breach of warranty. If the liability policy
were construed so as to cover only accidents not involving
breach of warranty or negligence, then no protection would
be given to the insured. The insured would not need liability
insurance which did not cover the only claims for which it
could be held liable. The word accident is common in most
liability policies and should not be construed in this type of
case as not including claims involving negligence or breach
of warranty. 7 1 7
In support of its holding, the court cites Hauenstein v. St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co.,718 particularly as to the definition and
meaning of the word "accident" as used in an insurance policy:
There is no doubt that the property damage to the build-
ing caused by the application of defective plaster was 'caused
by accident' within the meaning of the insurance contract,
since the damage was a completely unexpected and unin-
tended result. Accident, as a source and cause of damage
to property, within the meaning of an accident policy, is an
unexpected unforeseen or undesigned happening or conse-
quence from either a known or an unknown cause. 7 19
The court held for the insured and noted that a similar result was
reached in Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity
Co., 7 2 0 where "recovery was allowed for the cost of removal of de-
fective aluminum doors" and the cost of installation of new ones. 721
717. Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., supra note 716 at 153.
718. 242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W.2d 122 (1954).
719. Hauenstein v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., supra note 718, 65
N.W.2d at 126.
720. 51 Cal.2d 558, 334 P.2d 881 (1959).
721. In Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indemnfty Co., supra note 716, the court
cited the following cases: "Diefenbach v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 280
Mich. 507, 273 N.W. 783 (1937); Pawlicki v. Hollenbeck, 250 Mich. 38, 229 N.W.
626 (1930); Hunt v. United States Accident Association, 146 Mich. 521, 109 N.W.
1042 (1906); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943)."
The insurer was also held liable in General Casualty Co. v. Larson, 196 F.2d
170 (8th Cir. 1952); Reed Roller Bit Co. v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 198
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CONCLUSION
A clear and steadily growing majority of jurisdictions have oblit-
erated the privity requirement from actions for breach of war-
ranty in the traditional field of foods, beverages and other products
sold for human use or consumption. But some have gone beyond and
are including automotive vehicles, aircraft and other mechanical
devices. There are jurisdictions which have travelled the entire dis-
tance and simply discarded privity as a bar to recovery, either by
judicial decision or by legislation, especially where the warranty is
constructive. This then is the end result of a long and gradual proc-
ess of erosion characterized by the use of fictions, exceptions and
categorical repudiation. So numerous have these exceptions become,
as many courts recognize, they have devoured the rule.
These fictions or exceptions often shade into each other, nor
have most courts made any effort to draw sharp lines of demarca-
tion. As in the case of dangerous products and the tort actions they
gave rise to, the privity requirement was gradually eliminated until
today, it seems virtually nonexistent. In warranty cases, the major
departures from strict privity fall into one of the following cate-
gories:
1. The buyer is the agent of the injured consumer;
2. The vendor is the agent of the manufacturer, or is a conduit
between the latter and the consumer;
3. The manufacturer who advertises extensively makes a general
offer or warranty to those who use his products;
4. The consumer is a subpurchaser within the distributive chain
or conduit; and finally,
5. The consumer or other injured party is the third party
beneficiary of the sales contract.
But even where the courts have been inclined to relax the doctrine
of privity, they have at times considered themselves blocked by a
narrow interpretation or construction of the language of a sales
statute. Thus, the contention has been advanced that certain sec-
tions of the Uniform Sales Act preclude affording any relief for
F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1952) cert. den. 344 U.S. 920; Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Hercules Powder Co., 224 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1955); Nielson v. Travelers Indemnity
Co., 174 F. Supp. 648 (D. Iowa 1959) aff'd 277 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1959); King v.
Mason, 95 So.2d 705 (La. App. 1957) aff'd 234 La. 299, 99 So.2d 117; McAllister v.
Century Indemnity Co., 24 N.J. Super. 289, 94 A.2d 345 (1953), aff'd 12 N.J. 395,
97 A.2d 160, where the policy was characterized as "most ambiguous" and ac-
cordingly, all doubts were resolved in favor of the insured; Philadelphia Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Grandview, 42 Wash.2d 357, 255 P.2d 540 (1953).
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breach of warranty to one not in strict privity of contract. Other
courts have enlarged this interpretation to include those "in the
distributive chain." And some have held that the legislative intent
should be held to include those who suffer injury from use of the
product. Analysis of the cases heretofore considered makes one con-
clusion ineluctable: The desired uniformity has not been achieved
under this statute.
Whether the desired harmony will be achieved under the compar-
able provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code remains to be seen.
While the Code provides for a considerable latitude of judicial in-
terpretation, two significant inroads on the doctrine of privity are
specifically made: Express or implied warranties of the vendor ex-
tend to persons in the family or household of the buyer or guests in
his home. Also, the antiquated and rather absurd notion that serving
or "uttering" food in a restaurant is not a sale has been laid to rest
in a long awaited grave.
As the dawn of the third millenium A.D. approaches, the conclu-
sion is inescapable that the protection accorded to the consumer,
whether under the guise of negligence or breach of warranty, ex-
press or implied, will be ever more in the direction of absolute li-
ability of the vendor or manufacturer. With privity on the wane,
caveat venditor will be the rule, not caveat emptor; the time has
come to hold a requiem for this long overdue anachronism.
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